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This thesis uncovers the reasons behind, and offers a solution to, the disconnection 
between theories of nationalism and histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms. These 
two fields of research remain isolated from each other and rarely interact. The field of 
nationalism studies has little to offer to the study of Middle Eastern nationalisms as the 
leading theories of the field base their explanation on European historical experience. 
Histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms, on the other hand, generally eschew any 
theoretical elaboration and remain largely wedded to narrative explanation.  
 
Earlier chapters of the thesis trace the wellspring of this separation to an institutionally 
prevalent and rigid division of labour between disciplines and area studies. In Chapter 1, 
the thesis aims to clarify the causes of theoretical poverty in the histories of Middle 
Eastern nationalisms, with a specific focus on the cases of Iran and Turkey. The 
outcome of this poverty is a tendency to treat these nationalisms as unique, which ends 
up tacitly assuming the national unit of analysis and theoretically downplays the 
constitutive international dimension of their emergence. On the other side of the gulf, 
the dominant theories in the field of nationalism studies espouses a generalist thrust in 
their explanation, but only by abstracting from the historical conditions of Western 
Europe. This leads, argues Chapter 2, to the poverty of theory: as the historical 
conditions (and causal mechanisms) identified in the nationalism studies literature were 
absent in non-Western European cases, these nationalisms appear misshapen, or as 
theoretical externalities. This problem is termed variously as internalism, Eurocentrism 
or methodological nationalism.  
 
The problem itself has been identified before; yet previous diagnoses remained without 
a viable prescription. Chapter 3 lays out the main claim of this thesis: that the 
internalisms exposed in the previous chapters can be overcome by theoretically 
accounting for the causal significance of international relations for the emergence and 
development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms The chapter then cumulatively pieces 
together a methodological solution by engaging available ways to bridge the gulf 
between theory and history. It starts with exploring the promises and pitfalls of a 
solution previously suggested in the literature: historical comparison. Historical 
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comparison is found to be unsatisfactory on account of its obliviousness towards the 
fact that societies in contact do not only exist in a state of interrelationship but also 
reciprocally alter one another through their interaction. The chapter then reviews the 
recent debate in historiography between ‘comparativists and transnationalists,’ and 
takes a closer look at the calls for bringing transnational history and historical sociology 
into a fruitful exchange. This critical engagement culminates into the invoking of the 
theory of uneven and combined development (U&CD) as the most suitable candidate to 
bridge transnational history and historical sociology in order to overcome the problems 
of internalism in the study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Specifically, U&CD is 
well suited to theoretically integrate the mediating effects on Qajar Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire of other ‘backward’ societies, which experienced similar pressures and 
pursued modernisation with similar goals.        
 
To substantiate these claims, Chapter 4 proposes an alternative periodisation to 
conventional Eurocentric historiography by demonstrating how the Ottoman Empire 
and the dynasties ruling over the Iranian plateau began to transform their external 
relations during the course of eighteenth century by way of bilateral international 
agreements, which marked a ‘conceptual turning point’ in sovereignty and citizenship. 
Then, rather than employing a sole focus on the state level strategies of backwardness, 
which draws a relational distinction between industrialised European powers and late 
developing states of the non-European world, the chapter identifies agents of 
‘transmission and mediation’ located in another late developing society: the expatriate 
Qajar subjects resident in the Ottoman Empire. This community’s experience in the 
modernising empire and its convictions that the Ottomans could act as a model to 
reform the Qajar state and society adds a layer to our understanding of late 
development, which I call ‘mediated modernisation.’ This aspect of late development is 
largely overlooked in the accounts of Qajar modernisation and remained limited to 
specialised empirical studies. 
 
The final chapter advances the ‘mediated modernisation’ argument into the turn-of-the-
century emergence of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms – a period during which the first 
programmatic statements of these ideologies are formulated. The chapter starts by 
evaluating the impact of Japanese modernisation and the result of the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05 on Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The second section focuses on 
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the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across the late developing world 
during early twentieth century. As truly trans-imperial phenomena, the mobility and 
‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ of these constitutionalist movements frontally challenges 
the internalist histories. With a similar challenge in mind, the third section of the 
chapter traces a diverse group of intellectuals and reformists who carried ideas, agitated 
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Theoretical deficiency has been a chronic trait of Middle East Studies. Almost from the 
day it became institutionally visible in the United States, not only its generalist critics in 
the disciplines but also its practitioners questioned its ‘scientific’ purpose and standing 
(Bilgin 2006). Many an eminent scholar lamented the field’s provincial empiricism and 
its failure to do more than ‘a kind of stamp collecting’ to contribute to debates in social 
sciences (Mitchell 2004:75). These criticisms are not peculiar to Middle East Studies. 
Area studies have been traditionally assigned to a subordinate epistemological role and 
tasked with gathering raw data for proper scientists (Cheah 2008).  
 
While fresh fervour was added to the debate over theory (or its absence) with the onset 
of the so-called area studies controversy in the age of globalisation (Mirsepassi, Basu, 
and Weaver 2003; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Banda 1999), in many ways this was old 
wine in new bottles. Disciplinary generalists have over the years complained that the 
findings of the area studies are non-generalisable and, by their standards, of little 
scientific value. Area specialists, in response, have found these claims exaggerated and 
raised a charge of their own. In their view, the works of disciplinary generalists are too 
abstract to be of any use. And what they do is to masquerade what is essentially 
‘American Area Studies’ as universal knowledge.  
 
As it tends to happen in social sciences and humanities, both sides overstated the 
weaknesses of the other. Even then, some Middle East specialists have conceded that 
non-theoretical nature of their field is a problem to be reckoned with (Anderson 1990, 
1999; Ciddi and Levin 2014; Khalidi 1995; Quataert and Sayarı 2003; Somer 2014). In 
the words of Syed Farid Atlas, for instance, ‘the Middle East in general and Iran and 
Turkey in particular have not been areas of analysis that generated significant 
theoretical issues having an impact on various fields and regions’ (1993:473).  
 
This overall condition of the field is observable in the study of specific phenomena in 
the region. Nationalism in the Middle East is the case in point here. While there is little 
dispute over the historically constitutive role of this ideology in the region over the last 
hundred years or so (Gelvin 2011:182), negligible theoretical light has radiated from the 
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study of it. Accordingly, Mosher Behar notes that ‘the specialized scholarship on 
nationalism in the Middle East has rarely posed the defining question "What is 
nationalism?" in as theoretically structured a manner as the comparative social science 
scholarship does’ (2005:592). Nor have these specialised studies shown systematic 
interest in the theoretically oriented studies of nationalism (Marashi 2014).  
 
It is this theoretical deficiency that gives this thesis its commencing impulse and its 
question with specific focus: Why are Iranian and Turkish nationalisms 
un(der)theorised? I derive this question from two initial and preliminary claims:  
 
(i) Case or area studies accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms refrain 
from generalisation and broadly subscribe to empirical description. Thus, they 
suffer from theoretical poverty.  
 
(ii) General theories cannot account for the emergence and development of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms and this generates the poverty of theory in 
nationalism studies.  
 
The two literatures seldom communicate, and when they do, it is of little, if any, 
theoretical impact.1 Presented in the most academically intuitive sense, there is a gulf 
between history and theory.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I first attempt to justify the question. Why is the theoretical 
poverty of the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalism worth studying? And how 
can we identify this problem in the study of these nationalisms? This exercise presents 
brief signposts to my engagement with relevant literatures – both historical and 
theoretical – in the coming chapters by identifying their major problems that have 
created and sustained a gulf between history and theory.  
                                                
1 Nor many scholars traverse the boundary between nomothetic social science disciplines and 
ideographic area studies. Moshe Behar notes pointedly that ‘the only scholar with the Middle 
East as a principal regional focus who has made it into comparative anthologies on nationalism 
is Elie Kedourie’ (2005:596), whose notoriously conservative political views and idealist 
historiography, I must add, are now outmoded (cf. Breuilly 2000; O’Leary 2002). From the 
other way around, the only general work that engages with Iranian and/or Turkish nationalisms 
is by John Breuilly, who locates the Turkish case within the class of ‘reform nationalism outside 




The second step here is to connect nationalism as a historical phenomenon to the 
problems of these literatures – in the sense of a move from the deficiencies identified of 
these literatures to propose a solution. What alternative conceptualisation of nationalism 
can provide a panacea for the problems identified? An exercise in an alternative 
conceptualisation of nationalism shall signal the main premises for a theoretical solution 
to an historical phenomenon. What sort of theory is appropriate for the histories of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms?  
 
Once these foundations are set, I offer several points of clarification on issues that are 
not engaged directly or extensively in the coming chapters, but which need to be stated 
at the outset. This is followed by the chapter plan of the thesis.  
 
Why the Worry about Theory?  
 
My commencing curiosity is empirical. Nationalism has not been a subsidiary 
phenomenon in modern Iran and Turkey. Ali Ansari, for one, notes that nationalism ‘in 
all its manifestations has been the ideological reference point to which all competing 
ideologies [in modern Iran] have ultimately had to adhere, and within which most have 
been subsumed’ (2012:1). Although tension-ridden (Saleh and Worrall 2015), in Iran 
the Islamic Republic has made instrumental use of nationalism, hence defied the 
supposed incompatibility between Islam and nationalism (Grigoriadis and Ansari 
2005:329). Others have made a note of its success in integrating non-Persian ethnicities 
(Ahmadi 2005; Halliday 2000:35; Yaghoubian 2014). Notwithstanding its differing 
instrumentality for different groups, there seems to be no mist around the fact that 
nationalism has manifested formidable magnetism in the modern history of Iran. ‘Every 
social movement in Iran since the 1891 Tobacco Rebellion to the 2009 post-election 
protests,’ observes one scholar, ‘was at least partially motivated by nationalism and 
harboured nationalist goals’ (Litvak 2017:2).     
 
There is no shortage of similar assessments for Turkish nationalism. Hans-Lukas Kieser 
notes that ‘Turkey has been deeply marked by nationalism in the 20th century’ 
(2006:vii). Kadıoğlu and Keyman identify nationalist ideology as one of the key 
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parameters of modern Turkish politics. Even more curiously, they argue that Turkish 
nationalism has become powerful ‘especially since 1999, when Turkey became an 
official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU)’ – a process generally 
regarded as having a corrosive effect on nationalism had, so the authors argue, the 
opposite effect in Turkey (2011:xii; see also, Özkırımlı 2008). In both cases nationalism 
retains its powerful hold. So much so that the authors of a comparative analysis of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, a rare undertaking in the field, makes the historically 
far-reaching claim that ‘nationalism had operated as a dominant ideology in the process 
of the transition to modernity in both Turkey and Iran’ (Keyman and Yılmaz 2006:425). 
This much textual evidence should be enough to offer an initial assertion: Modern Iran 
and Turkey cannot be understood without making sense of the decisive and on-going 
role of nationalism.   
 
And what amplifies this curiosity is the sheer size and the critical purposes of the 
specialised literature. Over the last several decades, the academic study of Turkish 
nationalism has powerfully challenged the Turkish nationalist narrative. It is 
academically superfluous to state that Turkish nation is now thoroughly deconstructed 
and historically exposed as a relatively recent political invention. In this sense, the study 
of Turkish nationalism has closely followed in the footsteps of the modernist wave of 
nationalism studies – though overwhelmingly slanted towards appropriating its 
deconstructive ethos rather than its penchant for theory building. In these broad 
outlines, there is now a voluminous and growing literature on the subject.  
 
Compared to its Turkish counterpart, the academic study of Iranian nationalism took its 
critical turn towards its subject a decade or so later. The reason for its belatedness is 
related to the ‘institutional culture’ of Iranian Studies, where the dominant position 
upholds the narrative of the Iranian nation harking back to antiquity (cf. Matin-Asgari 
2012). Apart from Mostafa Vaziri’s controversial and partially flawed modernist attack 
(1993) and Mehrzad Boroujerdi’s incisive ‘deconstruction’ (1998), it can be argued that 
generally scholars have either chosen to steer clear of the debate over modernity versus 
antiquity of the Iranian nation or have openly subscribed to the perennialist position (cf. 
Elling 2013:163–66). In this sense, nationalism was not a sociological or historical 
curiosity, as its source, the Iranian nation, was regarded as a perennial entity. Lately, a 
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younger generation of scholars has been challenging this position – though not always 
openly and not by naming names (see, for example, Aghaie and Marashi 2014). 
 
I return to this burgeoning literature in the next chapter. It suffices here to note that 
despite the historical weight of the phenomena and the volume of scholarly effort, we 
are still short of satisfying the minimum requirements of social theorising for Iranian 
and Turkish nationalisms:  
 
Social theory explains one social fact by another through a model whose 
elements are people in a social situation trying to solve the problem posed by 
the situation as available evidence indicates they see it. The fact to be 
explained is their aggregate social behavior, which consists of observable 
individual social behaviour (Aya 2006:117) 
 
The failure to explain the emergence and development of nationalism as a social fact in 
Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire is due to two related reasons. The first is what we 
may call the missing causal explanation. The cause or the source of Iranian or Turkish 
nationalism is not difficult to identify: (Western) Europe. Nationalism did not exist in 
Qajar Iran or in the Ottoman Empire. But it was ‘borrowed’ from Europe. While the 
facticity of the European influence is almost always empirically noted in the literature, 
the theoretical implications of this externality are either not addressed or limited to 
facile allusions to general theories/theoreticians or typologies that I demonstrate in the 
next chapter. In other words, their use of available theoretical work, if they are used at 
all, does not go beyond partial application always followed with heavy qualification due 
to particularity or the sui generis nature of the case in question. But the specialised 
literature does not theoretically integrate the historical conditions that underpin or 
enforce the act of borrowing. 
 
The missing causal link has given the specialised literature a largely narrativist bent, 
which, in John Breuilly’s somewhat heavy-handed judgement, ‘explains nothing’ 
(1996a:157). Heavy-handed as it may be, Breuilly’s point can be supplemented with 
another. The increasing hegemony of social constructivist explanation in nationalism 
studies, which has made its way decisively into the study of Middle Eastern 
nationalisms, has served one valuable purpose. It demystified, at least academically, the 
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nationalist narratives by demonstrating the invented/imagined nature of modern nations. 
Yet this came at a significant cost. The social constructivist accounts by and large 
remain wedded to an internalist explanation.  
 
These are the reasons behind the theoretical poverty of the specialised literature. How 
about the general literature? The works of such notable figures of modernist theories of 
nationalism such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch surely, on 
account of their popularity and stature at least, fulfil the demands of social theorising 
identified above by Rod Aya. As I try to demonstrate in Chapter 2, they do indeed 
explain the historical fact of nationalism by another social fact or social facts through 
sophisticated models. But the nationalism they theorise does not quite look like 
nationalism in the Middle East. This is because – and despite their sophistication – it is 
the mode of the theorising deployed by the modernist theories of nationalism where 
their failure to grapple with non-European cases of nationalism lies.  
 
Theoretically oriented works on the historical emergence of nationalism are defined 
(and differentiated) on the basis of identifying the conditions of emergence of 
nationalism in modern Western Europe. These conditions vary from industrialism 
(Gellner 1983) to the dissolution of pre-modern ‘belief systems’ (Anderson 2006), from 
the emergence of the modern state and geopolitical competition (Breuilly 1993; Mann 
1995; Tilly 1995) to the rise of capitalism and mass politics (Hobsbawm 1992; Kohn 
1961). The choice of a particular socio-historical and/or political condition as the master 
variable (or some combination of variables) is determined by each theorist’s 
understanding of what (European) modernity is.  
 
But when theory offers generalisations derived from the historical conditions of 
Western Europe, an immediate theoretical gap follows. Because the historical 
conditions identified in the literature were absent in non-Western European cases, their 
nationalisms appear misshapen, or as theoretical externalities. This is the outcome of 
what Friedrich Tenbruck insightfully calls the problem of ‘internalism.’ An internalist 
theory posits that ‘each society with its changes and growth can and should be 
explained in reference to its internal constitution’ (1994:75). What follows from this, he 
adds, is the conception that ‘differences between countries are considered as different 
stages of a process that is apparent everywhere and known in its directedness’ and as 
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such ‘European modernization [can be] dissolved into the parallel development of given 
societies; some may be ahead of others but all are driven by the same internal necessity’ 
(1994:77).  
 
Yet these modernist theorists of nationalism, although cognizant of the international 
dimension of the emergence of (late) nationalisms and in possession of a considerable 
amount of historical learning, introduce, what I call, the ‘supplementary 
theories/procedures’ into their theories to account for the spread of the phenomenon. 
But because their theories are internalist in their core premises, their supplementary 
procedures are caught within static and homogenising conceptions of late nationalisms 
and can only attach the international as an external and contingent factor – an 
afterthought, that is (cf. Matin 2013a:1–23).  
 
Modernist theories of nationalism have cornered themselves in this untenable position 
for the reason that providing a theoretical answer to what nationalism is and how it 
emerged in the conceptual/theoretical singular is not enough to digest cases of late 
nationalisms. Theory conceived in the ontological singular and supplemented with 
historical sociology, however rich, has to contend with the later emergence of the 
phenomenon elsewhere, but has also, in equal measure, to fail to do so.  
 
We have, in other words, reached the point where we started. Like the separation 
between disciplines and areas, theories of nationalism and histories of Iranian and 
Turkish nationalism are by and large oblivious to the existence of one another. And this 
is a condition that goes well beyond the study of Middle Eastern nationalisms. Fred 
Halliday pointed out almost twenty years ago that the debate on nationalism ‘has in 
some ways reached an impasse: an array of general theories is offset against a mass of 
individual accounts with relatively little interaction between the two’ (1997:26–27). 
Reading both literatures, one may very well conclude that the nationalism of the general 
theoretical works is something entirely different from particular nationalisms that 








International Relations, Late Nationalism and Backwardness 
 
The solution to Halliday’s impasse or, more pertinently, a much more satisfactory 
account of the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms requires 
us to theoretically integrate the causal influence of international relations. As pointed 
out above, failure to do so is the shared feature of the general and particular literatures. 
In that sense, to write a historical sociology of the emergence of nationalism is to offer 
an account of social change. It is to identify the conditions under which historically 
located agents aspired for a new structural setting. Historically the increasing 
geopolitical pressures imposed on Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire from the late 
eighteenth century onwards and attendant historical consciousness of the elites of these 
political formations in grappling with these pressures provides the historical setting of 
this thesis. The main impulse behind the emergence of nationalism, and especially the 
nationalism of late developing societies, has been, as Gregory Jusdanis notes, ‘the 
discovery by intellectual and political elites of the tardiness of their societies. 
Nationalism therefore is in part a response to a condition of belatedness’ (2001:7).  The 
sense of belatedness or the anguish of backwardness, as Marshall Berman once put it 
(1988:175), was the driving impulse of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms.  
 
Formulated in the language of the philosophy of (social) science: if geopolitical 
pressures by advanced industrial social formations of Europe, then nationalism in the 
late developing non-European ones. Nationalism follows from intersocietal interaction, 
which is suffused with uneven developmental levels among units. My ‘constant 
conjunction’ is this. Given external geopolitical pressures, the elites of the peripheral 
states borrowed nationalist ideology as a means to ward off geopolitical pressures and 
achieve or bolster sovereign independence.  
 
And this is where a crucial argument of this thesis is located. Qajar Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire had experienced these pressures under distinctly different conditions 
than much of the late developing world. They were among a handful of peripheral 
societies that retained their formal independence, which allowed them some degree of 
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freedom to reconfigure their institutions, pursue defensive modernisation projects and 
shift between geopolitical alliances.  
 
More importantly, these nationalisms, in their response to the geopolitical pressures 
from the advanced Western European powers, had made use of mediating effects of 
other ‘backward’ states, which experienced similar pressures and pursued 
modernisation with similar goals. What I mean is that the formative influences of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms were these societies borrowed not only from modern 
European powers in order to catch up, but also from non-European countries such as 
Japan, Russia and India (Aydın 2007b). Furthermore, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire borrowed from one another. That is, geopolitical pressures and responses 
towards them were refracted by one of these countries, before reaching to the other.  
 
Such a theoretical recalibration of the empirical evidence can solve what appears to be 
the paradox of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, once it is seen that the international 
conditions within which (as well as against which) these nationalisms emerged and 
developed do not need to replicate the conditions of emergence of European 
nationalisms. Quite the opposite is historically valid. Because their conditions were 
uneven and their sources of influence multiple, Iranian and Turkish nationalisms 
combined these multiple influences in order to respond to the geopolitical pressures 
exerted by modern European powers. And this dynamism has to be captured 
theoretically. Otherwise it will resurface as anomalies in empirical-substantive analysis. 
If this can be done, an important gap in our understanding would be closed. 
 
Thus the problem with the general and specialised literatures or their estrangement from 
each other is not one of history, but that of theory. Gareth Stedman Jones formulates it 
in captivating austerity.  
 
The criteria by which the construction of a problem will be judged of historical 
significance will ultimately be dependent upon some explicit or implicit theory 
of social causation. In this sense, there is no distinction in principle between 
history and any of the other ‘social sciences.’ The distinction is not that 
between theory and non-theory, but between the adequacy or inadequacy of the 




The theory of Uneven and Combined Development (hereafter U&CD), developed from 
its broad outlines originally provided by Leon Trotsky (2007:3–12), I argue, fulfils 
Stedman Jones’s criteria for adequacy and provides the tools to capture Iranian and 
Turkish nationalisms as distinct (i.e. semi-colonial) forms. By demonstrating that the 
existence of societal multiplicity is an emergent property of unevenness (Rosenberg 
2010), Trotsky’s idea gives a universal grounding to overall human history and its 
fragmentation into many societies.  
 
From unevenness (spatio-temporal multi-linearity) follows combination, by which 
societies bring together different stages of development together in particular settings. 
Thus, what is treated as a standalone society from an internalist perspective can now be 
theorised as the developmental outcome of historically uneven interaction, which 
combines different levels of development in amalgamated forms. In this way, U&CD 
enables a theoretically and substantively original and productive engagement with the 
question of late nationalisms as opposed to forcing them into the historical conditions 
identified exclusively with European modernity.  
 
U&CD allows a theorisation of the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms within a field of multiple determinations that does not necessitate the 
replication of the conditions of emergence, which were identified with Western 
European nationalisms. As a theoretical framework that is not constrained by linear 
causality, U&CD can accommodate a dynamic historical analysis wherein international 
and domestic factors can be grasped in their dialectical relation. By this formulation I 
mean that the historical emergence and the development of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms, are not, in this approach, grounded in a homogenous conception of 
development, whose content is derived from European experience.  
 
Points of Clarification: What This Thesis Attempts to Do, and What It 
Does Not  
 
In so far as the subject matter of the thesis (nationalism, and nations) is concerned, I 
start from a baseline: nationalism is modern; so, for that matter, are nations. With its 
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commitment to self-determination, autonomy and popular politics, nationalism displays 
unambiguously the qualities of modern politics. Its creation of (and attachment to) a 
mythologised past has been accomplished through modern institutions (state-run public 
education, universal conscription and market economy) and carried by means of modern 
political mobilisation. That this achievement of nationalism is highly consequential 
politically (and culturally) does not alter the fact that the past is an instrumentally 
deployed repertoire of cultural patterns. The material of the ‘ancient’ past is invented or 
adapted by nationalist elites and intellectuals to retrospectively validate the nation’s 
perennial existence (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The recent power and emotional 
appeal of nations are no warrant for their antiquity.  
 
The notion of modernity, despite sceptical voices towards its use (Chakrabarty 2011; 
Cooper 2005:113–49), remains useful. The editors of a recent collection of essays on 
historical sociology point out that the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, despite 
suffering immense pressure from various ‘turns’ in social theory and history over the 
last four decades or so, has proved to be resilient. For many it still serves as an 
expedient historiographical template that assumes ‘a directional development’ from 
tradition to modernity (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005:2). While the problems of 
this binary code (Alexander 1994:172), especially its conception (or rather denigration) 
of tradition, are by now conclusively exposed and require no repetition here, I agree 
with Adams, Clemens and Orloff that we should be wary of calls to discard the concept 
of modernity, for it does ‘too much useful work – whether as an integrated ideal type or 
a separable cluster of signifiers – and it therefore systematically sneaks back into 
people’s utterances even if they disavow it’ (2005:14–15).   
 
I am cognisant that such a choice locates this thesis within the tradition of state-focused 
(though not state-centric), elite level analysis. The shortcomings of this choice are now 
extensively argued. Yet, I agree with historian Pamela Kyle Crossley that while ‘the 
agency of every living human is important,’ such sensitivity ‘must be accompanied by 
some appreciation that because of proximity to immediate, material power (of which the 
living person may have known little or nothing), some individuals have a greater impact 




The overall argument of this thesis is developed in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a 
critical review of the literature on the emergence and development of Iranian and 
Turkish nationalisms. This chapter aims to gauge the extent to which the histories of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms are theoretically oriented. The following chapter is a 
review of a representative sample of modernist theorists from the field of nationalism 
studies. It demonstrates the various ways in which theorists of nationalism fail to 
account for the emergence and development of late nationalisms. Chapter 3 outlines the 
theory of uneven and combined development and shows how its ontological premises 
can theoretically capture a multi-linear historiography of late nationalisms. Chapter 4 
offers a revisionist reading of the international relations of the Islamic world in the 
eighteenth century and demonstrates how changing conceptions of inter-dynastic 
relations paved the way for the later formation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, during 
which Iranian and Turkish nationalisms crystallised under the impact of imperialist 
pressures, the rise of Japan and the wave of constitutional revolutions. The thesis closes 




















Chapter 1  
 






This chapter opens up one of the preliminary claims of the Introduction: Case or area 
studies accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms refrain from generalisation and 
broadly subscribe to empirical description. Thus, they suffer from theoretical poverty. I 
do this by demonstrating the various ways in which the histories of the emergence and 
development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms remain undertheorised. More 
specifically, this entails the exposition of the two shortcomings of the specialised 
literature identified above, namely the missing causal explanation and narrativism.    
 
The argument is presented in three sections. The first one provides an overview of the 
so-called area studies controversy to locate the terms of the debate between 
(disciplinary) generalists and (area) specialists (Mirsepassi et al. 2003; Tessler et al. 
1999). This overview aims to establish that the estranged relationship between theories 
of nationalism and histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms cannot be attributed to the 
diversity of nationalism as a historical phenomenon. Instead it rests upon a 
disagreement with a longer lineage in the social sciences and humanities. The 
theoretical poverty of the specialised literature on Iranian and Turkish nationalisms 
follows from, and arises in response to, the subordinate role to which area studies is 
allocated and, equally importantly, the way in which Iranian and Turkish nationalism 
have developed within this setting. Their trajectories have led to different internal 
disputes and challenges.  
 
As a second step, this chapter poses one of the central questions of the general literature 
to the historical works on Iranian and Turkish nationalism, which pertains directly to the 
issues of causality and theorising. It is the ‘historiographical schism’ between 
modernism and its critics in the study of nationalism (Hastings 1997:2). The imperative 
to address the modernity of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms arises from the 
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historiographical baseline asserted in the introductory chapter: nationalism belongs to 
modernity. Because assertions have to be substantiated, firmly establishing this baseline 
(both historical and social theoretical) makes possible ‘an exploration of the transition 
from a social system that was not conducive to nationalism to a social system that was 
apposite to it’ (Gelvin 1999:74).  
 
The third section then moves on to evaluate the social constructivist accounts of Iranian 
and Turkish nationalisms. It starts by documenting the various ways in which theory 
finds its way into historical accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalism. Striking is how 
little theoretical self-reflection we find in these works, and even less engagement with 
general theories of nationalism. When the ideas of a general theorist are brought in, they 
arrive at a second remove: abstracted from the debates that sparked their formulation 
and criticisms they received, and from historical and theoretical difficulties inhibiting 
their straightforward application to late nationalisms. The section then moves on to 
evaluate their treatment of the ‘external’ sources of Iranian and Turkish nationalism. 
This evaluation concludes that external factors are treated as subsidiary circumstances 
and remain not only empirically but also theoretically external. This leaves social 
constructivist accounts with a broadly internalist explanation.  
 
1.2 Generality of the Disciplines versus the Specificity of the Areas  
  
What is known as ‘the area studies controversy,’ fought out on the enduring debate 
between nomothetic and ideographic modes of inquiry, took place largely within the 
confines of the discipline of Political Science (Bates 1996, 1997a, 1997b) in the United 
States (for European echoes of the controversy, see Jung 2014:249). Other disciplines, 
Timothy Mitchell points out, remained much less disturbed:  
 
In anthropology (as in history and literature) everyone was an area expert, 
while in economics no one was. So neither discipline typically presented its 
practitioners with the choice between being an area expert or a theorist. In 
economics you were always the latter (in different degrees of purity), in 
anthropology you aspired to be both. Sociology continued to be so focused on 
 
 15 
North America and Western Europe that it remained slightly removed from the 
debates over area studies (2004; see also Mirsepassi 1995).2  
 
Area studies research and teaching became a part of American higher education in the 
postwar decades with antecedents in the interwar period (Lockman 2016:1–7). Its 
fundamental premise was that the world – that is the world beyond the United States 
and Western Europe – is made of distinct regions with internal coherence and these 
distinct regions or areas such as the Middle East, East Asia or Latin America can be 
studied on the basis of this coherence. Initially funded by such non-governmental 
bodies like the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, the study of world regions came 
under federal funding with the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958. The 
primary institutions that connected the funding to the academic community of 
researchers and students have been the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) and 
the American Council for Learned Societies (ACLS). 
 
As a cover term, area studies research and training involves several key elements:  
 
(1) intensive language study;  
(2) in-depth field research in the local language(s);  
(3) close attention to local histories, viewpoints, materials, and interpretations;  
(4) testing, elaborating, critiquing, or developing grounded theory against detailed 
observation;  
(5) multi-disciplinary conversations often crossing the boundaries of the social sciences 
and humanities (Szanton 2004:4). 
 
The immediate incentive behind establishing and funding such programs was the need 
for specialists in the US with in-depth knowledge of world regions. ‘Up to 1940,’ notes 
David Szanton, ‘US universities had produced no more than 60 PhDs on the 
                                                
2 When this particular disciplinary setting (Hauptmann 2005; Steinmetz 2005) is concerned, it is 
not difficult to understand why political scientists took the lead in raising the main ruckus 
against ‘mere description’ of area studies. For political scientists in the US have long claimed 
the mantle of scientific vocation along with Economics. But despite its ardent commitment to 
rigour, US Political Science has arguably failed to achieve the hallmarks of (self-proclaimed) 
scientific credibility of the discipline of Economics. The enthusiastic importation and 
application of rational choice theory (cf. Johnson 1997; cf. Shea 1997) exhibits clearly this 
reverence towards the discipline of Economics, if not the disgruntled acceptance of the role of 
the second fiddle in the pursuit of hard (social) science.    
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contemporary non-western world and most dealt with antiquity’ (2004:6). But almost 
from its inception area studies’ epistemological status, institutional location and its 
scientific and practical utility became points of contention. One view is that its main 
function has been ‘to deparochialise US- and Euro-centric visions of the world in the 
core social science and humanities disciplines, among policy makers, and in the public 
at large’ (Szanton 2004:2). Additionally, area studies research has been touted for its 
promise to overcome rigid disciplinary boundaries. In this sense, studying an area in its 
wholeness with an integrated multi-disciplinary focus is argued to be superior to slicing 
the social world up with bounded disciplinary frameworks of knowledge. But in so far 
as fulfilling these endeavours is concerned, area studies received mixed reviews (Bilgin 
2006:581; Szanton 2004; Teti 2007). And despite its said promises, over the years, the 
number of standalone area studies departments has dwindled and they have been folded 
into social science disciplines, as they jostled with the latter for funding, institutional 
clout, tenured positions and academic prestige.  
  
While these debates were under way, critics were quick to point out the unstated 
intentions of area studies programmes. One criticism highlighted the historical 
concomitance between the formation of area studies and the enhanced geopolitical 
position and aims of the United States in the postwar world. For Rey Chow, ‘area 
studies as a mode of knowledge production, is, strictly speaking, military in origins’ 
(Quoted in Sidaway 2013:986–87). Others draw our attention to the key involvement of 
the Office of Strategic Services and later, its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(Cumings 1997). The precise nature of this relationship still a matter of debate (Johnson 
and Tucker 1975; Lustick 2000; Mitchell 2004; Rafael 1994).3 At a minimum, Pınar 
Bilgin’s point sounds incontestable enough: ‘were it not for the perceived threat of 
                                                
3 At the very least, I think it would be mistaken to reduce the role of area studies to a 
handmaiden to the US security state during the Cold War (cf. Engerman 2010). While these 
linkages are now documented (Szanton 2004:9), it was also within the intellectual and political 
diversity of area studies that one notices many critical voices – especially from mid-1960s 
onwards when a strong counter-culture swept through the US campuses and triggered an 
‘epistemological revolution’ (Novick 1988:469–572). Among these, of note were the 
Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) founded in 1968, which 
contested the professional silence and detachment of Middle Eastern Studies Association 
(MESA) towards especially the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mitchell 2004:91–92) and the Committee 
of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), also founded in 1968, which was similarly critical of US 
foreign policy towards Asia and especially its Vietnam War debacle (Kagan 1968). 
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Soviet expansionism, area studies would not have developed in the way that it did’ 
(2006:575–76).  
 
It should also be added that this geopolitical assessment overlapped and partly 
articulated with the critique raised by the followers of Edward Said, whose magnum 
opus, Orientalism has taken the intellectual world by storm and generated discussions 
around its thesis that reverberates today (1979). One such follower claims that ‘area 
studies needs to be understood in its relation to Orientalism in terms of it being the heir 
to this academic discipline’ (Kolluoğlu-Kırlı 2003:94). There is indeed truth this 
statement insofar as the formative period of area studies, especially that of Middle East 
Studies is concerned. In order to make the field of Middle East Studies to leave the 
ground, the human resources problem, identified above by Szanton, had to be solved. 
To that end ‘senior Orientalists had to be brought from Europe to lead the new Middle 
East programs’ (Mitchell 2004:82). The initial bargain was, as Bruce Cuming notes for 
the field of Asian Studies, that the classical Orientalists had to work with the political 
scientists and ‘for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic 
resources’ (1997:8).  
 
But the institutional and intellectual role and weight of the Orientalists had to be 
negotiated with the ‘scientific’ agenda of modernisation theory. The Orientalist métier 
was built, after all, on such ‘humanistic’ studies of history, classics and philology. More 
influential in the disciplines and in the new-fangled interdisciplinary field of 
development studies, modernisation theory could not but have its impact and ‘scientific’ 
demands on area studies. It may very well be that, as Edward Said observed, ‘[the 
fictions of] Orientalism and modernisation theory dovetail[ed] nicely’ (Quoted in 
Pieterse 1991:10), but conflating them simplifies the divergent histories of different 
fields and their subfields. First, streamlining the influence of Orientalism and 
modernisation theory runs the risk of overlooking the divergent impact and timing of 
their critics. As Timothy Mitchell notes for the field of Middle East Studies, it may be 
convenient to subscribe to the widespread and overly neat periodisation that 
modernisation theory is challenged and overthrown by the dependency theory from 
1970s onwards. But this would neglect the fact that the Middle East Studies had its 
‘own’ critique of modernisation theory in the work of Samir Amin before the 
dependency school. Moreover, the dependency theory, which originated in Latin 
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American Studies, did not make enough impact in the Middle East Studies to justify the 
periodisation (2004:92–95). Secondly, conflating Orientalism with modernisation 
theory would lead to an undifferentiated view of the field of Middle East Studies. Their 
influence varied within subfields. Orientalism has had a far stronger, but lately fast 
diminishing, hold on Iranian Studies compared to Turkish Studies. Modernisation 
theory, on the other hand, made considerable inroads into the latter, as long as it was in 
vogue. These distinctions, of course, are not exclusive, but only relative. After all, 
modernisation theory did produce its output on Iran, as one of its landmark texts, Daniel 
Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, had chapters 
on both Iran and Turkey (1958).4 Nor did the endorsement of one approach necessarily 
lead to the exclusion of the other. Bernard Lewis, who received an Orientalist training 
from such influential figures as Louis Massignon, wrote one of the most influential 
books on the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey with modernisation theory 
as its central historiographical device (Lewis 1968; cf. Zürcher 2010:41–53). But 
whatever overlaps there may have been, we need to be attentive to the ‘mainstream’ of 
subfields. For as I argue below, this shaped to some degree each fields ‘tendencies’ 
towards questions relating to nations and nationalisms, and set different priorities for 
their critics.  
  
By the time the so-called area studies controversy (Tessler et al. 1999) exploded in the 
1990s, the established disciplines had already gained the institutional upper hand 
against area studies. In the post-Cold War geopolitical reshuffling, the old criticism of 
particularism was laid again at the doorstep of area studies. The updated argument was 
that in the face of fast paced transformations wrought by globalisation and ‘the apparent 
erosion of the conceptual and spatial boundaries with which area studies constructed its 
objects and defined its institutional identity’ (Goss and Wesley-Smith 2010:ix),5 this 
type of research remained too limited in its analytical reach, even parochial, due to its 
focus on particular regions (Hall and Tarrow 1998). What is required, so it is argued, is 
                                                
4  From his research, Lerner drew diametrically opposed and characteristically bombastic 
conclusions on Iran and Turkey. While ‘modernizing process was barely visible’ in the former, 
the latter was the ‘bright model of successful transition’ in the region (Lerner 1958:401 and 
409).    
5 Reflecting back on how area studies imparted stability onto regions of the world, Benedict 
Anderson memorably observed, with reference to the region he specialized in, that ‘Southeast 




a reformed version of area studies, relocated under the institutional tutelage of social 
science disciplines and aiming for theoretical generalisations and methodological 
sophistication to rise above the restricted knowledge of singular areas. A global world 
required, so the critiques claimed, a global scholarship (Teti 2007:118).  
 
Between the overhaul of the erstwhile stability of concepts like the regional and the 
national, and diminishing federal funding, it seemed certain that the area studies’ days 
were numbered. Over the course of the 1990s and in lockstep with the world-flattening 
vision of the so-called Washington Consensus neoliberalism (Friedman 2007), former 
fields of interest such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were levelled down to 
geographies of market transformation as the state-centric vision of economic 
development lost much of its appeal (Makki 2004) – triggering a similar soul searching 
in the interdisciplinary ‘twin’ of area studies, development studies (Sylvester 1999:712). 
But we should be wary of swallowing the globalisation story in whole. Geopolitics has 
not gone away (Gowan 2003). If the field of Soviet Studies ‘had to be reconfigured, 
without the generous levels of funding they had enjoyed during in the Cold War [,] the 
collapse of the Soviet Union had [also] rendered some areas, notably Central Asia, more 
visible’ (Sidaway 2013:987). 6         
 
When the fashionable jargon of globalisation is suppressed, the area studies 
controversy, ‘a prolonged and often acrimonious dispute’ (Hanson 2009), essentially 
boils down to a debate among scholars fought on epistemological and methodological 
grounds. On one side are the theoretically oriented scholars of social science disciplines 
and on the other those from area studies with more concrete focus on world regions. 
‘Discipline-oriented scholars,’ put sharply to highlight the contrast, ‘have for many 
                                                
6 On more specific and politically charged terms the utility of Middle East Studies has been 
questioned. It has been accused of failing to predict significant events that affected in the 
region. Of these the latest was a barrage of criticisms directed at the Middle East experts as they 
were found to be ill-equipped to foretell the momentous upheavals engulfing the region known 
as the Arab Spring (Gause III 2011a, 2011b). About a decade earlier, following the September 
11 attacks, the area experts faced (Czwarno 2006) a far more vitriolic onslaught (cf. Lockman 
2004; cf. Beinin 2003; cf. Davidson 2008). In a particularly venomous diatribe, Martin Kramer 
claimed that the Middle East experts contributed to ‘the public complacency about terrorism 
that ultimately left the United States vulnerable to “surprise” attack by Islamists.’ Because, 
added Kramer, ‘they underestimated [Islamism’s] impact in the 1980s [,] misrepresented its role 
in the early 1990s [and] glossed over its growing potential for terrorism against America in the 




years argued that the work of area specialists lacks rigor, and, above all, that it is not 
scientific in that it favours description over explanation, lacks analytical 
cumulativeness, and shows no interest in parsimony and generalization.’ From this 
perspective, area studies research is ‘overly preoccupied with detail and specificity’ and 
‘offers little to those with broader interests, applied, as well as theoretical’ (Tessler et al. 
1999:xiii–ix). From the standpoint of the other side, again strongly expressed, 
discipline-oriented scholars revel in ‘faddishness and oversimplification.’ They engage 
‘in sterile debates about conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and with constructing 
highly abstract models that provide little real insight into the complex behaviour 
patterns or events’ (Tessler et al. 1999:xiii–ix). Their highhanded speculations have 
little utility for understanding the ‘real world.’  
 
According to Pheng Cheah (2008), the discord between theoretical disciplines and area 
studies has three important implications. First, the separation is a division of labour. It 
assumes and imposes specialisation. Area studies collect raw data and generate 
descriptive work. Disciplines, on the other hand, are in the business of theory building. 
Their work is general and abstract. This division of labour leads to the second point. 
The different roles of theory and description, thus assigned, are not merely one of 
specialisation but also, more crucially, of hierarchy. The theoretical vocation of the 
disciplines is thought to be superior to the quotidian fact finding of area studies 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2004:30–31). For the disciplines are prior to area studies and 
provide the latter with the methodological and epistemological rules and principles.  
 
Thirdly, the epistemological side of the controversy is essentially a re-articulation of the 
perennial philosophical opposition between universals and particulars (Cheah 2008:56). 
Disciplines, in their pursuit of the knowledge of the universal claim, to transcend the 
immediacy of the empirical evidence accumulated by area studies. ‘In part,’ notes 
Lucian Pye,  
 
the division has been one between those who crave knowledge in the form of 
universal propositions and discount the merit of "mere description," and those 
who revere the unending uniqueness of human experiences and see mainly 




What does this picture tell us about the Middle East Studies and more importantly about 
the historiographies of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms? It is within this setting that the 
Middle East Studies have come of age and internally diversified into broadly three kinds 
of stances (Teti 2007; see also Bilgin 2006). The first one maintains a hermeneutic 
understanding of the region, ‘grounded in the knowledge of languages, cultures and 
histories, reconstructing the story of regional politics as told and understood by the 
agents involved, emphasizing reliance on primary sources and fieldwork’ (Teti 
2007:120). Unsurprisingly this stance is most strongly represented by historians, who, 
with characteristic suspicion towards theory, emphasise the irreducible nature of the 
region’s dynamics and their differences from the West. One may differentiate on 
normative grounds between an older generation, whose work was informed, in varying 
degrees, by Orientalism and those who do not openly subscribe to those views, but still 
stress the indispensability of contextual knowledge. 7 
 
There are two salient points that need to be stated regarding Orientalist scholarship. 
First, the representatives of this view assert a fundamental incompatibility between 
Islam and nationalism (Kedourie 1992:346; Vatikiotis 1987:42–22). These assertions 
are based on a double essentialism. Reductionism asserts that various forms of identity 
in the Middle East and in the wider Islamic world, such as class, ethnicity, gender, 
religion and political allegiances, can be derived from ‘one inclusive identity,’ that they 
can be reduced to an Islamic essence. With this move the essentialist argument ‘craft a 
fixed, unique, undivided, and a-historical identity bringing together all Muslims 
worldwide’ and to support this, they ‘first Islamicize the history of societies’ (Atabaki 
2003:13–14). Once this internal homogeneity is imposed, it yields ontological 
exteriority. Islam as the defining quality of the region and as a belief system, so the 
argument goes, categorically opposes any form of community based on ethnicity and 
                                                
7 The former Orientalist view has been on the back foot for the past two decades or so, but made 
somewhat of a comeback after September 11 attacks (most notably in Kramer 2001a). Today 
the latter, not-explicitly-Orientalist tendency is most clearly represented by the editorial policy 
of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, which ‘requires that articles be based on 
original research and the careful analysis of archival and other primary-source materials’ 
(http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/submissions.htm). Closer to the latter group are the social scientists 
with a focus on the Middle East who subscribe to a ‘realist’ view of the region and claim to 
represent the world (or the part which they are specialised) as it is. According to Pınar Bilgin, 
the self-baptised Morgenthaus of the Middle East do no more than ‘provide descriptions of 
current events through resorting to realist jargon in loose fashion’ (2006:581).     
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territoriality, hence nationalism and modernity (cf. Bromley 1993:90–94).8  
 
In this vision of history, nationalism is purely an ideational phenomenon. It ‘is a 
doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (Kedourie 
1961:9). With its historical fountainhead clearly delineated, the Orientalist assumption 
of an epistemology of exteriority (cf. Nişancıoğlu 2013:17–19) bars nationalism from 
taking root in the Middle East, for modernity singularly belongs to and is attainable 
only in the West (cf. Matin 2013b:354). These are the assumptions that triggered the 
debate over whether late nationalisms were ‘of native origin or an outgrowth of national 
ideologies in Western Europe’ (Landau 1992:567) and led post-Orientalist scholarship 
to accentuate ‘local’ agency and endogenous modernisation. I return to this point below.      
 
The second salient point is that Orientalism retains a strong, if lately challenged, 
institutional hold on Iranian Studies in the US (Matin-Asgari 2012; Dabashi 2007:21). 
But it comes with a deeply political twist. Orientalism of the Iranian Studies is distinctly 
nativist and nationalist. It works with an inversion of the negative qualities attributed to 
the purported historical continuity of the Iranian nation by Orientalism.  In its inverted 
form the perennial Iranian nation appears as a mythical agent that has resiliently 
survived the centuries of tumult and turmoil. I engage with this mode of historiography 
in the following section.  
 
Scholars in Political Science and related disciplines represent the second stance. They 
tend to ‘treat the region as a deviation from a model – usually a variant of 
modernisation or development paradigms – based on Western experience’ (Teti 
2007:120). It is generally within this scholarship one finds self-criticisms of lack of 
theoretical rigour in area studies (Green 1994). Eminent scholars of the Middle East 
raised such concerns by stating that ‘most of us were content to describe rather than 
analyse’ and the field has produced ‘largely anecdotal, descriptive’ works that are 
                                                
8 Yet, Kedourie curiously allowed the possibility of Turkish modernization without answering 
the obvious question: ‘if it can occur in one Muslim country, then why not in all, and what then 
of the alleged incompatibility of Islam and modernity?’ (Bromley 1993:92). Haim Gerber 
challenges the thesis of incompatibility from the other direction by arguing Islam’s inclusive 
treatment of ethnicities. As such, he leaves the assumption of the centrality of Islam largely 
untouched (2007). Gerber’s targets are not the Orientalists, but the scholars like John Armstrong 
(1982) and Adrian Hastings (1997), who subscribe to the so-called perennialist theory of nations 
and nationalism.     
 
 23 
‘obsessed with current events’ (Anderson 1999:4, 1990). Decades earlier Manfred 
Halpern complained about thick empiricism prevalent in Middle East Studies, which he 
decried as ‘a kind of stamp-collecting, neglecting to identify essential structures and 
relationships’ (1962:118). Quite possibly influenced by institutional pressures and arguably 
internalising the charge that their research amounts to ‘mullah-watching’ (Anderson 
1990:52), some Middle East specialists sounded the clarion call for scientific redemption 
under the roof of disciplines (Khalidi 1995:5).9  
 
Turkish Studies has shown remarkable receptiveness towards these calls. ‘As a group,’ 
warned two éminences grises of the field, ‘we cannot afford to remain narrow 
specialists: more of us need to become members of our disciplines first and Turkish 
studies specialists second’ (Quataert and Sayarı 2003:x). The diagnosis they offered in 
the same page was not sanguine. ‘With very few exceptions,’ they observed, ‘scholars 
in Turkish Studies have been either content with applying the existing theories and 
conceptual frameworks to their studies or they have altogether ignored theoretical issues 
in their particular disciplines’ (2003:x). A decade later a journal of the field, Turkish 
Studies, re-opened the question of theory with a special issue (Ciddi and Levin 2014). 
Among the contributors to that issue, Murat Somer (2014) stressed the generally 
descriptive and case-specific nature of research on Turkey. And when a particular 
research is not bound by the descriptive specificities of Turkey, it either consumes a 
theory produced for elsewhere or forces Turkey into a most similar cases comparison.  
 
To avoid these shortcomings, Somer appeals to Turkey’s many qualities, which for him 
presents a rare combination and makes it a source for theory development. In a vivid set 
of ‘contrasts,’ he highlights those rare qualities: ‘Turkey is Middle-Eastern and 
Western, a strong and a weak state, Muslim and secular, democratic with a long history 
of democratization and authoritarian with a long history of oppressing dissent, all at the 
same time’ (2014:573). Somer immediately opts for what we may call soft 
exceptionalism. It is not that ‘Turkey is the only country featuring an unusual collage of 
                                                
9 Michael Hudson disagrees with these assessments: ‘I think it is fair to conclude that the field 
of Middle East comparative politics is actually in better shape than many of its own scholars 
believe. Despite bad (and probably worsening) field research conditions, inadequate funding for 
Ph.D. candidates and established scholars, and a certain regrettable disjunction from mainstream 
political science, a great deal of interesting work is being done not only by political scientists 
from the West but also, increasingly, from the region itself’ (2001:803). 
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seemingly contradictory characteristics’ but ‘one of the more difficult cases’ 
(2014:573). What starts as a call for theorisation, ends up with re-valorising 
particularity. Moreover, comparativism asserts itself. For it only follows from Somer’s 
reasoning that there are indeed countries out there, which are less difficult cases, hence 
more amenable to theorising. One could, of course, hazard a guess on which these 
theorisable countries might be.10   
 
The third and the final stance are represented by the post-Orientalist scholarship 
emerged in the 1960s-1970s, ‘critiquing the intellectually and politically problematic 
assumptions of mainstream [Middle East Studies], responding to decolonization, the 
Arab–Israeli wars, and related global tensions.’ The central concerns of this scholarship 
are ‘problematizing cultural difference, writing history “from the margins” and 
exploring the nexus between academic analyses and political practices’ (Teti 2007:120). 
This is the most capacious category of the three and it is application to the critical 
studies of Iranian and Turkish nationalism requires some further specifications. While 
the post-Orientalist label is certainly representative of the recent critical work on Iranian 
nationalism (cf. Ansari 2015:70), it does not work quite the same way for its Turkish 
counterpart. A better covering epithet may be social constructivism for these 
approaches. They are the subjects of the final section of this chapter.   
                                                
10 In any case, Somer is off the mark at least in one instance. Since late 1970s, the historians 
and historical sociologists of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have become part of the vibrant 
research community of the World Systems Theory headquartered in the Fernand Braudel Centre 
of the State University of New York in Binghamton. Although lost some of its appeal lately, 
working within this theoretical school with macro-structural ambitions, scholars have produced 
a prolific and influential corpus of research especially during the 1980s (İslamoğlu-İnan 1987; 
Kasaba 1988; Keyder 1987).  It is important to note that this body of work was not merely 
derivative or theory-consuming, but actually contributed to the theory-building efforts of the 
school. I can think of no such ‘theoretical incorporation’ or disciplinary cross-fertilisation for 
Iranian Studies. It seems like the opposite is true.  
For example, while the study of the Ottoman Empire has recently gone through a noticeable 
renewal and its students are eagerly participating in the so-called ‘imperial turn’ (Aymes 2013; 
Mikhail and Philliou 2012), same cannot be said of the histories of the dynasties ruled over the 
Iranian plateau and beyond. The companions and handbooks of imperial histories, covering 
sometimes literally all empires from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union, does by and large 
ignore, most glaringly, the strongest of the Islamic dynasties ruled over the Iranian plateau, the 
Safavids (Doyle 1986) – let alone the Qajars. Or when it is brought in, the Safavid history is 
often ‘dissolved’ within a chapter on the Ottoman Empire – the implication being that the 
historical relevance of the Safavids is limited to their relationship with their neighbours 
(Burbank and Cooper 2010:133–41; Faroqhi 2015). It is this lack of comparative interest that 




1.3 The Question of Modernity and the Middle Eastern Nations and 
Nationalisms 
 
As I noted above, the need to address the question of modernity of Iranian and Turkish 
nations and nationalisms is dictated in the first instance by my earlier assertion that 
nations and nationalisms are modern. Secondly, at some level the different ways in 
which this question is handled in sub-fields gives us clues about their orientations. To 
start with, in so far the study of Turkish nationalism is concerned, the question of 
modernity is by and large, and academically, a non-problem. Among the scholars of the 
subject, there is an almost universal recognition of the belated modernity of Turkish 
nationalism. ‘Even by Southeast European standards,’ argues Halil Berktay, ‘the Turks 
were tardy in developing a national consciousness’ (1990:101). Thus, ‘while Greek, 
Armenian and Bulgarian nationalisms existed in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 
nineteenth century, one cannot speak of “Turkish nationalism” despite the fact that there 
were elements of identity (especially language) relating to “Turkishness”’ (Georgeon 
2002:23). In so far as the timing of the emergence of Turkish nationalism in its 
programmatic form is concerned, the mainstream of Turkish historiography would 
generally locate this somewhere in the early twentieth century. But there is more to be 
said on this, to which I return shortly.  
 
There are several supporting arguments towards the modernity of Turkish nation and 
nationalism. To begin with, language, for many nationalists the benchmark of any 
nation, cannot be the objective criterion to attribute a perennial existence to the Turkish 
nation. In the vast expanse of the Ottoman imperial domain,  
 
[Turkish language] was associated with different social and occupational 
contexts and not necessarily with ethnicity. Ottoman Turkish – distinct from 
the Turkish spoken by the Turkish peasant in Macedonia, Thrace as well as 
Anatolia and looked down upon by speakers of the former – was the main 
language of Ottoman administration (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2010:77).  
 
Such that, Kemal Karpat notes, it was only in the twentieth century Turkish language 
‘acquired distinctly political dimensions’ and became an expression of the Turkish 




Nor is ethnicity much of help. This is not surprising as ethnic Turks of the Ottoman 
Empire lived most of their lives in isolated villages, unless uprooted by environmental 
calamities or hurtled across the wide expanse of the empire by military conscription or 
settlement policies. They intermixed with numerous other ethnic and religious 
communities for centuries under an imperial regime, which by its very nature did not 
conceive cultural unity as a policy option. Ethnic identities, if we can use this 
designation at all, remained fluid and syncretic, and secondary to religious ones (Kasaba 
2006:205–6). A similar tendency applied to the ruling classes of the Empire. More so 
than their ‘European’ counterparts, the Ottomans ‘projected an unabashedly pluralistic 
and multiethnic identity’ (Casale 2007:123).  
 
As far as the Ottoman state is concerned, the subjects of the sultan were differentiated 
along religious lines. For the Ottoman imperial culture the word ‘Turk’ was a 
derogatory epithet. It represented ‘the ignorant and savage peasant of Anatolia’ 
(Kushner 1977:2; Lewis 1968:332–33). And for the Anatolian peasant, who well into 
the twentieth century identified himself/herself as Muslim, Turk meant a nomad, even 
worse, a Shi’a – that is a heretic (Georgeon 2002:35). Moreover, Turk was a European 
attribution, which the Ottoman elite deeply resented. As far as non-Turkish Muslims to 
the East are concerned, the Ottomans were, in reference to their geographical location, 
Rumi (Roman) Muslims (Kafadar 1996:1–2; Kunt 2005:191–92). Turkish ethnicity, 
then, is not at all conducive to establish the historical permanence of the nation. This is 
to a degree that even the so-called ethno-symbolist perspective in nationalism studies 
(Smith 1986, 2009), which insists on continuities between pre-modern ethnic 
communities and modern nations, treats the Turkish case, unlike the Iranian one (Gat 
2017), as ‘a lost cause’ (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:8).  
 
There was indeed a time when the modernity of Turkish nationalism or the Turkish 
nation was not a more or less universally accepted historiographical baseline. The early 
modern Republic in its zeal to give the newly formed nation its history went to 
extraordinary lengths to ‘nativise’ Turks into Anatolia. They turned the ancient 
Sumerians and Hittites into proto-Turks who putatively left their ancestral homeland in 
Asia escaping natural catastrophes. The climatic twist added a ‘scientific’ element to the 
historical narrative. Assuming the mantle of an ancient civilisation went some way to 
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insert the Turks into the progressive stream of Western civilisation. Not fully satisfied, 
Turkish History Thesis, as the overall project was called, made an even more universal 
claim. The Sun Language Theory asserted that all civilised languages were derived from 
an original proto-Turkic language (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:66–71).      
 
As Erik Zürcher observes, ‘from 1932 onwards, the historical thesis formed the 
mainstay of history teaching in schools and universities. Its more extreme claims were 
quietly dropped from the late 1940s onwards, but traces remain even in the schoolbooks 
of today’ (2004:191). The motives for downplaying the spectacular elements of the 
Turkish nationalist history can partly be explained by the considerable influence of 
modernisation theory on Turkish Studies. Indeed, the Turkish case and the radicalism of 
its founding leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was particularly attractive to the theorists 
who ‘inclined toward authoritarian modernism’ (Gilman 2003:31).11 The difference 
modernisation theory introduced, or sharpened, was the logic of immanent historical 
discontinuity of modernity with its past. Historiographical implications of this shift are 
far from trivial. For it highlighted the unique achievements of the modern Turkish state 
and the elites that founded it at the expense of those elements that were based on, as 
they were, claims about a distant past with questionable ‘scientific’ credibility (cf. 
Ersanlı 2003:153–60). From the viewpoint of modernisation theory, Turkey, given its 
achievements, qualified at least for a prospective membership into the modern Western 
world. Ernest Gellner, who subscribed to an episodic understanding of world history 
and viewed transformations from one episode to the next as sharp discontinuities (cf. 
Martins 1974:280–84), perhaps gave one of the clearest statements on Kemalist 
‘achievements’: ‘Turkey can claim that its commitment to modern political ideas owes 
nothing to alien imposition, and everything to an endogenous development. Turkey 
chose its destiny. It achieved political modernity: it was not thrust upon it’ (1994c:82).   
 
As noted before, the case of Iranian nationalism is politically more complicated. 
‘Nationalism,’ Ali Ansari observes, ‘often informed studies of Iran – consciously or 
                                                
11 Remarkably, Nils Gilman attributes the original use of the concept of the term to none other 
than Atatürk: ‘although the idea of an all-encompassing world-historical progressive process 
had roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European thought, use of the word 
modernization to describe a political and economic program was first popularized by the 
Turkish dictator Kemal Ataturk (1880-1938), who made the “modernization of Turkey” one of 
his central political slogans’ (2003:30).  
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otherwise – and was regarded as the sine qua non of the pursuit of history’ (2015:70). 
Until the 1990s the dominant academic (and political) narrative of Iranian nationalism 
has been based on the so-called ‘Persian-National’ paradigm (Shahbazi 2005:100; 
Yarshater 1983, 1993; cf. Matin-Asgari 2012).  While the basic premise of the paradigm 
attributes a continual national consciousness (or Iranianness) to people inhabiting the 
Iranian plateau, reaching as far back to the sixth century BCE, the actual ‘elements’ of 
Iranian identity over the longue durée has been subject to reformulation and 
redefinition. And these re-formulations and adaptations have been no less political than 
historiographical (Ram 2000).   
 
Nationalist reading of Iranian history is embedded in an institutional culture which 
‘regularly organize scholarly conferences and events, raise funds, dispense rank, 
recognition and awards, and generally play a decisive role in Iran-related academic 
hiring and publication’ (Matin-Asgari 2012:172). Heavyweights of this institutional 
setting are the International Society for Iranian Studies (ISIS), based in the United 
States and funding bodies such as the Foundation for Iranian Studies and the Kian 
Foundation. They publish the leading journals in the field, namely Iranian Studies, Iran 
Nameh, Iranshenasi along with the highly influential Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
Established scholars publishing in these journals hold the line of defence against those 
purportedly ‘negating Iranian identity and the existence of an Iranian nation in previous 
centuries, and at claiming that Iranian identity was conceived in Europe rather than in 
Iran’ (Quoted in Matin-Asgari 2012:172).  
 
At least four defining features of a perennial Iranian nation can be traced, and 
sometimes combined (Ahmadi 2005), within the Persian-National paradigm: language 
(Meskoob 1992), religion (cf. Ashraf 1993), the idea of territorial continuity (Lambton 
1957:12–13) and ‘race’ (cf. Zia-Ebrahimi 2011). For this paradigm, an Iranian nation as 
an identifiable cultural entity harks back to antiquity and has remained, or has been 
preserved, over the centuries, if not over the millennia. These attributions of nationness 
or national consciousness to pre-modern Iranians speak in different accents but share 
the root-language of modern nationalism and its characteristic of retrospective history 
writing. Yet this mode of historiography offers little factual evidence (Boroujerdi 
1998:49) and operates with a highly romanticised conception of national consciousness 




Among the ‘national features’ identified above, Persian language seems to be the most 
popular among the nationalist and pseudo-nationalist scholars and has been treated as 
the main vessel of national consciousness over the centuries. Persian language, Matin-
Asgari notes, is believed to have ‘preserved Iran’s nationhood or “the spiritual unity of 
Iranian history”’ (2012:175). As the hallmark of the Iranian nation, it is ‘an elixir that 
will guarantee the survival of Iranian identity’ (Boroujerdi 1998:43). Yet as late as the 
second half of the nineteenth century ‘probably no more than half of Qajar subjects 
spoke Persian (with vast regional variations in dialect—for example, Gilaki—so that 
even fewer peasants spoke a mutually comprehensible Persian)’ (Cole 1996:37). Given 
this, there is little need to trail the nationalist view of Iranian history back centuries to 
assess its claims on the nation-preserving powers of the Persian language. Here is a 
presentation of the linguistic landscape of Iran in the nineteenth century by one of its 
leading historians. Variety of languages and their dialects is plainly staggering.  
 
Iran was, as it still is, a land of linguistic minorities. In the Persian, Bakhtiyari, 
Luri, or Armenian; the nomadic tribes Bakhtiyari, Qashqayi, Baluchi, Arabic, 
or Mamasani. In the Caspian provinces, the peasantry used Gilaki, Taleshi, or 
Mazandarani; the townsmen Persian and the Azeri dialect of Turkish; the tribes 
Kurdish or the Turkoman dialect of Turkish. The inhabitants of Azerbaijan 
were predominantly Azeri-speaking; but the region also had pockets of Tat and 
Armenian settlements, and of Kurdish, Shahsaven, Turkoman, Afshar, and 
Qareh Daghi tribesmen. The western provinces consisted predominantly of 
Kurdish, Luri, and Arab tribes; and partly of Afshar, Azeri, Persian, Bayat, 
Gurani, and Assyrian settlements. Moreover, many of the Kurdish valleys had 
developed their own Kurdish dialects. The southeastern provinces contained 
Baluchi, Arab, Afghan, Afshar, Kurdish, and Nowshirvani tribesmen. Finally, 
the northeastern region was populated with Persians, Azeris, Turkomans, 
Kurds, Arabs, Shahsavens, Afshars, Jamshids, Tajiks, Afghans, Qajars, 
Hazaras, Bayats, and Baluchis (Abrahamian 1982:14–15, empahsis added). 
 
Rasmus Christian Elling puts the recent estimates for non-Persian languages spoken in 
Iran as Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Turkish 1%, 




There is a counter-argument. It is contended that these languages and dialects are 
actually members of a wider linguistic family (Ahmadi 2005:133–34) or, in its milder 
version, they have over the centuries developed enough mutual affinities by way of 
exchange to deserve the epithet of a linguistic family, of which the linguistic wellspring 
is, unsurprisingly, Persian. Mostafa Vaziri exposes the nationalistic distortion of this 
line of argumentation.  
 
What does a Kurd have in common with a Gilaki, given that their languages, 
traditions, and histories have been totally dissimilar? The philological answer 
provided was that they both belong to an Iranian language family. But this 
ignored the fact that neither Kurds nor the Gilakis ever used the term Iranian in 
their tradition. Furthermore, the classification of the Iranian language family 
was a recent academic undertaking; thus, the proposition that an Iranian 
consciousness had existed among the speakers of these language families in the 
past is improper and anachronistic (1993:5).  
 
The case for Shi’ism as the main element of a continuous Iranian collective identity has 
a more directly political reference. It is traced back to the centralising efforts of the 
Safavid rule (1501-1736) and its imposition of Shi’ism as the official religion of the 
imperial domain (Dale 2010:77–105).12 For example, historian Nikki Keddie claims that 
‘even though Iran has numerous ethnic groups whose first language is not Persian and 
has seen several autonomist movements, the common Shi’i heritage has been significant 
social glue except in the few border areas where Sunnis predominate’ (2006:318, 
emphasis added).13 But, as Abrahamian maintains, Shi’ism, although practiced by the 
majority of the population, has also been a source of fragmentation. Next to the main 
official Twelver branch existed many older sects such as Ismailis. Moreover, the 
                                                
12 The claim draws also on the geopolitics of collective identity, as the main regional rival of 
the changing dynasties of the Iranian plateau remained constant through the centuries: the Sunni 
Ottoman Empire. The eminent historian of the Qajar period, Fereydoun Adamiyat, on the other 
hand, identified the nature of the conflict as ‘nationalist rather religious’ (1949:237). Tellingly, 
he was quick to add that the quality of nationhood did not apply to the Kurds, as the designation 
of Kurdistan ‘was merely a geographical expression’ (1949:237).  
13 Keddie does not subscribe to the view that the Safavid Empire was a (proto) national state: 
‘The Safavids are often seen as founders of the modern Iranian state. This is because (1) they 
unified a large territory comparable to modern Iran and (2) they established a common 
religious and cultural base centring on Shi'ism. It is, however anachronistic to present this as a 
national state, and the Shi'i religious identity, which the Safavids partly forced on Iranians to 
distinguish them from the Sunni Ottoman and Uzbek enemy states, was more important than 
any hints at a national identity’ (1999:8). 
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nineteenth century Iran experienced major religious schisms in the form of Shaykhism 
and Babism. The religious picture was further complicated by the existence of Sunni 
Muslims, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. These cleavages 
found their expression in settlement patterns that sustained divisions (1982:15–18). In 
terms of the administrative reach of the state, policies imposing Shi’ism time and again 
acted as force for fragmentation and at their height, during the Safavid period, 
‘gradually eroded the tribal support for the empire on the Sunni periphery’ (Amanat 
2017:135).   
 
Of the elements said to be the sources of pre-modern Iranian national consciousness, the 
purported territorial continuity appears to be least convincing – save for the now 
thoroughly discredited racial argument.14 Whenever it is raised, it is immediately 
qualified in some form. Acknowledging the modernity of the nations, Keddie 
nonetheless allows Iran an exception: ‘however, in the case [of] Iran the concept of an 
entity called either Iran, Iranshahr, or a related term, is an ancient one, going back into 
pre-Islamic times and continuing during the early centuries of Islam’ (1999:1–2; cf. 
MacKenzie n.d.). But immediately follows the qualification that ‘there were long 
periods, especially after the Muslim conquest, when "Iran" was a geographical 
expression, and there was no real Iranian state, and Iran was either part of a larger 
Islamic state or saw numerous small and often ephemeral dynasties that sometimes 
included both Iranian and non-Iranian territories’ (1999:3). 
 
Sometimes even these qualifications are dropped and romanticism, if not mysticism, is 
substituted in their stead. Roy Mottahedeh provides one of the most stark examples: 
‘Iran, a land with over two millennia of consciousness of itself’ (1985:10). But, as 
                                                
14 The Aryan Myth was originally developed in the eighteenth century with the European 
intellectual discovery of India and the Sanskrit language. The search for common linguistic 
origins (the Indo-European language family) was transformed into a full blown racial argument 
in the course of the nineteenth century that in effect turned the Persians into members of an 
extended Indo-European kinship (Ansari 2012:13–14). Reza Zea-Ibrahimi’s work exposes the 
farcical nature of these claims: ‘since the discovery of Nazi Germany’s death camps, the 
authority of the Aryan discourse in the West has at long last eroded, and the designation “Aryan 
race” has fallen into disuse except for a few publications of the most dubious scientific 
integrity, sometimes with evident racist and pro-Nazi leanings. Nevertheless, Iranians continue 
to nonchalantly refer to the nezhàd-e àriyàyi [the Aryan race] and their alleged belonging to this 
family that would include Europeans’ (2011:446–47). In any case, the doctrines of Aryanism, as 
Ali Ansari observes, had never found much support among the leading nationalists thinkers in 
Qajar Iran (2017:101). 
 
 32 
Kashani-Sabet notes, it was only with the first Russo-Persian war of 1804 that ‘the story 
of Iran's journey toward nationhood’ commenced. The war marked ‘an episode that 
resulted in the loss of territory for Iran’ and ‘this defeat altered the geographic contours 
of the country and ignited the spirited discourse that advocated political reform and 
patriotism (vatan parasti). The contraction of frontiers forced a reconsideration of 
the country's political institutions’ (1999:4). It is only then that the question of territory 
became politicised and only later in the century became nationalised.    
 
With regards to the empirically hazier claim that pre-modern Iran as a geographical 
entity was more ‘a concept of cultural identity than a national one’ (Keddie 1999:2), 
Hamid Dabashi recounts a colleague’s recollection from fieldwork that negates, albeit 
anecdotally, the supposed attachment of its inhabitants to a national-geographical entity 
called Iran. 
 
Shahla Haeri, a distinguished Iranian anthropologist and a good friend of mine, 
told me once that when she was doing fieldwork in a remote village in Iran, she 
told one of the villagers, ‘Next time I come to Iran, I will bring you’ one thing 
or another. ‘Where is Iran?’ the villager asked. ‘I don’t know that village. Is it 
near here?’ (2007:20)    
 
Abbas Amanat offers a more reasonable argument in his monograph that covers the vast 
expanse of Iran’s history since the age of Safavids. Amanat argues that the Safavid 
defeat at the hand of the Ottomans in Chaldiran (1514) commenced the geopolitical 
reality of a political entity with boundaries by curtailing Shi’i messianic revolution. But, 
he adds, in no uncertain terms, that this was not, not for centuries to come, modern 
nationhood (Amanat 2017:58 and 75). 
 
The continuity thesis has shaped nationalist Iranian historiography in several ways. 
First, the attribution of a perennial existence to the Iranian nation shows an uncanny 
resemblance to the arguments deployed by Orientalist historians. These ‘discursive 
affinities’ (Tavakoli-Targhi 2001:4–8) between nationalism and Orientalism can be 
better observed if we compare the examples cited above with an oft-quoted passage 




Though no country has undergone, during the last twenty centuries, more 
revolutions than the Kingdom of Persia, there is, perhaps, none that less altered 
in its condition. The power of the sovereigns, and of the satraps of ancient 
times; the gorgeous magnificence of the court; the habits of the people; their 
division into citizens, martial tribes, and savage mountaineers; the internal 
administration; and the mode of warfare; have continued essentially the same: 
and the Persians, as far as we have means of judging, are at the present period, 
not a very different people from what they were in the time of Darius, and the 
Nousheervan (1815:621). 
 
Nationalist historiography has in effect given a positive valence (‘glorification of the 
past’) to continuity, which for Orientalism symbolised the Asiatic stasis. This 
glorification basically inverted the premises of Orientalists historiography, but has done 
so on ‘the common ground’ of ‘an uninterrupted link between present and pre-Islamic 
past’ (Atabaki 2003:6).     
 
As I noted before, the pervasiveness of the nationalist bias in the historiography of Iran 
has an unmistakable institutional and geopolitical ring to it. Iranian Studies, as 
developed in the United States during the Cold War generally upheld a positive view of 
the Pahlavi dynasty (Schaar 1979:74–78), which remained mostly in the slipstream of 
American foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover, the Shah was generous in 
providing funding for the study of Iran in the United States as he wished to ‘bolster [his 
regime’s] connections with American academic institutions and enhance its reputation, 
especially after the sharp rise in oil prices in 1973 put much greater resources at [his] 
disposal’ (Lockman 2016:212 and 320, note 14). Seen through this prism of the 
geopolitics of area studies, Hamid Dabashi’s assessment seems on the mark. ‘The field 
of Iranian Studies,’ he argues, ‘is a direct descendant of old-fashioned Orientalism, 
through the intermediary of Cold War-initiated area studies, albeit now mostly inhabited 
by native scholars, a nativist disposition, and cast in entirely domesticated and (ultra) 
nationalistic terms’ (2007:21). 
 
Secondly, it is not always clear, who actually preserved, or indeed who was, the pre-
modern Iranian nation. For lack of historical evidence, some nebulous Iranian elite is 
given credit for being perennially nationalist (Moazami 2013:24–25). In so far the 
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historical agency is concerned, the problem is not so much the existence of pre-modern 
ethnic solidarity among elites or the study of it. The latter is a legitimate, if highly 
contested, research topic with an established school of its own (Özkırımlı 2010:143–68; 
Smith 2009). In that sense the argument sounds reasonable enough that a Persian 
collective of state officials, like the Chinese mandarins, has survived the vicissitudes of 
history, because they rendered an essential and much sought after service to the 
changing rulers of the Iranian plateau, who were in most cases of military background 
and of non-Persian ethnicity. But even then it does not follow that these people hedged 
their loyalty with their Iranian nation. As Craig Calhoun points out, ‘a web of 
interpersonal relationships locates a person locally, but membership in the category 
“nation” locates people in complex, globally integrated world’ (1997:7).  
 
The question of agency takes its toll also on otherwise serious historians, when they, 
wittingly or unwittingly, reproduce the tropes of nationalist historiography. According 
to Abbas Amanat, ‘at least since the third century CE there was a well-defined political 
concept, an imperial entity with a centralized authority, called Iranshahr (Kingdom of 
Iran) and located it in Iranzamin (the land of Iran).’ He concedes that this concept ‘no 
doubt was modified, if not altogether lost.’ Yet its memories ‘did not entirely fade.’ But 
when it comes to identifying the agency, that is, who kept these memories fresh, 
historian’s instincts catches up with Amanat and forces him to qualify his position and 
to use passive voice:   
 
It is possible to argue that the act of remembering a cultural past and 
identifying with its real or imagined accomplishments is particularly strong in 
critical junctures. During times of social upheaval when the state no longer is 
capable of and willing to safeguard and enforce a collective identity, memories 
are preserved through popular legends and poetic narrative (2012:4–5). 
 
Here, the affinities of Amanat’s position with standard nationalist narratives are 
unmistakable. The nation perseveres, even without a potent state, in the face of 
historical misfortunes. But for Amanat, it is only ‘possible’ but not certain to argue that 
memories ‘are preserved.’ The use of passive voice is telling. The missing historical 
agency of a human collective is substituted by ‘popular’ literary form – vessels with no 
consciousness or historical agency. The substitution does not in effect make much of a 
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difference, for there is little, if any, consciousness or agency is attributed to the 
members of the Iranian nation. As Zia-Ebrahimi observes, the role of the Iranians in 
Iranian nationalist history ‘is limited to their maintenance – time and again – of a 
distinct culture, language, and way of life after a series of invasions by alien races’ 
(2016:6). 
 
Thirdly, there is the problem of the habitual cursory use of concepts such as nation, 
nationalism, and national consciousness to cover centuries of history and the passing of 
imprecise and speculative historical assertions without analytical rigour and conceptual 
clarity. This kind of ‘scissors-and-paste’ history, wherein a ‘general assertion 
accompanied by brief examples’ (Breuilly 2005:15) requires considerable conceptual 
stretching to compensate for the dearth of empirical evidence. Yet, such elasticity is 
immediately followed by heavy empirical qualifications that reduce the concepts to 
floating and freely interchangeable designators. Richard Cottam, inter alia, provides a 
stark example of this. ‘Iran, in fact,’ he argues, ‘is an excellent example of a state in 
which national consciousness can be clearly identified for many centuries.’ Only to shift 
from national consciousness to nationalism in the next sentence: ‘but the importance of 
nationalism as a primary determinant of Iranian attitudes and political behaviour is 
largely confined to the twentieth century’ (1979:5). As Elling points out, after almost a 
century of state policies toward homogenisation, the ethnic composition of Iran retains 
its diversity. The population of almost 80 million is composed of Persian 51%, Azeri 
24%, Gilaki and Mazandrani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 
2%, other 1% (Elling 2013:18). 
 
Finally, this perennialist understanding of the Iranian nation relieves historical 
explanation from any need of identifying causal mechanisms. Since national 
consciousness has always been there, in one form or another, the difficulties of 
empirical demonstration, not to mention sociological explication, are papered over. Yet 
the dubious claims of national consciousness cannot stand the available historical 
record. Juan Cole details a very different social and political landscape of Iran in the 
nineteenth century, which deserves to be quoted in full:  
 
The Qajar empire in the second half of the nineteenth century simply was not a 
nation-state…Although a majority were formally Shi'ite Muslims, many 
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peasants practiced a magical folk religion far removed from the bookish world 
of the seminarian, and very large numbers of Qajar subjects had other religious 
identities, such as Christian, Jewish, Sunni, Zoroastrian, Isma'ili, Ahl-i Haqq, 
Babi and Baha'i. A third of the population was Turkic in language and heritage, 
and many other ethnicities, such as Lur, Arab, Kurdish and Baluchi, were 
encompassed by the Qajar state (even today, millions of women in particular 
among these linguistic minorities know little or no Persian). Literacy was 
almost certainly extremely low, something on the order of two or three percent, 
and a substantial portion of the population was pastoral nomads with no strong 
sense of territorial patriotism (nomads were perhaps fifty percent of Iranians in 
1800, twenty-five percent in 1900). Iranian national identity was not an existent 
that needed to be symbolized, but an idea yet to be realized. This is not 
intended to deny that forms of ethnic identity existed on the premodern Iranian 
plateau, that Persian-speakers recited Firdawsi (and other poets) in village 
gatherings, or that these individuals conceived of Iran as a geographical notion 
or that some had a sentimental attachment to it. None of these phenomena, 
however, adds up to a nation in the modern sense. (1996:37). 
 
Other concrete evidence can support Cole’s overview of the composition of the Qajar 
society. Nineteenth century Iran, let alone previous centuries, was far from supporting 
the objective pre-conditions of nation building. The urban population did not constitute 
more than 10% of the total at the start of the twentieth century (Amanat 2017:14) and 
this effectively limited, in plain numerical terms, the size of the public sphere, public 
education and other ‘homogenising’ tools indispensable to any nation building effort by 
states. Moreover, the tribal pastoralists constituted 40% of the population at the same 
period. Given that ‘the vast territories under tribal control were virtually off limits to the 
state’s direct control’ (Amanat 2017:14). The myth of the ancient Iranian nation is just 
that; something that has been formulated in the twentieth century, which no 
recognisable objective reality previously.     
 
It makes little difference whether an author openly subscribes to the ideology of 
nationalism or not. For both in nationalist historiography and variety of approaches that 
posits the existence of nations long before modernity (cf. Smith 2000:34–51), we are 
offered ‘a tunnel narrative in which the national, after a long subterranean existence, 
finally comes to the surface’ (Breuilly 2011:66). Nationalism then becomes in effect a 
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non-problem, since its existence can be derived from an ontologically prior and 
historically durable national essence.  
    
1.4 Where in the World did Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms Come 
from? 
 
What about those who do not treat nationalism as a non-problem? There are, indeed, 
scholars who deploy critical approaches to the study of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms – more numerous in the latter than the former due to reasons discussed 
above. They utilise a range of critical methods that are derived from schools of thought 
such as postcolonialism, poststucturalism, gender studies and discourse analysis 
(Özkırımlı 2005). Their critical spirit makes it possible for us to classify these 
approaches under the third stance of post-Orientalist approaches in Middle East Studies, 
but a more inclusive epithet seems to be social constructivism. Because if there is one 
common denominator that can bring these new approaches together, it is their 
epistemological commitment to the principle of social construction of reality, more 
specifically the social construction of the modern nation as apposed to its inherent 
naturalness or perennial history. In this, they agree with the macro-structurally oriented 
modernist theories of nationalism. But how does this commitment translate into 
research? In what ways do they overcome the particularism of the nationalist histories? 
A brief survey shall document that the critical spirit of these scholars does not quite lift 
them over the fence to land them on the theoretical side of the division. 
  
One type of attempt toward generalisation points to the hybrid formation of nationalism 
and refrains from pigeonholing Iranian or Turkish into an existing type. Amy Mills, for 
example, sees Turkish nationalism that guided the secular and modernist reforms of the 
early Republican Turkey as ‘modelled after European nationalisms’ (2014:694), without 
naming any particular types or stipulating any analytical means to differentiate the 
ingredients of the mix. Çağlar Keyder is somewhat more specific when he argues that 
‘Turkish nationalism was shaped in the general context of nineteenth-century “late-
comer” nationalisms following the German example’ (2005:3). Essentially a 
comparative attempt, these designators are almost always presented in the introductory 
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passages as if their suggestive qualities are entirely transparent to the reader and they 
are rarely, if ever, elaborated.   
 
A second type of generalisation comes in the form of classification. More often than 
not, researchers grab for the most readily available, but widely challenged, distinction 
between civic and ethnic nationalism. Günay Göksu Özdoğan, for one, claims that ‘the 
Kemalist vision and project of Turkish nation-building had both a territorial-political 
and an ethnocultural basis, attempting to forge a synthesis between French and German 
conceptions of nation’ (2010:49). Similarly, Feride Aslı Ergül stresses that  
 
Turkish nationalism is the amalgam of several socio-political processes of 
different fractions and it includes both ethnic and civic approaches in it. It may 
be possible to claim that it evolved into a more civic form in time, but its ethnic 
expressions can not be totally ignored’ (2009:188). 
 
Ali Ansari observes that the ‘ambitions [of early Iranian nationalists] were to emulate 
Anglo-American ideas of civic nationalism’ and this aspect of their thought is ‘often 
neglected in favor of a more Francophone approach, even though it might be argued that 
this somewhat more homogenous and elite-led reading of nationalism was more favored 
by Turkish rather than Iranian nationalists’ (2015:76). 
 
This comparativist and classificatory theme is sometimes supplanted by direct 
references to the theoretical literature on nationalism. But this also yields more 
confusion than clarity. For example, Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet declares, in an endnote, 
that her analysis of nationalism is informed by the works of – in the order she presents 
them – Benedict Anderson, Partha Chatterjee, Homi Bhabha, Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm (2002:179, note 1). This mixed bag approach to theory may very well be 
attributed to the sensible position that no one theory can explain Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms. Yet, she does not invoke such reasoning. Absent that, it escapes Kashani-
Sabet that without identifying any means to adjudicate between notoriously 
incommensurable theoretical premises of these scholars, her assortment amounts merely 
to a list of eminent theorists of nationalism. At a minimum, I think, the reader is invited 
to understand that she subscribes to a broadly understood modernist view of 
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nationalism. But modernity of Iranian nationalism, so it appears, is not an obstacle to its 
particularity. 
 
The historiography on Iranian nationalism is varied and multifaceted, much 
like the changing icons of the nationalists themselves…There are many 
different emphases in Iranian nationalism, including linguistic, territorial, 
ethnic, and religious. What is perhaps unique to the nationalist discourse in Iran 
is the way in which the varying emphasis on these complementary but often 
competing articulations of nationalism has transformed Iranian politics in 
radical ways (Kashani-Sabet 2002:162, emphasis added). 
 
The assertion of uniqueness, or the denial of theory, is not substantiated. 
Understandably so, because the assertion congeals the dubious corollary that other 
nationalist discourses are monolithic in their claims on history and politics. In the end, 
we need just one other instance to refute any claim to uniqueness on this score of 
competing articulations (see Bora 2003; Özkırımlı 2011).   
 
Occasionally, a particular theorist makes a cameo appearance. In one such instance, 
Soner Çağaptay strings together several disparate quotes from the works of Anthony D. 
Smith to make a case for the importance of ethnic myths, traditions, symbols and 
memories for the constitution of the Turkish nation. He then boldly asserts that ‘this 
model of nationalism sheds light on the ascent of Turkish nationalism before, during, 
and after the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire fell and the modern Turkish 
nation arose’ (2006:4). This sentence alone fundamentally contradicts his initial 
endorsement of ethno-symbolist theory. Because, instead of deep historical continuities 
central to his theoretical choice, we are now offered a discontinuous view of history 
(empire, then nation) – a view that is associated, more than any other, with 
modernisation theory. In any case, Çağaptay’s engagement takes no more than a 
paragraph and he later makes another passing reference to Smith. Nowhere does he 
reflect on the inherent complications the history of Turkish nationalism presents for the 
ethno-symbolist thesis (see Canefe 2002:134).  
 
Such a miscellany of textual evidence could of course be challenged on the grounds of 
citing circumstantial evidence. But that is precisely the point I am trying to get across. 
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For not only the engagement with theories of nationalism is few and far between in the 
specialised literature, there remains only one systematic effort to ‘analytically assess… 
how Iran’s modern history adds to, or complicates’ the claims of the theories of 
nationalism’ (Marashi 2014:4). At the time of writing, there was no such effort for the 
case of Turkish nationalism. It seems reasonable, then, to argue that the literatures on 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms suffer from theoretical confusion and poverty, albeit in 
various ways. And this disjuncture between theory and history is not peculiar to our 
cases, for they are only two instances of a much pervasive malaise. 
 
At present, the field [of nationalism studies] is saturated with a vast number of 
abstract theoretical works and individual histories with relatively little 
interaction between the two. Theorists of nationalism generally refrain from 
applying their ideas to particular nationalisms, contenting themselves with 
passing references to a limited number of cases for illustrative purposes. 
Historians of nationalism, on the other hand, remain innocent of recent 
theoretical developments in the field, embracing, more often than not, 
descriptive narratives of particular nationalisms. (Özkırımlı 2010:219).   
 
Prevalent as this malaise maybe, this cannot be our ultimate judgement. If it were, there 
would remain the problematic implication that the specialised literature must genuflect 
before the general theories and fit the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalism to 
their models. As I try to demonstrate in the next chapter, such an option would generate 
its own problems. For the theories of nationalism, as the quote from Umut Özkırımlı 
points out, are not exactly customised for case studies – certainly not, I would add, for 
late nationalisms. Then, we must press the argument forward. But towards which 
direction should we turn?       
  
There is at least one more way – which I can think of – to evaluate the theoretical 
substance of the specialised literature on Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Our 
substantive conclusion from the previous section is, in Eric Hobsbawm’s phrasing, that 
‘nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round’ (1992:10). But 
this general principle needs a diachronic elaboration across space – that is, the 
‘diffusion’ and multiplication of nationalisms needs to be empirically accounted for 
their differential timings of emergence in multiple places by, in relation to or in search 
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of states. After all, nationalisms and states did not make their nations simultaneously.  
As such, if we cannot derive nationalism from the particular and internal histories of the 
Iranian or the Turkish nation, then the available analytical move points towards, to 
retain the terminological parity, ‘external’ sources. 
 
In the specialised literature, the notion of externality, as it determines the conditions of 
the early formation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, has three valences, all of which 
are vital to the argument developed in this thesis and they will receive their due 
attention in the following chapters. For the time being, let us see how they are 
understood in the specialised literature. Of these valences of externality, the first one is 
historically straightforward. Nationalism is of Western European origin. It matters little 
for our purposes whether this was the revolutionary France (Kedourie 1961:12–13), the 
Spanish colonies in South America (Anderson 2006:47–65), the cross-Atlantic world of 
republican revolutions (Sewell Jr. 2004) or the first modern capitalist society, England 
(Greenfeld 1992:29–87). We cannot write this historical fact off. No amount of 
ahistorical mystification of Iranzamin (the land of Iran) (see, for example, Sharifi 
2013:2–3) or reinvention of the Ottomans as Turks (Deringil 1998), along with the 
ample number of references above, can convincingly ‘naturalise’ nationalism (and 
nations for that matter) into the ‘pre-modern’ times in order to circumvent nationalism’s 
non-native origins. Indeed, Ali Ansari, in his monograph on Iranian nationalism, makes 
this as its entry point to resolve the problem of hermeneutical circle: ‘one difficulty in 
analysing any ideological process is to know where to enter the debate.’ His answer is a 
chronological one: ‘given the dominance of Western thought on the development of 
Iranian nationalism, it seems relevant to start with the impact of the West in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century’ (2012:3). Jacob Landau, posing the problem from what 
seems to be at the international relations angle, argues that ‘Turkish nationalism 
developed largely as a response to competing forms of patriotism among non-Turkish 
entities both within the Ottoman Empire and outside it’ (1992:567).15 
 
The second externality is that of the nationalisms of the ethnic and/or religious 
minorities. This dimension of externality is particularly visible in the case of Turkish 
                                                
15 A sub-species of this first externalist source are the linguistic and historical works of 
Orientalists and Turcologists in the nineteenth century, which provided nationalists with 
templates of nationalist history (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:32; Tavakoli-Targhi 2001:4–8).  
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nationalism, because earlier nationalists of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians had, in varying 
degrees, the blessings and the support of external powers like Britain and the Russian 
Empire, and also because these nationalism ‘eventually’ led to the disintegration of the 
Empire (Davison 1986).  
 
The third externality relates the geographical origins of the early nationalist thinkers 
like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and İsmail Gaspıralı. These émigré intellectuals 
were mostly the subjects of the Russian Empire who arrived with the waves of 
immigrations following the Tsarist drive of conquest reaching to areas with large 
Muslim populations such as the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia over the course 
of the nineteenth century.  
  
The way in which history of nationalism integrates these factors has been 
overwhelmingly done by retaining an ontological distinction between internal and 
external dimension of a society that is transformed into a nation. Surely, the exogenous 
factors are relevant, but they are relevant at the point of impact. The recent social 
constructivist and revisionist approaches work with a linear causal mechanism when it 
comes to explaining the emergence of nationalism. Because they wish to expose 
nationalism’s modernity, they have to accept that it came from Western Europe. So the 
impact of the West is empirically registered. But once it does its job and acts as a trigger 
or a source, then the analysis turns inwards. What is introduced empirically is excluded 
theoretically, because the narrative structure retains the separation of external and 
internal that is connected with linear, not ontologically constitutive, causality. Rather 
paradoxically, what starts as an epistemological challenge to nationalism ends up tacitly 
accepting the national unit of analysis. In other words, critical studies of Iranian and 




This chapter tried to identify the parallels between two disconnections. The first is the 
one between social science disciplines and area studies, and the second between the 
theories of nationalism and the histories of nationalism. This is not an exercise in 
perfect congruity, because nationalism studies remain an interdisciplinary endeavour 
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where paradigmatic coherence has proved to be not only an elusive quest, but also 
deemed unfavourable. In this sense, the antagonistic nature of the area studies 
controversy is not directly replicated in nationalism studies between general theories 
and particular. This is for the simple reason that theorists of nationalism have not 
cohered around rigidified disciplinary structures and therefore they have not claimed 
‘scientific’ primacy or exercised institutional boundary maintenance. But the empirical 
referent of theory both for the disciplines and the theories of nationalism remains the 
modern Euro-American historical development, which masquerades as the universal, 
thus fails to digest cases of late nationalisms.   
 
More importantly, the ‘non-theoretical’ sides of the both disconnections suffer from 
internalism. This can partially be explained by the intellectual socialisation the scholars 
within the general logic of area studies, whether or not they study the histories of 
Middle Eastern nationalisms. This general outlook is well captured by Pınar Bilgin.    
 
[A] concern shared by many Middle Eastern scholars that existing theories lack 
explanatory value in the Middle Eastern context. This incongruity between 
social science theories and Middle Eastern ‘realities’, in turn, is a symptom of a 
broader problem—that is, the limited utility of ‘standard’ concepts and theories 
within ‘non-Western’ contexts. This is one reason why many students of the 
Middle East, who were frustrated in their efforts to ‘fit’ existing theories to 
Middle Eastern experiences, have increasingly turned away from doing theory-
informed work and sought solace in assumptions of ‘Middle Eastern 
exceptionalism’ (meaning that the Middle East requires narratives specific to 
itself), thereby further reinforcing a restricted notion of ‘theory’ as something 
that the ‘theorists’ do (Bilgin 2006:579). 
 
Following Bilgin’s lead, this thesis turns to theories of nationalisms to see in they are 









Chapter 2   
 




2.1   Introduction 
 
The previous chapter maintained that the gulf between theory and history runs deep in 
an institutional culture that has founded and sustained a division of labour between 
social science disciplines and area studies. This division of labour has imposed on area 
studies in general and Middle East Studies in particular an inferior role within an 
epistemological hierarchy that privileges the theoretical vocation of social science 
disciplines over the empirical toiling of area studies. In response to this imposition 
many of the Middle East specialists have distanced themselves from theories, which 
they consider as irrelevant to the region’s dynamics, and have retreated into narrative 
description. Seen in this light, the detachment of area studies from the disciplines is 
more a question of sociology of knowledge than one inherent in their subject matters.  
 
Drawing a parallel with this separation, I also made references to scholars who express 
their disapproval of a similar situation in the field of nationalism studies wherein 
general theories and empirical studies exist side by side with little interaction. To some 
degree, the particularism prevalent among the students of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms, which I documented in the previous chapter, can be attributed to their 
‘academic socialisation’ in area studies, but it is not fully reducible to it. The separation 
between theories and histories of nationalism (or between the general and the particular) 
has its own characteristics attributable to the ways in which nationalism studies as a 
field has developed. 
 
One critical conclusion from the preceding analysis is that in so far as the 
historiography of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms is concerned, the separation is more 
often habitually observed than critically questioned. The existing engagements with the 
theories of nationalism, frequently no more than brief allusions to particular theorists, 
remain fragmented in their aims and fall short of mobilising their critiques as resources 
 
 45 
for an alternative theorisation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Generally non-
cumulative reviews of different theorists identify the shortcomings of the theories vis-à-
vis the specific empirical case and often make, wittingly or unwittingly, a tacit case for 
exceptionalism (Bayar 2014:6–12; Yaghoubian 2014:5–24). Without critical edge, they 
do not go beyond the minimum conventional requirements of literature review. 
  
This is the point where this chapter picks up its thread. Histories of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms, I argue, need to systematically and critically engage with theories of 
nationalism to expose their shortcomings and to recover their explanatory potential 
where possible. Only then can alternative theoretical resources be proposed. Mere 
assertions that theories of nationalism cannot capture the ‘reality’ of Middle Eastern 
nationalisms will not do. Therefore, this chapter is not seeking to recycle the misgivings 
of the area specialists and be done with it. Instead, it investigates the theoretical side of 
the theory/history disjuncture with a focus on the so-called modernist theories of 
nationalism – the dominant ‘paradigm’ of the field (Smith 1998) – in order to avoid the 
barren conclusion that history is history and theory is theory, and never the twain shall 
meet. In that sense, the guiding question of this chapter can be formulated as follows: 
What is it about theories of nationalism that renders them inapplicable for the histories 
of late developing nationalisms in general and Iranian and Turkish nationalisms in 
particular?  
 
The need for such an engagement with theories of nationalism is not a figment of my 
imagination. It is necessitated by the phenomenon itself. The global history of 
modernity presents us the challenge that it has been an age wherein ‘differences were 
increasingly expressed in similar ways’ (Bayly 2004:2). Since nationalism has been the 
most prevalent form of expressing collective identity and difference in the modern 
world, this requires generalising inquiry. As Maria Todorova points out in the same 
vein, ‘in assessing the nationalist phenomenon in a global framework, the great puzzle 
is, of course, the remarkable similarity of both the institutional forms of nationalism and 
of the national imaginary’ (2005:149; see also Thiesse 2005:122). Nationalism, for all 
its claims for particularity, is also general. As such, nationalisms intriguingly resemble 




If this is so, then the first place one needs to look at is the theoretical literature on the 
subject. How do theories address this puzzle and why have the ways in which they do 
this not been illuminating for Iranian and Turkish nationalisms? In analytical terms, I 
try to address these questions by tracing them in two different theoretical registers. The 
first is the causal core of theories. Almost all modernist theories, attempting at some 
form of generalisation, try to determine the historical preconditions that made 
nationalism possible or necessary. They try to explain ‘one social fact by another’ (Aya 
2006:117). The causal core of the theories is often, I argue, where the problem of 
internalism can be found in its starkest form.  
 
And this was my second preliminary claim in the Introduction: the modernist theories 
cannot account for the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms 
and this generates the poverty of theory in nationalism studies. Because, I also claimed, 
that this poverty is a by-product of internalism, which is a legacy of classical social 
theory (Poggi 1965; Tenbruck 1994). Internalist theories treat societies as closed 
systems. Social change is ‘thus viewed as a process that is internal to societies, and 
cultural differences among various peoples explain their different rates of development’ 
(Magubane 2005:95). There is one more layer to internalism. The model for this 
ontologically singularly conceived internal social change is derived from the historical 
experience of Western Europe (Matin 2013b:354). In more specific terms, the causal 
mechanism (if x, then nationalism) is abstracted from this particular historical 
experience yet treated as a universally iterative sequence.  
 
The second theoretical register concerns the fact that nationalism exists in the multiple. 
One way or another every theorist is confronted with the historical and geographical 
variety of nationalism and seeks to address this theoretically. This generally takes two 
forms. A theorist either introduces a temporal and/or developmental distinction between 
early (almost always European) and late (almost always non-European) nationalisms or 
takes the multiplicity of nationalism as the baseline and offers typologies to handle the 
variety of the phenomenon. These are not mutually exclusive forms of explanation and 
one can find examples where they are combined. One commentator points out the 
significance of this issue for any theory of nationalism: 
 
It may not be necessary for a theory of nationalism to explain the emergence of the 
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original national states but it must surely explain why, once in existence, this form 
of political organization has proved so attractive, why it is so appropriate for a 
society attempting to develop, otherwise we have no more than a theory of 
international imitation in which the nation state is, for unexplained reasons, worthy 
of imitation (Orridge 1981:184). 
 
It is at the intersection of these two theoretical registers I seek the answer to the 
question identified above. Because it is in the relationship between these registers one 
can trace the relationship of theory to history. Often, theory is built from the substantive 
history of early nationalisms, through which that history is effectively de-historicised 
and is elevated to the status of the universal and, then, applied to the history of late 
nationalisms, if at all. In a sense, the logic of comparativism is inscribed in all 
modernist theories of nationalism, where the history of early nationalisms serves as the 
constant, the ideal-typical, the theoretical and the history of late nationalisms as the 
divergent, the particular and the empirical – much like the distinction between the 
disciplines and the areas. Indeed, the distinction between the early and the late 
corresponds to the distinction between the theoretical and the empirical (Mongia 
2007:388).    
 
This comparativist undercurrent of nationalism studies, more generally known as 
Eurocentrism, is intimately tied to the problem of internalism (cf. Anievas and Matin 
2016a). And the mishandling of the relationship between theory and the history of 
nationalism is not the making of nationalism studies. To reiterate, it is a legacy inherited 
from classical social theory, which, Anthony Smith pointed out 40 years ago, did not 
recognise the diffusion of nationalism as a specific problem that needed attention 
(1978:236). The very fact that nationalism does not simply have a history and a 
geography, but histories and geographies, escaped the founders of social theory, and 
their later followers. 
 
This chapter is organised around three important problems in the theoretical literature: 
internalism of the general theories, static historiography of comparativism and under-
specificity of theories of ‘late nationalism.’ Each problem is treated under a separate 
section and in each section I review the works of two notable theorists. Admittedly, all 
of the pairings make somewhat strange bedfellows, but I try to justify my choices by 
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establishing common elements and concerns. I do not claim that the problems identified 
for a specific pair of theorists afflicts them in the same manner.  
 
To that end the first section reviews the works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict 
Anderson. As social scientists Gellner and Anderson develop general theories of 
nationalism as part of a broader concern. They offer nothing less than macro historical 
sociologies of modernity within which nationalism plays a crucial role and their theories 
represent the most potent forms of internalism.  
 
Historians Miroslav Hroch and John Breuilly represent the second pairing here. As 
seasoned historians they hold an occupation-induced suspicion towards general theory. 
Yet they do not retreat into particularism. They deploy concepts and methods of social 
science. They start from the fact that nationalism is not a singular phenomenon and it 
shows great variety. This leads them to argue that it cannot be captured by a single 
theory. They propose instead that a viable solution can only be found in the realm of 
methodology. Consequently, they employ a comparative method and build typologies 
(cf. Arnason 2006). Their attempt to escape the internalism of the general theory 
however falls short mainly due to the static historiography of the comparative method 
itself.  
 
The final section reviews scholars of a more ‘radical’ persuasion whose work 
concentrates on the ‘external’ sources of nationalism. Here the works of Tom Nairn and 
Partha Chatterjee are under review. They are my hard cases, so to speak. I agree with 
Nairn in his identification of the uneven development as the structural cause of 
nationalism and with Chatterjee on his compelling critique of Eurocentrism – especially 
of Benedict Anderson. In many ways, they go further than others to shed light on the 
dynamics of late nationalisms. But their attempts at building general theories of 
peripheral nationalism are paradoxically trapped in the Eurocentrism they seek to 
challenge. Their epistemologies are far more indebted to the Eurocentric dichotomy 
between the West and the East than they realise. This leaves much to be said about the 
variations among peripheral nationalisms and especially about the nationalisms of the 
semi-colonial societies like Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. As such, my 




2.2  The Quest for General Theory and the Problem of Internalism 
 
Benedict Anderson observes that despite its mighty political power, nationalism ‘has 
never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers’ 
(2006:5). Nationalism may not have its grands philosophes, but, according to Siniša 
Malešević, the field of nationalism studies does actually have two ‘founding fathers’: 
Ernest Gellner and Anderson himself (2015:3). The veracity of Malešević’s designation 
is beyond doubt. Much of what passes as theoretical reflection on nationalism engages 
one way or another with the work of Gellner or Anderson. As such, to start the review 
with their works offers the conventional safe choice: one should begin at the beginning. 
Incidentally, in their works one can detect internalism at its most profound form – much 
more so in Gellner’s than Anderson’s, it must also be said.   
 
In both, I seek answers to two questions: 
 
• What is nationalism?  
• How did nationalism spread?  
 
More so than the answers given to each question, the tension between the answers, if 
any, would reveal their successes and failures to provide satisfactory theorisation of late 
nationalisms.   
 
2.2.1  Ernest Gellner  
 
One of the most influential social theorists of the twentieth century, Ernest Gellner’s 
academic career showcases a distinguished diversity of subjects including ethnographic 
fieldwork in the Atlas mountains, a highly controversial critique of Oxford linguistic 
philosophy, monographs on the sociology of Islamic world, indefatigable defence of the 
Enlightenment ideals and countless and sometimes heated exchanges with other 
scholars. A ‘polymath and provocateur’ in the words of one reviewer (Langlois 
1994:87), when Gellner died in 1995, the flags at Cambridge University were set at half 
mast (Hall 2011:vii). Seen as part of such an illustrious and prolific intellectual life, his 
venture into the study of nations and nationalism could not but spark much inspiration 
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and debate (Hall 1998b; Hall and Jarvie 1996; Lessnoff 2002; Malešević and Haugaard 
2007). Lately, and perhaps lamentably, he is remembered primarily as a scholar of 
nationalism at the expense of his other substantial contributions (Malešević 2015:3).  
 
The distinguishing mark of Gellner’s contribution to nationalism studies is that he is, by 
common consent (Breuilly 2006:liii), the scholar who offered the most systematic 
theory of nationalism. Gellner aims at theorisation at the grandest scale. It is on account 
of this that his failure is on a par with his ambition, in so far as theorising late 
nationalisms is concerned. And any review of Gellner’s theory of nationalism should be 
grounded on his ‘philosophic history’ (1989:11–20; cf. Meadwell 2015:273–79), which 
is based on three sharply disconnected stages of universal human existence moving 
from hunter-gatherer bands to agrarian societies to reach finally the industrial society. 
Gellner concentrates on the transition from the agrarian world to the industrial one.  
 
The key dimension of this transformation is the changing relationship between power 
and culture. The agrarian societies were based on a hierarchical division between high 
and low cultures. The ruling groups legitimised and sustained their position on the basis 
of a sharp cultural divide, which blocked upward mobility. Culture in agrarian societies 
acted as a means of vertical differentiation. Industrial division of labour, in contrast, 
requires an upwardly mobile and functionally interchangeable population with a basic 
skills set (1989:205–23). This society is an aggregate of individuals not restricted to 
positions acquired by birth and sustained by tradition based on estates. This mobility 
and egalitarianism necessitates a context-free language, and basic literary and numerical 
skills, which allow one to shift between occupations. The ‘modular man’ that Gellner 
marks as the basic unit of this society is ‘capable of performing highly diverse tasks in 
the same general cultural idiom, if necessary reading up manuals of specific jobs in the 
general standard style of the culture in question’ (1994b:102).  This is what Gellner 
calls the high culture of industrial society. It can only be achieved by a standardised 
public education administered by a state and is presented in the cultural idiom of 
nationalism to hold together an anonymous, impersonal society. This is the function of 
nationalism for industrial society.  
 
There is another key element of this philosophic history. Transitions from one stage to 
the next are not gradual but revolutionary (Gellner 1989; cf. Hearn 2006:105–6). 
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Moreover, the last of these stages, industrial society, is universal and a historical 
necessity, not a contingency that may allow political choice. As a ‘step-like transition’ 
(Smith 1998:30), it is fated to be the general condition of humanity. ‘Mankind,’ asserts 
Gellner, ‘is irreversibly committed to industrial society’ (1983:39). It is this structural 
change, which necessitates, as in the orthodox Marxist base/superstructure model, 
nationalism as the ideology of an abstract and homogenous community of equals. It 
could not have been different. He notes to that effect that ‘nationalism as such is fated to 
prevail, but not any one particular nationalism’ (1983:47). 
 
Gellner’s theory demonstrates unmistakably the influence of the abstract universalism 
of classical social theory (as it was reincarnated in post-war modernisation theories). 
History unfolds as the progressive succession of stages, the final one defined by 
industrialism. This final stage in history, or the form of society it generates, is both 
nowhere (as Gellner provides no empirical demonstration for his theory) and fated to be 
everywhere. Thus, culture becomes a means of horizontal differentiation among 
societies. Unsurprisingly, this view of history and the place of nationalism within it 
have become the Achilles’ heel of Gellner’s theory. There are two key criticisms here.  
 
The link between industrial society and nationalism, many argued over the years,16 is far 
from convincing beyond Western Europe. The modern world is replete with robust 
nationalisms that were neither functionally nor temporally subsequent to 
industrialisation, for there was, and still is in certain parts of the world, little of that 
outside Western Europe.17 Furthermore, not only was industrialisation not the condition 
behind the emergence of nationalism, but it was actually one of its goals. This of course 
inverts (and negates) the functional relationship/necessity and gives nationalism of the 
late developing societies a distinctly political bent. And the study of politics has never 
been the strong suit of functionalist social theory. 
                                                
16 Accusations of functionalism, laid at Gellner’s doorstep more than once over the years 
(O’Leary 1998:51–52), have produced different responses from him. In one instance he 
recognised the empirical limitations of his theory for certain cases (1994a:189). In another he 
was habitually unimpressed by the criticism. He could not see why functionalism ‘should be a 
badge of shame’ (1996:627). These responses, however, do not even parry the major empirical 
problem that shakes Gellner’s theory at its foundations. 
17 Nor does industrialisation necessarily require high culture sustained by mass literacy as the 
case of Britain demonstrates. The first industrial society was ‘notoriously laggard in introducing 





In this sense, Gellner’s theory and the ‘philosophic history’ that underpins it are 
unrepentantly internalist/Eurocentric. It works by modelling from an abstract case of 
industrial society that is fated to be replicated internally in other societies. Thus, the 
functional relationship between industrialism and nationalism is coupled with a 
teleological view of history (Stagardt 1996:186; see also Chatterjee 1993a:4–5).18 But, 
as Miroslav Hroch observes, ‘the development of commodity production and productive 
relations proceeds in principle without regard to the development of linguistic, cultural 
or political entities’ (1985:5).  As such, Gellner fails to offer a theoretical, not to 
mention a logical, answer to the question why a universal stage in history should and 
did fragment into many national high cultures. His commitment to the abstract 
universalism of classical social theory displays a striking and nonchalant disregard for 
any notion of lateness as a developmental, as opposed to merely chronological, 
category.     
 
However, this is not all there is to Gellner’s argument. In Nations and Nationalism the 
argument takes a turn. And the new direction is actually old. It originates in an earlier 
chapter (1964:147–78), far more focused on the dynamics of modernity than contrasting 
it with its past. Here the leitmotif of modernity is not the universal multiplication of 
national high cultures, but political fragmentation due to the uneven spread of 
industrialisation:  
 
This ghastly tidal wave [of modernisation] does not hit various parts of the 
world simultaneously: on the contrary, it hits them successively (though of 
course not in any neat and orderly succession). Essentially, nationalism is a 
phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as 
such, but with its uneven diffusion (1964:166, emphases added).   
 
The uneven arrival of industrialism ‘divided humanity into rival groups very 
effectively’ (1983:52) as it disrupted previous political arrangements (1964:171). These 
disruptions have their winners or losers, and hence lead to nationalism in two ways. The 
first is when some members of the urban population find their access to the labour 
                                                
18 In this teleology nationalism becomes, in the words of Perry Anderson, ‘a wholesomely 
constructive and forward-looking principle’ (1992:207).  
 
 53 
market and to the bureaucracy limited because they do not belong to the high culture of 
that society. The barriers to communication incite the disadvantaged group towards 
appreciating their own culture and seek a political roof for it. Or, secondly, when this 
unequal access to the fruits of industrialisation overlaps with what Gellner calls 
‘entropy-resistant’ traits like religion, skin colour and rigid cultural practices of a 
disadvantaged group, this can lead to a rival nationalism (1983:63–87; O’Leary 
1997:210).  
 
But the moment when a better understanding of late nationalism seems imminent also 
marks the closure of that possibility. For all its dynamism, this secondary theory turns 
out to be an internalism of a specific kind. Gellner appears to have drawn exclusively on 
the dynamics of uneven industrialisation and its politicisation of cultural differences in 
the Habsburg domains during the nineteenth century (Marashi 2014:4–9; Smith 
1998:231, note 3). This empirical limitation causes a mismatch with other experiences 
of nationalism. As Afshin Marashi notes for the Iranian case, 
 
the social dislocations were felt to be caused not by local bourgeois-aristocratic 
proto-industrial elites of the city who spoke a different regional language or 
dialect than the town dwellers or peasantry – as was the case in the paradigm of 
east-central Europe –but rather, by global-imperial economic penetration into 
Iran (2014:9). 
 
And the empirical problem is indicative of Gellner’s tendency to fold the premises of 
this secondary theory back into a theorisation of society in the singular  
 
The industrial age inherited both the political units and the cultures, high and 
low, of the preceding age. There was no reason why they should all suddenly 
fuse into a single one, and there were good reasons why they should not: 
industrialism, in other words the type of production or of the division of labour 
which makes these homogeneous breathing tanks imperative, did not arrive 
simultaneously in all parts of the world, nor in the same manner. The 
differential timing of its arrival divided humanity into rival groups very 




Notice how the fact of political multiplicity of the pre-industrial age only ends up being 
divided into rival groups. A legacy of political and cultural differentiation among 
societies is identified, but addressed in the conventional sociological category of groups.  
 
Ultimately, this leaves us with two key defects in Gellner’s theory in so far as the 
history of late nationalisms is concerned. First, it overlooks the impact of 
industrialisation at the intersocietal level, i.e. the incorporation of late developing 
societies into the world economy (Marashi 2014:8). As we shall see below, this is 
precisely the level at which Tom Nairn puts Gellner’s secondary theory in use. Second, 
the cumulative outcome of this double internalism is, as Jonathan Hearn argues with 
reference to Gellner’s work, that the theory ‘hides the fact that societies simultaneously 
at various “stages” interact, and that their “stage” is often an outcome of those 
interactions, not of some internal development’ (2006:106–7). This intersocietal 
dimension that acts as one of the determinants of social change is completely effaced by 
Gellner and has no bearing on the emergence and trajectory of late nationalisms. 
 
2.2.2  Benedict Anderson  
 
Benedict Anderson, the prominent South East Asia specialist, died in late 2015. A path-
breaking book on nationalism, his magnum opus, Imagined Communities survives him. 
It is almost impossible to gauge the influence of this book without attaching a laudatory 
adjective. Anderson’s publisher lends a helping hand in this instance. Tariq Ali, in a 
short obituary he wrote on behalf of Verso Books, notes that ‘since it was first 
published in 1983, [Imagined Communities] helped to sustain our publishing house 
intellectually and financially’ (2015). It is hard to tell which part of Ali’s, doubtlessly 
sincere, praise is more remarkable. Is it the part that Imagined Communities has kept 
afloat (and will probably continue to do so) a publishing house19 that is politically on 
the ‘wrong side’ of an age to survive its ethos of cutthroat market competition? Or is it 
the part that a quick browse through Verso’s catalogues reveals names with anything 
but little intellectual influence? It is certainly not an exaggeration to say that no other 
                                                
19 John Breuilly recently reported that Imagined Communities has so far sold about half-a-
million copies. This extraordinary figure for an academic book excludes the number of sales for 
its many translations (in Breuilly et al. 2016:626).  
 
 55 
book on nationalism can claim to match Imagined Communities in its reach to 
readerships beyond nationalism studies.  
 
Anderson presents his narrative of modernity and nationalism in two steps: the 
disintegration of the old world and the formations of modernity (historical 
transformation), and the spread of nationalism to the colonial world (the distinction 
between early and late nationalism). Roughly the first step takes place in the Euro-
American world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This period marks the 
disintegration of the medieval world and the emergence of the original models of 
nationalism, or the nation-form as Anderson prefers to put it. The second step is the 
adaptation of these models by the post-colonial states in the twentieth century. The 
disintegration of the European medieval world and the formations of modernity 
constitute the first half of the book, whereas the second half is reserved for late 
nationalisms.   
 
Although a familiar theme for any modernist account of nationalism, in Anderson’s 
narrative the great modern transformation and the attendant emergence of nationalism 
are more than material and institutional processes. ‘Nationality…nation-ness, as well as 
nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind’; therefore nationalism should be 
understood both in relation to the erosion of large cultural systems that preceded it and 
as the combined effect of novel historical forces within which it was formed (2006:4). 
In so far as the preceding cultural systems are concerned, two institutions held the 
medieval world together. The Catholic Church and the dynastic state exercised spiritual 
and secular authority over peasant masses. Although Medieval Christendom had never 
corresponded to a unified political entity, it maintained a tight grip on its privileged 
access to divine truth by its exclusive custodianship over the sacral language of Latin. 
The message of God was transmitted to the mass peasantry through local intermediaries, 
who shared this custodianship with each other.  
 
The Protestant Reformation unmade this ‘transnational’ link. And the development of 
capitalism by way of print media in the vernacular (print-capitalism) created new 
reading publics by giving new fixity to the ‘national’ language below Latin and above 
local vernaculars. These developments also ushered in a new conception of time. 
Homogenous empty time, a concept Anderson borrows from Walter Benjamin, broke 
 
 56 
the link between the sea of Christian believers and otherworldly salvation conceived in 
messianic time. Society, in other words, was secularised and the modern individuals, 
who could now read the message without intermediaries, imagined their collective 
existence as a nation.  Homogenous empty time allowed an imagination of the national 
community moving up in the calendar. Novels and the newspaper became the primary 
means of representation for this new conception of time. The former acted as an 
analogue for the nation with its characters sharing the same temporal existence despite 
being unaware of each other. And the newspaper, consumed daily and in mass, 
generated ‘a shared sense of simultaneity’ among its readers (Parker 1999:40). This 
secularised sense of national existence removed the source of political legitimacy from 
the dynastic state and relocated it to the limited and sovereign national community 
(Anderson 2006:9–37).   
 
The second big claim of Anderson fits in here. The disintegration of the medieval order 
based on Latin as the language of ontological truth, divinely ordained rule of dynastic 
authority, and the fusion of cosmology and history by the messianic conception of time 
had its costs. Ancient religions, whatever their other merits or shortcomings, neutralised 
the arbitrariness of human mortality by ‘transforming fatality into continuity.’ Given 
this disintegration and the need for a new answer to the fatalities of human existence, 
Anderson continues, ‘few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of 
nation.’ For nationalism, unlike the evolutionary/progressive styles of thought such as 
Marxism and liberalism, offered existential comfort (2006:10–11).  
 
It is at this point Anderson’s account takes a more chronological turn and looks at how 
early modern state centralisation and standardisation of rule in Europe was differently 
experienced across the Atlantic. In Spanish America, recruitment on the basis of talent 
was not eagerly practiced. The imperial centre, for various reasons that should not 
detain us here, thwarted the upward mobility of its creole functionaries. They were also 
limited in their geographical mobility within their respective imperial administrative 
units. Having found that the accident of birth severely hindered his fortunes, the creole 
functionary’s bureaucratic pilgrimage became the cauldron of a different sentiment. On 
his ‘cramped pilgrimage [the creole functionary] found travelling-companions, who 
came to sense that their fellowship was based not only on that pilgrimage’s particular 
stretch, but on the shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth’ (2006:57). When this shared 
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resentment towards the centre crisscrossed with the clearly defined territoriality of the 
imperial administrative units, the arrival of Enlightenment ideals, the independence 
movements and print-capitalism, Creole nationalism was born; the first of its kind.20 
 
The second step in the narrative, that of nationalism’s spread comes after this period of 
transformation in Anderson’s account and it has been a matter of extensive debate. In 
terms of composition, Anderson reserves the second half of the book to not so much the 
making, but the diffusion of nationalism to the extra-European world. To that end, he 
offers a classification of different nationalisms travelling geographically and 
chronologically from Latin American Creole nationalism to Western Europe linguistic 
nationalisms. From Western Europe it reaches to Russia and the British Empire in the 
form of state-sponsored official nationalism. The latter is imported by the twentieth 
century anti-colonial nationalisms. The thread that binds these different forms is what 
Anderson calls ‘modularity.’ According to Anderson, ‘once created, [the nation] 
became “modular”, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-
consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a 
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations’ (2006:4). Thus, 
nationalism becomes the universal mode of political experience. It travels, so Anderson 
argues, across homogenous empty space and time.  
 
A model became available for pirating from the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. As the experiences of the independence movements in the Americas and the 
French Revolution became printed, they turned into concepts. ‘Out of the American 
welter,’ argues Anderson,  
                                                
20 I provide this brief summary on Creole nationalism to retain the unity of Anderson’s 
argument. The historical veracity of his claim that nationalism originated in Spanish Latin 
America is now widely disputed by Latin Americanists. The specialists of the region ‘reject 
Anderson’s big claim about Latin America, namely that the wars of independence were 
nationalist undertakings that resulted in models for the development of nationalism in Europe 
and elsewhere. There are probably no historians of the independence wars who would accept 
Anderson’s version of them, which was, as has often been pointed out, based on a limited range 
of secondary sources. His suggestion that the career pathways of creole bureaucrats played an 
important role in generating élite consciousness of difference both from Spain and within the 
Americas has been met with scepticism, partly because he provided no specific evidence in 
support’ (Miller 2006:205; cf. Castro-Klarén and Chasteen 2003; cf. Doyle and Van Young 
2013). Furthermore, Anderson is criticised on the grounds that he could only locate original 





came these imagined realities: nation-states, republican institutions, common 
citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags and anthems, etc., and the 
liquidation of their conceptual opposites: dynastic empires, monarchical 
institutions, absolutisms, subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, serfdoms, ghettoes, 
and so forth (2006:81). 
 
What underpins Anderson’s concept of modularity is his vision that politics in the 
modern world has taken an increasingly standardised form (1998:29).  
 
The debate on modularity is not surprising (Goswami 2002; Gupta 2004). After all, 
Anderson is arguably the first theorist to tackle the question of the spread of nationalism 
beyond its Euro-American core, hence the question of late nationalism, in a way other 
than simplistic diffusionism of ideas. Yet, this framing of modernity is found flawed on 
account of its restriction of the content of nationalist politics to its original, modular 
forms (Mongia 2007). The nation-form in this sense is modular at its origin (Parker 
1999). In the words of one critic, ‘by insisting upon the “ineradicable” nature of past 
“modular” forms, Anderson unwittingly takes all of the imagination out of all imagined 
communities!’ (Ullock 1996:427).  
 
This leaves his model open to criticism on empirical grounds. Claudio Lomnitz, for one, 
compellingly challenges Anderson’s identification of secularisation as a pre-condition 
for the emergence of nationalism in Spain and by extension in Spanish America – 
especially in Mexico – by demonstrating the constitutive role of religious motivation 
and religious organisations behind the emergence of nationalism (2000). Jim 
MacLaughlin raises a similar criticism for Anderson’s native Ireland: ‘nationalism in 
Ireland did not grow out of the dusk of religious modes of thought. If anything it 
contributed to the growing power of the churches and boosted their political power 
while heightening the appeal of simple religious beliefs among ordinary people’ 
(2001:239). Troublingly for Anderson, none of these instances are late nationalisms. 
And in cases of late nationalisms, religion did not vacate public sphere to allow secular 




Surely, an argument can be made that Anderson does not restrict the emergence of an 
existential need for answers to the disappearance of a specific religion (i.e. Christianity) 
from the daily lives of people or the erosion of (European) dynastic legitimacy. His 
claim of ‘a profoundly standardized conception of politics’ allows a more inclusive 
conception of a historical and geographical transformation. As such, it can be related to 
wider changes wrought by modernisation in the periphery. For that, however, we would 
still need an international theory that grasps the unevenly constituted societal 
multiplicity not as an afterthought but the very basis within which ‘nationalism’, or any 
such answer to the existential urge, spreads and combines with ‘local’ forms. In other 
words, Anderson’s concept of modularity needs to specify ‘causal processes at work’ 
(Cooper 2015:484).  
 
2.3  Capturing the Multiplicity of Nationalisms: Comparative 
History and Typologies 
 
Comparison is perhaps the most customary tool in social sciences and humanities to 
approach any phenomenon that shows temporal and spatial variety. Nationalism is one 
such phenomenon. But it comes with one crucial characteristic. As noted above, it 
aspires to achieve similar things, uses similar techniques and utters similar discourses in 
order to establish difference. This allows historians with social scientific leanings to 
pursue comparative historical analysis on the basis of a singular phenomenon with 
historical and geographical variations.      
 
What requires attention here is that both Breuilly and Hroch operate with limited 
comparison. They introduce qualifications as to which cases can be compared and 
which cannot be. Breuilly asserts a fundamental difference between European and non-
European nationalisms (1993:10). This difference, at the least a subject of curiosity for 
any comparativist, does not merit further discussion for Breuilly. For Hroch, two initial 
exclusions prepare the ground for comparison. First, he distinguishes old nations of 
Western Europe from ‘small nations’ of Eastern Europe – on which more below. And 
secondly, he declares the non-European world21 as outside the remit of his theory by 
                                                
21 Still, his work, especially the periodisation of nation-formation he offered, has found 
reception among students of non-European nationalisms (Gelvin 1998; Hoyo 2010; Koohi-
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arguing that ‘I regard the nation-forming process as a specifically European phenomenon’ 
(Hroch 2015:xi), with an apparent but unexplained move that turns European nation-
formation into a uniform category.22 
 
2.3.1 John Breuilly 
 
John Breuilly’s Nationalism and the State is an empirically comprehensive effort by a 
historian to provide ‘a general framework for analysis’ for the study of nationalism. 
Although his uncompromising commitment to conceptual precision and his recourse to 
typology make a dry and overly argumentative reading at times, Breuilly methodically 
puts together a survey of nationalism with remarkable historical reach and geographical 
variety. A rarity within the field, Breuilly’s work covers more than 30 cases. As Charles 
Tilly once called it, Nationalism and the State is truly a ‘sourcebook’ of the history of 
nationalism (1996).  
 
For Breuilly the trouble with the study of nationalism is that the word refers to several 
things and not all of these meanings are commensurable. He identifies three different 
such meanings in circulation: (i) Nationalism is a set of ideas; (ii) nationalism is a 
sentiment; (iii) nationalism is a form of politics. His proposed way out of this semantic 
imbroglio is to restrict nationalism to a political explanation. To that end he argues that 
nationalism is ‘above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. 
Power, in the modern world, is principally about the control of the state’ (1993:1).23  
 
Seen in this way, nationalism makes three political assertions:  
 
1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
                                                                                                                                          
Kamali 2003; Siddiqi 2010; Shissler 2003; cf. Harris 2009:62–63), albeit with ‘theoretical 
tinkering’ (Maxwell 2010:870).  
22 In any case, Hroch’s understanding of ‘non-European’ histories appears heavily influenced 
by Orientalist categories. His analysis of the late Ottoman Empire deploys many of the highly 
disputed and now largely discarded tropes of declinism, oriental despotism and economic 
stagnation (2013). Maria Todorova raised a similar critique on Hroch’s ‘rather scanty 
knowledge of southeast European developments’ which ‘makes for embarrassing reading from 
an otherwise great historian’ (2005:158 note 43). 
23 Weber’s influence is unmistakable: ‘today, in the age of language conflicts, a shared common 
language is pre-eminently considered the normal basis of nationality. Whatever the “nation” 
means beyond a mere “language group” can be found in the specific objective of its social 
action, and this can only be the autonomous polity’ (Weber 1978:395, emphasis in original). 
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2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. 
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the 
attainment of political sovereignty (1993:2). 
 
Treating nationalism as a form of politics, argues Breuilly, is superior to two other 
major approaches. The first one is the idealist approach. Nationalism in this view is a 
political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals. The second one is the socio-economic 
approach that treats nationalism as ‘an expression of something deeper such as class 
interest or an economic or social structure or a cultural formation’ (1993:1). The 
problem with these approaches is that they cannot pin down nationalism conceptually. 
Nationalist doctrine mixes with other doctrines so freely as to render its identification 
highly difficult. For the socio-economic explanations Breuilly raises a similar objection. 
So many different social classes and interests carry the banner of nationalism at one 
time or another that pursuing this line of research could only end up in confusion. 
Breuilly does not deny the importance of these factors. He accepts that they can 
illuminate the analysis of particular nationalisms, but they cannot be the basis of a 
general framework. Therefore typologies of nationalism cannot be founded on them.   
 
In the next step, Breuilly introduces another crucial distinction. He excludes from his 
work what he calls state-led nationalism, because he finds it very difficult to draw 
precise conceptual boundaries around this type of nationalism: ‘to regard all policies of 
self-interest undertaken by national governments as nationalist would be to empty the 
term of any specific meaning’ (1993:8). It is more feasible to treat nationalism as 
oppositional politics seeking to obtain or use state power. By this point we have a 
reasonably precise concept of nationalism. It refers to successful political movements 
that seek state power in the name of their nation. The other meanings of nationalism are 
left out of the picture.   Nationalism, often likened to a chameleon for its ability to adapt 
to different circumstances, finds its colour spectrum rendered almost monochromic in 
Breuilly’s hands. 
 
Breuilly is not yet done on his mission to make his way through the fog of conceptual 
imprecision. His second claim is on method. Casting doubt on the possibility of a 
general theory of nationalism, he opts for a general framework of analysis, which 
should fulfil two criteria. Given that ‘the internal variations within nationalism are too 
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great to allow a single method of investigation,’ a necessity for a typology arises. 
Following from that, comparative history is the best available method to utilise such a 
typology and to populate identified types (1993:2). 
 
His typology has two modes of differentiation. The first is the nature of nationalist 
opposition. This generates three types of nationalism: ‘a nationalist opposition can seek 
to break away from the present state (separation), to reform it in a nationalist direction 
(reform) and or to unite it with other states (unification)’ (1993:9). He then checks these 
against the type of the state a particular nationalism opposes. On this score nationalisms 
are differentiated on the basis of opposing either a non-nation state or a nation-state. 
This procedure gives six classes of nationalist movements with the relevant examples 
below:  
 
 Opposed to Non-Nation 
States 
Opposed to Nation-States 
Separation Magyar, Greek, Nigerian Basque, Ibo 
Reform Turkish, Japanese Fascism, Nazism 
Unification German, Italian  Arab, Pan-African 
* Reproduced from Breuilly (1993:9) 
 
Breuilly offers, in a later work (1996a), a concise historicisation of this straightforward 
formulation of nationalism and politics. To that end he asks the crucial questions. 
Where and when did nationalism emerge and why? And it is here that the rigorously 
built edifice of his methodology starts to appear skeletal and to buckle under the 
pressure of the multiplicity of nationalism.   
 
On this score he tries to uncover the historical relationship between nationalism and 
modernisation. Acknowledging his agreement with Gellner on modernity, Breuilly 
argues that it involved a fundamental change in the generic division of labour. By 
generic he means a broader set of human activities (coercion, cognition and production) 
than the specific economic division of labour. In Europe the old corporate division of 
labour, wherein specific institutions such as the guilds carried a bundle of different 
functions, gave way to a functional division of labour. In this latter form, each major 
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function increasingly unbundled from older multi-functional organisation and was 
concentrated into its specific institution.   
 
What links this transformation to nationalism is the development of the modern state. 
Originally developed in a liberal form, the modern state’s rise involved a ‘concentration 
of “public” powers into specialised state institutions (parliaments and bureaucracies), 
while leaving many “private powers under the control of non-political institutions’ such 
as free markets, private firms, families and so on (1996a:164). The separation of the 
public and private realms, and the breakdown of corporate ties generated the new-
fangled idea of the individual. The key problem that followed from this was ‘how to 
make the state-society connection; how to maintain some harmony between the public 
interests of the citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals (or families)’ 
(1996a:165).    
 
Two answers provided to this pressing question give us the key to the history of 
nationalism. The first, political answer hinged on the notion of citizenship. From the 
eighteenth century onwards, the aggregate of individuals was defined as a body of 
citizens, a community of rights-bearing individuals who voluntarily entered into 
contractual commitment to live together as a nation under a shared set of rules, 
institutions and values. Only this way, it was thought, could the individuals’ 
commitment to the state be secured. The second, cultural answer put a premium on the 
collective character of the society in response to two key issues that confronted political 
élites: an intellectual problem (how did one legitimize state action?) and a political 
problem (how could one secure the support of the masses?). ‘In practice,’ argues 
Breuilly, ‘nationalism has been a sleight-of-hand ideology which tries to connect the 
two ideas together’ (1996a:166).  And ‘given this sleight of hand, as well as the political 
neutrality of the cultural identities to which nationalism appeals (which means they are 
available for many political uses), nationalism has taken a bewildering variety of 
forms,’ concludes Breuilly (1996a:166). This, in turn, justifies his starting point and the 
need for a typology of nationalisms.  
 
The strength of Breuilly’s work is concentrated in one of his key assertions. When he 
argues that nationalism is first and foremost about politics and modern politics is about 
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the state, this goes some way to overcome the conceptual confusion.24 But this element 
of his approach is also its weakness. When subjected to a closer look, his notion of 
modern politics is far too generic to fulfil the promises of his method, which is to 
provide the readers with a general framework to understand nationalism in its variety. 
As Geoff Eley argues in a review of the first edition of the book, ‘what Breuilly exactly 
means by “nationalism as politics” remains extraordinarily elusive’ and is wedded to a 
very formalistic conception of the separation of the public and the private (1984:398). 
Thus, the prospect of grasping the various forms of nationalism by means of a 
classification is predicated on a universal mode of nationalist politics pegged to the 
attainment of state power. But Breuilly’s method does not tell us how this mode of 
politics, or quite simply nationalism, became universal or why it was pursued in many 
different ‘contexts.’ What makes comparison possible or the grounds for comparison is 
asserted rather than explained (Mongia 2007:385).  
 
Comparative method and classification works in this case with a posterior logic. It runs 
something like this: because nationalisms show great variety, they cannot be grasped by 
a single definition, but they can be captured by and distributed under different 
taxonomical headings if we can find one core principle common to all. In his later work 
Breuilly acknowledges that much of nationalism studies, including his Nationalism and 
the State, suffers from two defects. The first is what he call the ‘internalist bias’ which 
‘works back from the “successful” cases of nationalism; those which resulted in a state 
given the name of the nation for which those nationalists laboured’ (2011:66). This 
posterior reasoning, which is just noted, suggests a deeper problem. It does not start by 
asking why nationalism has been endorsed as a political device in different political 
contexts. For these contexts, in the plural, are conceived as disconnected instances of 
the same, nationalism-producing political dynamic.  
 
                                                
24 His other key argument is unexceptionable. In so far as the ‘overall mood’ in nationalism 
studies is concerned, there is nothing unfamiliar about his claim that nationalism has many 
manifestations and that it cannot be captured by a single theory. Indeed, nationalism studies, the 
broad multi-disciplinary field of research, which otherwise brims with conceptual, theoretical 
and historiographical controversies, seems to have reached some sort of a tacit consensus on the 
impossibility of a general theory of nationalism. And this is because there are many and 
different nationalisms. Nationalism exists in the multiple – in the sense of both number and 
form/type (see, among others, Anderson 1986; Bhabha 1990; Calhoun 1997:21–22; Hall 1993; 
Kosofsky Sedgwick 1992:241; McCrone 1998:169–87; Seth 1993:91–92). On this score, 
Breuilly is preaching to the choir.  
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This limitation of Breuilly’s work is a by-product of his underdeveloped conception of 
politics, which he assumes to explain separate cases of nationalism. But the logic of 
nationalist politics did not emerge separately in individual cases. As Breuilly rightly 
points out, as the second defect of the literature, ‘even where connections across cases 
are considered important, these are presented in a bilateral form, as in accounts of how 
an imperial power transfers nationalist ideas, sentiments and politics to a periphery’ 
(2011:67). A better rephrasing could possibly be ‘unidirectional’ rather than ‘bilateral’ 
in this sentence, but the gist of the argument is clear enough. Without a conceptual 
device such as Anderson’s modularity, Breuilly’s comparative method cannot grasp the 
political dynamics of late nationalism and its content formed with reference to this 
dynamic other than treating lateness as a chronological, but not a developmental and 
intersocietal feature of nationalist politics across the modern world. Even then, I must 
add, this does not mean, as Moshe Behar erroneously claims, that Breuilly presupposes 
the existence of nations (2005:595).   
 
2.3.2  Miroslav Hroch 
 
Although the first systematic quantitative and comparative study of the emergence and 
development of nationalist movements, Miroslav Hroch’s study had to wait seventeen 
years to make its full impact. Originally published in German in 1968, the work of the 
Czech historian largely escaped the attention of the Anglo-American academy 
(Özkırımlı 2010:114) until the English translation of his seminal text arrived under the 
title Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (1985). Since then it has 
influenced several generations of scholars (cf. Maxwell 2010). The measure of this 
influence is not lost on the leading figures of the field. According to Eric Hobsbawm, 
Hroch’s work ‘opened the new era in the analysis of the composition of national 
liberation movements’ (1992:4). Ernest Gellner acknowledged with witty honesty that 
the publication of Hroch’s book ‘made it difficult for him to open his mouth for fear of 
making some mistake’ (in Hall 1998a:6).  
 
As an opening manoeuvre Hroch identifies two problems that afflict the literature on 
nations and nationalism. The first of these is by now familiar to us. He observes that 
there has accumulated on one side ‘an immense mass of information’ on individual 
histories of national movements which entices ‘the historians of all the European 
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nations…to consider their own national history as a unique, specific and 
incommensurable component of the world’s development.’ On the other side is ‘the 
traditionally one-sided conception [that treats] general (or European) history as the 
history of certain great states, a history in which the small states and nations occupy 
only a marginal place, or no place at all’ (1985:xi). It is this second group of states and 
nations that Hroch concentrates on.  
 
The second flaw in the literature compounds this separation. According to Hroch, the 
literature erroneously represents the history of nation-formation in Europe as the 
unfolding or the spread of the idea of nationalism. But ideas, he argues, do not travel 
and find reception merely on account of their intrinsic inspirational value. Nor can 
intellectuals in the business of inventing nations valorise them outside certain objective 
preconditions. Even if this was the case, we are still left with the challenge that 
‘individual discoveries of national sentiment do not explain why such discoveries 
recurred in so many countries, independently of each other, under different conditions 
and in different epochs’ (1998:79).  
 
In light of these problems, Hroch proposes an elaborate solution backed by original and 
punctilious empirical research on national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. 
His solution entails several key elements: Theoretical/methodological, conceptual and 
historiographical. For the first, Hroch declares that he is not advancing a theory, but 
offering ‘effective methods for the classification and assessment of experiences of 
nation-building as a process set within a wider social and cultural history’ that aims for 
controlled generalisations rather than consigning specific nation-building experiences to 
their unrepeatable singularity (1996:78, 1998:91). He then offers a sociological 
conception of the nation as ‘a large social group integrated not by one but by a 
combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, 
cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective 
consciousness’ (1996:79). 
 
In his view, this overcomes the limitations of the objective definitions of the nation by 
acknowledging that individuals cannot be defined by some essential characteristics, but 
only by the recognition of their locations within a set of social relationships. The nation 
is, then, a social group like others, but a particular type. Its particularity comes from its 
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size and relative permanence. It is a large social group that is not defined by immediate 
personal contact. And unlike other large social groups, relations among co-nationals are 
relatively constant and well defined. Nationalism is the surface manifestation of this 
relative permanence manifested in individual and social consciousness, but ‘its essence 
derives from the stable connection of the individual with a series of objective social 
relations’ (1985:4).  
 
Historically, Hroch locates the formation of the nation within the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Europe with earlier, feudal antecedents. In early modern 
Europe, these antecedents led to two different outcomes. Most of the Western European 
states evolved under the rule of a single ethnicity and experienced the classical pattern 
of bourgeois revolutions: ‘a new class, the  “third estate”, [who] set itself up against the 
old feudal ruling class and sooner or later proclaimed itself the representative of the 
whole nation’ (1985:8). Hroch finds this model of nation-formation inapplicable to the 
histories of what he calls ‘small nations.’ This in effect introduces one parameter of 
comparison into his history. 
 
The terminology is not quantitative, but qualitative. By small or oppressed nations 
Hroch refers to those populations that occupy a compact territory without ‘their own’ 
nobility, political unit or a literary tradition. These small nations generally existed 
within multi-ethnic empires and for such a long period of time that the relationship 
between the oppressor and the oppressed became structural. Since they had an 
exogenous ruling class, their experience of the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
generated a different outcome. The bourgeoisie of these small or oppressed nations, 
mostly concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe (with notable exceptions like the 
Irish and the Catalans in the West), were ethnically different from the majority of the 
population.  
 
To be able to make meaningful comparisons, Hroch develops a periodisation of national 
movements. This involves three phases. Phase A ‘is marked by a passionate concern on 
the part of a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, for the study of the language, the 
culture, the history of the oppressed nationality’ (1985:22). This was not as yet an 
organised movement with clear political goals. They were not, in the political sense of 
the term, nationalist. In Phase B a new group of agitators threw in their lot with the 
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national movement, formulated concrete political goals and strove to broaden the social 
basis and reach of their message. The final Phase C was when the national agitation 
gains a mass following. Hroch’s comparison concentrates on Phase B. And his criterion 
for comparison is  ‘the social and territorial composition or origin of the national 
leaders, the “pioneers” of the agitation in Phase B of the national movement’ (1998:92). 
 
Hroch then plots this periodisation against the broader transition from feudalism to 
capitalism by identifying three key developments of the latter transition: the industrial 
revolution, the bourgeois revolution and the formation of an organised and class-
conscious proletariat (1985:27). This yields four different types of national 
movements.25 Type 1, the integrated type nationalist movements experienced Phase B 
before the revolution and the movements gained mass character during or shortly after 
the revolution. The second type is the belated nationalist movement. Nationalist 
agitation started before the revolution and masses only became part of nationalist 
agitation after a class-conscious working-class was organized. Type 3, the insurrectional 
type of national movement reached Phase C (the mass movement) before the revolution, 
under feudal conditions. The nation is formed before the bourgeois revolution. The 
disintegrated type is the final one. Nationalist agitation began after the capitalist 
transformation and under a liberal constitutional system. Hroch does not have much to 
say about this type, but, as Gellner notes, the implication seems to be that early 
industrialisation can be fatal for certain nationalist movements (1994a:189). The most 
relevant examples for this category appear to be post-industrial nationalist movements 
of the Quebecoise and the Catalans.         
 
The problems with Hroch’s approach are of two kinds. One is with the way in which he 
charts his theoretical position in relation to other approaches and the way he formulates 
his concept. Significant in this context is his challenge to idealism – that is, to 
approaching nationalism as a matter of history of ideas. Hroch is right to challenge the 
shortcomings of the concept of nationalism, when it is presented in an idiom of idealist 
philosophy of history. Ideas could not simply flow around, and ‘intellectuals can 
                                                
25 Gellner shrewdly points out that by differentiating large and small nations on the basis of 
‘state-endowment’, Hroch implicates a third dimension to the classification. This dimension 
does not enter into the argument as Hroch concentrates on small nations. It is this wider 
typology, Gellner adds, which implies a more general theory of nation-formation (1994a:187–
88).    
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“invent” national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation 
of a nation already exist’ (1998:79). But he overstates his case in one count and fails on 
another. First, history of ideas was indeed a very popular approach to the study of 
nationalism around the time Hroch’s work was published in Czechoslovakia, but much 
less so at the time of its English translation and it was certainly dated and unpopular by 
the end of twentieth century (Breuilly 2000; Eley and Suny 1996). Second, ideas in the 
form of political principles, institutional configurations and concrete programmes of 
social and political transformations are transported, transplanted and adapted by human 
beings, at times with great urgency, in concrete historical circumstances confronted by 
questions of political expedience, and even political and cultural survival. The cure for 
idealist diffusionism is not an exclusive ‘social determination’ (cf. Eley 1996), for 
posing the problem in this way reproduces the idealist/materialist dichotomy (cf. James 
1996:7).     
 
But more crucially Hroch’s challenge falls back to internalism. He argues that ‘the 
diffusion of national ideas could only occur in specific social settings’ (1996:79). This 
move not only enables him to distance himself from a diffusionist view, but also 
reinforces his ontological claim that a nation is a set of social relations. But in his 
attempt to play down the diffusion of ideas, Hroch sacrifices a crucial dimension of 
social change and he seals the national as a bounded set of social relations. Nation 
formation, it seems, operates separately in each national context, which he conceptually 
and historically delimits a priori.  
 
In a sense, Hroch’s logic of comparativism works in the opposite direction of Breuilly. 
Where the latter, by his own admission, retraces his steps from successful instances of 
nationalism, Hroch fixes nationalisms ontological basis a priori. It is the pre-existing 
nation as a set of social relations that produces nationalism (Gellner 1994a). This 
absolves him of the need to historicise the spread of nationalism. The most clear textual 
expression of this comes when Hroch’s analysis is confronted with the need to offer a 
causal explanation for the emergence of late nationalisms:  
 
The nondominant ethnic group was distinguished from the state-nation (like the 
French, Dutch, or Portuguese) by three deficiencies: it lacked “its own” 
nobility or ruling classes, it possessed no state, and its literary tradition in its 
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own language was incomplete or interrupted. Sooner or later a group of 
educated members of such an ethnic community reached the conclusion that 
their group also belonged to the category of the “nation”’ (1985:xiii, empahsis 
added).   
  
Two types of nationalism, early and late, are juxtaposed with reference to their state 
endowment, but no connection between them is conceptualised. At best there is an 
implication that the early nations acted as models for the later ones, but this does not 
receive any theoretical attention in Hroch’s history. But the relationship between them 
is not one of interaction or influence but of chronological succession, wherein the late 
nationalism is typified by the unfortunate term, revival.  
  
The theoretical downside of Hroch’s ‘internalism’ is its inattention to international 
relations. National agitation arises primarily in response to the crisis of the old regime. 
International relations can exert an occasional influence but not at a magnitude to merit 
theoretical attention: ‘Sometimes, important events in international politics, for example 
the Napoleonic wars, could strengthen or accelerate the crisis’ (1985:xiv). Indeed, 
Hroch’s empirical case studies makes, if at all, only passing references to ‘external 
factors.’ Norwegian independence is won partly, argues Hroch in one instance, as a 
result of ‘a favourable constellation in international politics’ (1985:41). 
 
2.4 Inverting Eurocentrism: Limits of Structuralism and 
Postcolonial Theory 
 
The authors that are subjected to perusal in this section represent a direct contrast with 
the ones in the previous one. Whereas Breuilly and Hroch established a dichotomy 
between the West and the East by asserting that there is some fundamental difference 
between their nationalisms, in many ways Nairn and Chatterjee see this dichotomy as 
the source of nationalism, or at least in Chatterjee’s case, its particular form in the 
colonial world.     
 
In both Nairn’s and Chatterjee’s works there is a degree of ambiguity in so far their 
normative view of nationalism is concerned. I argue that they are both nationalist in 
their own way and this shapes their argument. Chatterjee’s verdict on nationalism is 
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decidedly negative yet also ambiguous (Ballantyne 2003:111). This effectively puts a 
distance between him and the Marxist optimism towards the liberating potential of 
Third World nationalism. Nairn provides an interesting contrast. Written almost a 
decade before, his work does not display the pessimism of Chatterjee’s. An argument 
can be made that the low-spirited mood of the 1980s set by the failure of post-colonial 
development and the devastations of the Third World Debt Crisis weigh down on 
Chatterjee’s Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (1993a). More proximately, 
the turbulent history of post-colonial India where the state became increasingly 
authoritarian and droves of intellectuals became disillusioned with the developmental 
project of bourgeois nationalism and its promises have doubtlessly left their marks on 
Chatterjee and the other members of the Subaltern Studies collective (Ludden 2002:6). 
 
The contrasting fortunes of these critiques of imperialism also suggest that by the time 
their work on nationalism ‘hit the market,’ the Anglo-American academia, with its 
proverbial quota for ‘radicals,’ was receptive to the type of critique of the Empire 
offered by postcolonial theory (Kaiwar 2014:1–30) at the expense of the one offered by 
a Marxist who openly embraced Scottish nationalism (Cocks 2002:114–16).  
 
2.4.1  Tom Nairn  
 
It was the resurgence of nationalism in advanced industrial countries, and Tom Nairn’s 
native Scotland in particular, in the 1960s and 1970s that provided the immediate 
context for a series of articles published in New Left Review during 1970s, which were 
later compiled under the title of The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism 
(1981). Nationalist mobilization in Wales, Scotland, Quebec and more violently in 
Northern Ireland provoked interest after almost thirty years of post-war affluence and 
the established belief – notably held by modernisation theory – that nationalism, not to 
mention nationalist conflict, was a characteristic of societies experiencing the shift from 
underdevelopment to development. Nationalism, much like geopolitics, was attributed 
to the horrors of Nazism, which advanced, civic and patriotic societies of the West 
scorned as atavistic and irrational. For them the problem of nationalism simply did not 
exist any more. 
 
According to Nairn, in order to avoid the past failures of Marxism and much of other 
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approaches, a theory of nationalism needs to beware of two things. First, it must not get 
caught up in the normative dispute whether nationalism is good or bad. ‘A detached 
historical view,’ argues Nairn, can ‘see the phenomenon as a whole, in a way that rises 
above [its] “positive” and “negative” sides’ (1981:332). Second, ‘the only framework of 
reference which is of any utility is world history as a whole’ (1981:332). Locating the 
source of nationalism at this level allows Nairn to reject internal explanations or, as he 
calls them, ‘internal motions as such’ as the driving forces behind its genesis. To pursue 
country-by-country analysis is to swallow ‘the usual mangled half-truth of commonsense’ 
served by the ideology of nationalism that ‘human society consists essentially of several 
hundred different and discrete “nations”, each of which has (or ought to have) its own 
postage-stamps and national soul. The secret of the forest is the trees, so to speak’ 
(1981:332). Thus, and stated categorically, the real origins of nationalism are ‘in the 
machinery of world political economy’ and its uneven expansion outwards from 
Western Europe since the eighteenth century (1981:335). Nationalism, argues Nairn, is 
‘as a whole quite incomprehensible’ outside this historical context of the uneven 
development of capitalism (1981:96).    
 
Having made this general claim, Nairn moves on to specify the historical dynamics of 
nationalism’s emergence. To that end, he elaborates on the general claim by exposing 
the discrepancy between the self-image of capitalism and its actual operation. The 
avatars of capitalist development presented it to the world outside its core areas as a 
progressive force. They argued that capitalism, although initially uneven, has an internal 
natural dynamic to re-balance the developmental disparity between the early developers 
(England and France) and the latecomers (Germany, Japan, Italy and the rest of the 
world). The historical agency to achieve this would be an enlightened cosmopolitan 
élite in the periphery in collaboration with their counterparts in the core countries. Once 
this universal class realised the benefits of the pacific commerce and overcame the 
irrationality of ‘war’, the benefits would start trickling down to the masses (1981:336–
37).   
 
The actual history of capitalist development, however, did not unfold as the progressive 
elimination of unevenness between the core and the periphery, but rather the latter 
experiencing its impact as domination and invasion. It was not the growing harmony of 
interest among first the upper classes worldwide and later the masses, but the sordid 
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material interest of the English and French bourgeois classes at the heart of world 
capitalism. The peripheral élites, ‘trampled over rather than taught the rules of the 
game; exploited rather than made partners’, soon realised that the concepts of the 
Enlightenment and classical political economy were a smokescreen for something 
entirely different (1981:339).  
 
From the structural determination of uneven capitalism, Nairn derives three key aspects 
of peripheral nationalism. First, the distinction he draws between the ideology and 
actual practice of world capitalism allows him to specify a causal mechanism for the 
emergence of a nationalist response among the peripheral élites. This causality is not 
based on a Eurocentric diffusionist model wherein nationalism as an idea flows from 
Europe to the less fortunate parts of the world. It is one of geo-economic compulsion 
generating political consciousness. The emergence of peripheral nationalism is not one 
of choice, but one of necessity (1981:339). 
 
Nairn then adds another causal chain, so to speak, to explain why peripheral nationalism 
needed the mobilisation of the masses – although only later and not in all cases 
(1981:339). On the face of it this appears as an internal mechanism related to the 
specifics of the relationship between the élites and the masses. However, for Nairn it is 
connected to the fact of unevenness of world capitalism. The compulsion of 
underdevelopment generates the necessity to resort to populism given limited resources 
at the disposal of the peripheral élites. All that they had was the people, their people, 
who were anything but a nation yet: ‘the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism 
had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a 
language they understood’ (1981:340).  
 
Third, for Nairn the content of peripheral nationalism cannot be understood without 
reference to the condition of unevenness. It gave peripheral nationalism its profound 
ambiguity. The nationalists of the late developing world aspired for catch-up. They 
desired for themselves and for their nations all of the bounties of modernity. But to be 
able to do this, late developing nationalism needed to appeal to the non-modern. It had 
to formulate its call to arms in the idiom of ‘a sentimental culture sufficiently accessible 
to the lower strata’ (1981:340). In its inescapable ambivalence, the peripheral 
nationalism is caught up in the agonising web of combining Western ‘technology’ with 
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national ‘culture.’ To that end, they were ‘compelled to attempt radical, competitive 
short-cuts in order to avoid being trampled over or left behind’ (1981:341).  
 
More than the first (the structural factor), the second and the third arguments explain the 
emergence of nationalism: ‘The dilemma of underdevelopment becomes “nationalism” 
only when it is (so to speak) refracted into a given society, perceived in a certain way; 
and then acted upon’ (1981:100 emphases added). The second chain identifies two 
reasons for the peripheral élites’ response to imperial injustice: the imperial drive for 
cultural assimilation (Anglicization or Frenchification) and exclusion of the part of 
peripheral élite from the transnational class (1981:338–39). The disaffected lot then 
turned to the masses and invited them to the fight. But these arguments do not add up to 
a proper methodology to answer the question why did the peripheral response take the 
form of nationalism? That is, nationalism that seeks a political roof for an abstract 
community of equals with attachment to an ancient homeland, sharing common culture 
and speaking a national language (cf. Orridge 1981:183). For all their problems, 
‘Eurocentric’ theorists like Gellner and Anderson offer social theoretical explanations 
for this specific form of community. They explain nationalism as a social fact by 
making reference to other, prior social facts. What Nairn offers (in his third argument) 
is, at best, a reworked version of the psychologism of the traditional diffusionist 
historiography of Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie and others (Smith 1978:238–40). We can 
trace this in his history of nationalism.  
  
Unlike the conventional view that locates nationalism’s emergence in revolutionary 
France (Löwy 1998:52), Nairn argues that nationalism first emerged in countries 
experiencing late development, though not in the ‘overseas periphery’ as erroneously 
claimed by Breuilly (1993:412). Germany and Italy were the birthplaces of nationalism 
as we know it when they were ‘march-lands endeavouring to re-order themselves to 
face the threat from the West’ (1981:343). It was in these two countries and later in 
Japan that one encounters the most potent form of the phenomenon. Because it was in 
these ablest of late developers that ‘a painful experience of “under-development” 
combined with modern socio-economic institutions enabling them to mobilise and 
indoctrinate their masses effectively’ (1981:345–46). And from there it spread to the 
rest of the world in concentric circles carried on by ‘the tidal wave of modernisation’ 




Nationalism emerged in the early developing countries only after it was fully formed in 
the periphery – that is only after Germany, Italy and Japan caught up in the late 
nineteenth century. ‘England, France and the United States did not invent nationalism,’ 
argues Nairn, because ‘they did not need to, originally’ (1981:344). For they already 
had what nationalism is really about. At this point the argument takes a complicated 
turn for the reader. Here is what Nairn says about the pioneers of development:  
 
From the very outset, part of the “superiority” of the development leaders lay 
in their political and state systems. It lay in the fact that they had invented the 
national state, the real proto-type of the nationalist ideal, by quite empirical 
processes extending over many centuries. They discovered and proved its 
power long before nationalism had been formulated as the general, systemic 
response to that power's incursions throughout the world (1981:343). 
 
The implicit distinction between the national states of England and France, and the 
nationalism of late developers suggests that there existed English and French nations 
(but not nationalisms), before peripheral nationalisms. And it is the national political 
and state systems that partly made the early developers superior. Moreover, this early 
experience of national state building was an outcome of ‘quite empirical processes’ 
(Nairn’s euphemism for normal). Peripheral nationalism emerged as a compensatory 
mechanism to achieve these national things.   
 
Nairn’s dogged commitment to structuralism offers little methodological finesse to 
make a convincing case for that. As Anderson argues, ‘it will be hard to see [from 
Nairn’s argument] why the invitation came to seem so attractive, and why such different 
alliances were able to issue it’ (2006:80). What is less hard to see, however, is why 
Nairn has been charged with being a nationalist (Cocks 2002:111–32; Hobsbawm 
1977). Given that neither the structural pressures of world capitalism nor its uneven 
development can explain the form of peripheral response, Nairn adds a ‘reverse’ causal 
line that reasons from the cultural difference of late developing societies to anchor the 
structural determination internally. The mildly formulated instrumentalist element in the 
argument (exclusion of the part of peripheral élite from the transnational class) does not 
change this contradictoriness of his attempt to secure the argument from both ends. 
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Seen in this way, Nairn’s method seems similar to the hybrid of primordialism and 
constructionism which  
 
treats ethnic consciousness as a universal potentiality which is realized – 
objectified, that is, as an active political identity – when a population 
recognizes common interests, usually when it finds its existence, interests, or 
integrity under threat. From this neoprimordialist perspective, collective 
identities are not “things” in or for themselves, but an imminent capacity that 
takes on manifest form in response to external forces (1995:5, emphasis in the 
original).    
 
The limitations of structuralism can be further exposed by a closer look at Nairn’s 
method to explain the spread of nationalism in the wider peripheral world. What he 
offers on this score is an imagery of nationalism spreading in concentric waves from the 
early late developers outwards. This draws a very accessible world map of nationalism’s 
history, but ultimately simplifies the central dynamic of his theory. In effect, this vision 
of diffusion is based on a mentally convenient, but historically one-dimensional, 
imagery. Let me try to illustrate the problem by putting Nairn’s cases to a different use. 
Germany’s ‘early late development’ altered the unevenness of world economy in at 
least two crucial ways. First, the early developers responded to the German catch-up by 
adjusting their worldview. Nairn captures this by arguing that by the end of nineteenth 
century early developers also became nationalist. But he fails to see the other 
significance of this for the general condition of unevenness. Germany’s early late 
development also altered the vision of other late developers. So did the Japanese 
modernisation, but in a significantly different way than the German one especially for 
the late developers in Asia. A similar dynamic was at work when Tanzimat reforms in 
the Ottoman Empire became models for the Qajar reformers in Iran. The challenges that 
unevenness poses for late developers and the overall objectives of their strategies cannot 
be captured within a neatly imagined model of tidal waves. Ignoring these 
developments, Nairn’s uneven development acts as the structural condition that explains 






2.4.2 Partha Chatterjee  
 
One of the founding members of the influential Subaltern Studies group established in 
late 1970s, Partha Chatterjee is the leading theorist of nationalism within the wider 
school of postcolonial theory. For the purposes of this review, I focus on Chatterjee’s 
two key contributions. The first is his book, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World (1993a), where he develops a Foucaultian discourse analysis of nationalist 
thought in colonial and postcolonial India. The other is his engagement with the work of 
Benedict Anderson and especially his notion of modularity. In a consistent and sharp 
argumentation and tone over the years, Chatterjee has argued that Anderson’s notion of 
modularity is Eurocentric and espouses a hierarchical difference between the original 
nationalism of the West and its lower quality Eastern copy (1991, 1999, 2003; see also 
Guha 1985).  
 
Chatterjee’s earlier engagement attempts to make a case that because the wellspring of 
nationalist thought is the West, nationalist thought in the colonies carries a paradox. He 
builds his argument in two steps. First, he offers a hotchpotch and at times not 
remarkably sophisticated criticism against what he calls sociologism of the existing 
theories, which fits ‘nationalism to certain universal and inescapable sociological 
constraints of the modem age.’ If this method does not quite work for anti-colonial 
nationalism, then a typology of Western and Eastern nationalisms is offered to 
sociologically account for the deviance of the latter (1993a:22). Such sociologically 
determinist or functionalist understandings of nationalism empties it of all content, 
Chatterjee argues; ‘it is the content of nationalist ideology, its claims about what is 
possible and what is legitimate, which gives specific shape to its politics’ (1993a:40).  
 
We need, in other words, to take the content of nationalist doctrine seriously, for it is in 
the structure of a body of knowledge that we can trace the dynamics of power – hence 
the Foucaltian substance of his argument. This is because, Chatterjee argues, the 
injustices of colonialism are not restricted to the political, economic and military 
domains. Colonial oppression extends into the epistemological domain through the 
ideology of nationalism. In this sense, Chatterjee is not offering a causal account in the 
conventional sense. He is less interested in what makes nationalism than in the inherent 
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contradictoriness of nationalist thought and the implications of this for colonial and 
post-colonial politics. The paradox of nationalist thought is  
 
the particular manifestation of a much more general problem, namely, the 
problem of the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in 
the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral 
and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought 
which perpetuates, in a real and not merely a metaphorical sense, a colonial 
domination (1993a:11).  
 
At this second step Chatterjee develops a critical study of ideology. He adapts from 
Anour Abdel-Malek (1963) the analytical distinction between the problematic and the 
thematic of a social ideology. The problematic is the level of an ideology that ‘asserts 
the existence, and often the practical realizability, of certain historical possibilities.’ 
Nationalist thought at this level ‘retains the essentialist character [of the Oriental] 
depicted in Orientalist discourse. Only he is not passive, non-participating. He is seen to 
possess a “subjectivity” which he can himself “make.”’ The thematic of ideology, on 
the other hand, justifies the claims asserted at the level of the problematic ‘by an appeal 
to both epistemic and moral principles.’ The thematic of nationalist thought, in this 
sense, ‘accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction 
between “the East” and “the West”…hence the same ‘objectifying’ procedures of 
knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western science.’ Nationalist 
thought is inherently contradictory ‘because it reasons within a framework of 
knowledge whose representational structure of power [it] seeks to repudiate’ 
(1993a:38). This contradiction finds its formative expression in what Chatterjee calls 
the moment of departure of colonial nationalism, when the aspiring nationalists 
encounter post-Enlightenment thought and accept its essentialist distinctions between 
the West and the East, but also advocate strategies to overcome it. 
 
The epistemological entrapment into which colonial peoples were led by nationalism 
also determined the path post-colonial development. Chatterjee makes a case for this by 
arguing that the Gramscian notion of passive revolution was ‘the general form of the 
transition from colonial to post-colonial national states in the 20th century’ (1993a:49-
50, emphasis in original). The twin pressures of independent capitalist development, he 
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argues, dictate the form of the post-colonial state: the underdeveloped domestic means 
of production and the overwhelming dominance of metropolitan capitalism (backed by 
its political and military power). In the face of these pressures the nascent bourgeoisie 
was confronted with the necessity to enlist the peasantry in the fight against the empire. 
But because it lacked the social power to assume the leadership role, the bourgeoisie did 
not pursue a full-scale attack on the traditional power structures and instead opted for a 
molecular transformation of society.  This is the moment of manoeuvre when the 
colonial nationalists seek to ‘bring [the pre-capitalist dominant groups] round to a 
position of subsidiary allies within a reformed state structure,’ even if in this phase 
many political possibilities with emancipatory potential are attainable (1993a:49). 
 
Colonial nationalism finds its most systematic expression when it embarks on its 
passive revolution in earnest following national independence. This is the moment of 
arrival, which Chatterjee associates with the thought of Jawaharlal Nehru (1993a:131–
66). At this point the discourse of nationalism ‘is not only conducted in a single, 
consistent, unambiguous voice, it also succeeds in glossing over all earlier 
contradictions, divergences and differences’ (1993a:51). The moment of arrival 
effectively blocks the genuine participation of subaltern classes in national political life, 
for the state-building nationalist believes that the project of national emancipation 
‘necessarily implies an elitist programme, for the cultural synthesis in question can only 
be realized by the refined intellect’ (Özkırımlı 2010:185). 
 
Chatterjee’s objection to modularity, developed in his later work, is based on his claim 
that Anderson privileges the original nationalism of Europe and the Americas over late 
and derivative nationalisms of Asia and Africa: 
 
If nationalists in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community 
from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and 
the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? History, it would seem, has 
decreed that we, in the post-colonial world, shall only be perpetual consumers 
of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have 
thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and 
exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial 




To correct this Eurocentric bias, Chatterjee argues that colonial nationalisms operated in 
two distinct domains. The first is the material domain of the economy, statecraft and 
politics, where Western models were consciously imported due to their technological 
and organizational superiority. In this domain anti-colonial nationalism is modular. This 
is not, however, all there is to colonial nationalism. There is also the spiritual domain: 
the domain of culture, the family, language and education. If the material domain is 
formed on an identity with the colonizer’s superior achievements, the spiritual domain 
is protected by anti-colonial nationalism. The latter is where anti-colonial nationalism is 
‘most powerful, creative and historically significant’; this is where it ‘fashions a 
“modern” national culture which is, nevertheless, not Western’ (1993b:6). This is where 
the anti-colonial nation happens. Therefore, it cannot be seen simply a copy of Western 
nationalism. 
 
This criticism, however, is misplaced. Anderson clearly acknowledges, albeit only in 
the second edition of Imagined Communities, that nationalism built its formative and 
critical force outside the reaches of the colonial state – that is outside the public spheres 
of economics and politics, which were closely supervised by the metropole (Ullock 
1996:427). ‘It was precisely because temples, mosques, schools and courts were 
topographically anomalous,’ notes Anderson with the help of spatial metaphors, ‘they were 
understood as zones of freedom and – in time – fortresses from which religious, later 
nationalist, anticolonials could go forth to battle’ (2006:168–69). Tellingly, Chatterjee 
concedes that Anderson may be right to the extent that nationalism in the colonial world 
has indeed copied from the European model. But this is only the case because ‘we have 
all taken the claims of nationalism to be a political movement much too literally and 
much too seriously’ (1993b:5, emphasis in original) – exactly the kind of approach he 
advocated in Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World against ‘sociological  
determinism and functionalism’ (1993a:38).   
 
This is indeed a critical juncture in Chatterjee’s work and marks his desire ‘to come out 
of the cage of intellectual history’ (Goswami 2013:181). It seemingly follows from his 
earlier claim that all colonial peoples made their way into the nation-state system 
through passive revolution. Although this claim sounds conceptually intriguing, it 
nevertheless rings historically vacuous (cf. Marashi 2014:15–19). For without the 
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specification of minimum necessary premises for any historiography of nationalist 
decolonisation, no such sweeping assertion could allow us to answer why passive 
revolution acted as the common midwife for these post-colonial states in different times 
and places, not to mention in opposition to different colonialisms (see, for instance 
Riley and Desai 2007).  
 
Absent such answers, Chatterjee has to operate, like most post-colonial theorists, with 
an understanding of European colonialism that is monolithic and powerful and all the 
more inescapable (cf. Lazarus 2002). This is to the point that all post-colonial 
development is caught in the epistemological categories of post-Enlightenment thought. 
In his quest against the avatars of Eurocentrism, Chatterjee ends up inversely 
reproducing the dichotomy of Eurocentric historiography.  Even his later encounter with 
Anderson, certainly more animated politically, replicates to a degree the ‘spatial’ 
differentiation between the British coloniser and the colonised for the post-colonial 
India (Haj 1997:146).  
 
Chatterjee is not clear whether these dualities are the actual forms of post-colonial 
politics or the overbearing categories of post-Enlightenment thought. The reader is 
never truly informed of the difference. For that reason there is some truth in the charge 
that Chatterjee’s analysis is trapped in Eurocentric categories (Ramaswamy 1994:961). 
This may sound a tad unfair for a postcolonial theorist, but the confusion is remarkable. 
In his early work, Chatterjee berates nationalism for being European and in his later 
work, he berates a theorist of nationalism for saying nationalism is European.   
 
But there are further problems with such binaries as outside/inside, politics/culture, 
West/East, material/spiritual. First, and at a more general level, Chatterjee’s argument 
that nationalists laboured in the spiritual domain to build their nation is hardly a 
differentiating factor among nationalisms (Desai 2008:427). In other words, 
nationalisms are surely different, but they are not different in creating difference. The 
argument that nationalisms are different ‘rhetorically overstate[s] the particularity of 
nationalist imaginings’ (Goswami 2002:779). By overlooking the global uniformities of 
the modern world (Bayly 2004), it inversely reproduces the normatively suspect 
dichotomy of Western and Eastern nationalisms by foregrounding the cultural content 




Secondly, these ‘defensive and compensatory contrasts’ (Parker 1999:43, note 2) are 
deployed by Chatterjee as antidotes to the Eurocentrism of Anderson, which, in the 
former’s reading, treats Western nationalism as a superior and also a singular category 
over and above non-Western nationalism. This is not the case. Imitation of earlier forms 
of nationalism is not exclusive to colonial nationalists. For Anderson, official 
nationalisms were secondary and in reaction to the popular linguistic nationalisms of the 
early nineteenth century. It is one thing to argue that the processes through which such 
imitations have taken place remain frustratingly underspecified in Anderson’s account, 
especially in their geopolitical dimensions (Goswami 2002), yet quite another, and 
flawed, to claim that for Anderson the original and the copy distinctly belong to the 
West and the rest respectively. To argue the latter, as Chatterjee does, amounts to a 
flagrant disregard of the empirical support Anderson brings in to sustain his case for the 
modularity of the nation-form in Imagined Communities (cf. 2006:86–111).  
 
Thirdly, and more specifically, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire add a further 
element of complication to Chatterjee’s dichotomies. The ‘spatial’ dualities forecloses 
an analysis of nationalism in semi-colonial societies, which did not operate with such a 
separation – not, at least, in the immediate and objective sense proposed by Chatterjee. 
They did politically imagine and challenge the master frame set by Western geopolitical 
pressures. This was not a static exercise caught within simple toggling between ‘the 
West and the East.’ Nor was it based on strictly ‘spiritual’ alternatives, but involved 
differing degrees of embracing Western civilisation and culture. As Fatma Müge Göçek 
notes, a clear-cut divide between the European coloniser and the non-European 
colonised does not hold in the case of the Ottoman Empire ‘where the lines were much 




This chapter offers three conclusions. First, whatever its other shortcomings, 
Anderson’s notion of modularity strikes an important chord. The alternative on offer to 
such an abstraction is the argument that there can be no conceptual and theoretical unity 
to the study of nationalisms or one has to fall back onto an essentialist position like 
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Nairn. But such a position neglects ‘the historical regularities or “family resemblance” 
between diverse modern nationalist movements, despite their highly variegated regional 
and cultural contexts of production’ (Goswami 2002:776). In more concrete terms, we 
need to take Siniša Malešević’s caution seriously:  
 
While there is no dispute with the view that cultural differences are real, the 
fact is that the organisational skeletons of modernity remain very similar if not 
identical: the nearly uniform bureaucratic institutions of the nation-state all 
over the globe, the ever-present state’s monopoly of organised violence, 
taxation, education and legislation; the dominance of the very similar financial 
institutions and capitalist corporations, the rise of context-free science and 
technology, the interdependent industrial expansion, etc.’ (2014:377). 
 
Thus, what is needed is not the abandonment of modularity but its reformulation (cf. 
Goswami 2002; cf. Cooper 2015).   
 
Second, the static ontology and the ‘experimental time’ of comparative analysis (Adams 
et al. 2005:66), even when it subscribes to modernist historiography, cannot but assume 
the existence of multiplicity of political or cultural groups that transform into nations. 
The question for this approach is how to get beyond the static ontology and find 
theoretical premises that can capture the very fact and consequences of multiplicity. 
One promising way is to see comparison not a tool imposed on history but one ‘used in 
the past by historical actors themselves, when they engineered similarities and 
differences in order to create particular historical trajectories for their polities and 
communities’ (Saunier 2013:5). Comparison in this sense has indeed been built into the 
global diffusion of nationalism:  
 
Because the first nation-states (i.e., Great Britain, the United States, and 
France) happened to be the most powerful states in the world from the 
eighteenth century to today, [a variety of political movements across the 
world] “pirated” nationalism…hoping they would one day preside over 
states that matched the military glory, political might, and cultural 





Third, a reformulated concept of modularity should be able to historicise the diffusion 
of nationalism without getting caught in the fruitless back-and-forth of the West and the 
East dichotomy which afflicts both Nairn’s and Chatterjee’s work. There are indeed 
passing moments in Nairn’s writing where he makes approving, but fleeting, use of 
Leon Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development (1981:339), which 
intimates a methodology to bridge the articulation of nationalism as a universally 
acceptable form of politics and its particular manifestations in the late developing 
world. But in Nairn’s use uneven and combined development is ‘merely a rhetorical 
device rather than a theoretical category’ (Matin 2013a:82). His uncritical application of 
Gellner’s tidal waves argument costs Nairn the ontological depth of the dynamics of 
unevenness and the promise of combined development to shed light on the 
heterogeneity of nationalist politics, as he ultimately opts for a simplified notion of bi-
temporality (developed/underdeveloped) seemingly inspired by the core-periphery 
























Theorising the International Origins of Late Nationalisms 
_____________________________________________________ 
   
3.1. Introduction  
 
Our analysis so far endeavoured to make a case that a gulf exists between histories of 
nationalisms and theories of nationalism. This involved reviewing two sides of the gulf 
in their respective literatures to identify their shortcomings. The problem with the 
specialised literature engaged with in Chapter 1 is its particularism. For lack of 
theoretical resources on which to base their historical research, they tend to treat their 
cases as exceptional. In other words, specific late nationalisms are historicised with 
reference to their particular and internal developmental dynamics, even if the original 
impetus came from ‘outside.’ This has led to an intellectual dead-end wherein all 
nationalisms have their specific dynamics that cannot be subjected to theoretical 
control. The paradox is that, especially for the critically oriented studies of the subject, 
nationalism manages almost surreptitiously to fix the analytical boundaries of its own 
deconstruction.  
 
The internalism of the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms has its theoretical 
counterpart in the general literature. Before moving forward, let me restate the content 
and consequences of internalism, for this is the cardinal problem this thesis seeks to 
tackle. A particularly incisive criticism of internalist social theory is made available to 
us in a lesser known article by a German sociologist named Friedrich Tenbruck (1994; 
see also Martins 1974; Poggi 1965).26 The fundamental assumption of internalist 
sociology, according to Tenbruck, is that ‘each society with its changes and growth can 
                                                
26 Tenbruck’s article was originally published in German in 1989 and it had a specific target in 
mind: the postwar History of Society school (Gesellschaftsgeschichte) in Germany. Appeared 
well before the high tide of globalisation theory with its fashionable but flawed critique of 
methodological nationalism, the article contained ‘prophetic proposals.’ Yet Tenbruck’s 
challenge went largely unanswered (Osterhammel 2009:43) – a fate similarly fell upon the 
text’s English translation in 1994. This goes to show how difficult it could be to penetrate 
through the skin of sclerotic principles in social sciences and humanities. Despite being 
published in English more than 20 years ago and in a journal which has been very much at the 
centre of the globalisation debates, according to the Google Scholar metrics Tenbruck’s piece 
have received only 31 citations as of December 2017.   
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and should be explained in reference to its internal constitution.’ This basic premise 
inevitably leads to the treatment of interactions among societies as insignificant details. 
‘Inter-societal conditions,’ added Tenbruck, ‘represented only facilitating or inhibiting 
modifications and complications of their own internal dynamic’ (1994:75). Internalism 
banishes the intersocietal from the theoretical domain. In the actual execution of 
sociological theorisation, internalism ominously guards against asking certain types of 
questions concerned with, for example,  
 
the reciprocal conditioning of societies, their relationship to each other, that is 
their ‘external situatedness,’ and in addition those factors that, as religious, 
political, economic or cultural processes of societalization, occur across and 
beyond a range of societies; or those which take place below this level, e.g. as 
migrations, asylum-seeking or other forms of population movement; and, 
finally, all forms of military, cultural and economic expansion (1994:76). 
 
But this is not all there is to internalism. One of the reasons why internalism is so 
rampant in modern social theory, to the extent that it has become invisible to most, is 
because many of the European and North American practitioners of sociology never 
realised that there can be any other type of society than theirs; nor did they think that 
their society requires any external input for its development. Like a duck takes to water, 
for the Western sociologist its fundamental conceptual category, society, appeared quite 
natural and self-reproducing within its boundaries. Those who dared to venture beyond 
those boundaries methodologically armed themselves almost exclusively with 
comparative method. This has interlaced sociological internalism with another 
widespread intellectual and political problem: Eurocentrism.  
 
To see how this is different from the internalism of historical works on nationalism, we 
can contrast the role of causal explanation in both. Unlike the specialised literature 
where causal explanation is sacrificed for narrativism, in the general literature the 
problem is with the nature of the causal explanation itself. This is because in the latter 
case, the causal analysis is derived from a certain historical geography; and for that 
reason, it cannot be extended to the late developing cases. The empirical problem, most 
clearly expressed, is that late developing nationalisms fully expose the limitations of an 
internalist theory. In either case the analytical boundaries unconsciously impose 
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themselves. In the specialised literature the analytical boundaries of the specific national 
unit paradoxically set limits on the analysis of nationalism. The deconstruction of the 
nation is caught in ‘the territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994). In the general literature the 
historical experience of a specific historical geography (Europe) presents itself as the 
supplier of the universal causal key to explain other nationalisms. 
 
Needless to say, I am not the first person to notice the troubling rift between theory and 
history in the study of nationalism. Therefore, the chapter reviews previous attempts in 
a cumulative fashion in order to propose its own solution to the problem. This will 
allow me to evaluate various attempts at bridging the rift between theory and history, 
and, more importantly, to avoid the potential risk of self-referentiality of my proposed 
theoretical solution. To that end, the first section starts with an almost routinely 
proposed solution: comparison. Although in most cases its ‘nature and methods…are 
assumed as givens’ (Friedman 2013:34), comparison ‘seems fundamental to human 
understanding…that depends upon principles of relation and differentiation’ (Felski and 
Friedman 2013:1–2). As a first port of call, comparison is touted as the most 
immediately available and viable tool to bridge the gap between theory and history. But 
despite all its cognitive authority, comparison has recently come under fire for its 
inability to account for connective and interactive dimension of social reality.    
 
That critique of comparison leads to, or rather largely emanates from, the recent global 
or transnational turn in historiography. The proponents of this burgeoning perspective 
on history claim to overcome the limitations of traditional history writing – namely 
Eurocentrism, internalism and static temporality of comparison – by shifting the focus 
on to transactions, transfers and crossings between and across societies (Conrad 2016; 
Haupt and Kocka 2009; Iriye 2013). These histories, named collectively by its two 
practitioners as ‘the family of relational approaches’ (Werner and Zimmermann 
2006:31), come with many adjectives (world, transnational, global, connected, 
entangled etc.), work in different scales and ask sometimes dramatically different 
questions. Notwithstanding their internal variety, they seem to agree on the premise that 
the world cannot be fully understood if discreetly bounded units (most notably nations 
or nation-states) determine where historical analysis starts and ends. In their challenge 
towards nation-centric histories, they focus on ‘the interdependencies that are not 
captured by “the nation” as a category, such as the transfer of ideas, technologies and 
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cultural practices’ (Rüger 2010:659). Given its pronouncements, transnational history 
appears to be a perfect cure for the problems identified in the previous chapters.  
 
This is only a targeted look because I do not pursue an extensive survey of transnational 
history. What is more useful here is to assess, in two steps, the contributions of this new 
turn in historiography to (i) the study of nationalism, which would yield (ii) theoretical 
insights. Notwithstanding its crucial criticisms of methodological nationalism and 
Eurocentrism, transnational history is hampered by a mobility bias which neglects the 
transhistorical quality of ‘geopolitics’ and often repeats the excesses of globalisation 
theory (cf. de Vries 2013).    
 
Following this discussion with its still tentative findings, I present in detailed fashion 
the premises of Uneven and Combined Development, as the most well suited theory to 
establish the above mentioned cooperation and to overcome the theory and history rift 
in the study of nationalism. This presentation has several steps. The first is an 
introduction of Leon Trotsky’s original contribution in response to the apparent 
peculiarity of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This is followed by an analysis of the 
recent renaissance of Trotsky’s original idea, especially, though not exclusively, in the 
discipline of International Relations. It is here we find increasingly in systematic form 
the key premises of U&CD, as I demonstrate by successively explaining the meaning of 
each component: unevenness, combination and development. And following from these 
premises are the methodological principles of U&CD.  
 
The final section of the chapter demonstrates the application of U&CD’s methodology 
to the formative period of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms from the mid-eighteenth to 
the early twentieth centuries. To that end it introduces the intermediary concepts of 
‘politics of comparison’ and ‘mediated modernisation,’ which connect main premises of 
the theory to the historical analysis. 
  
3.2 Is Comparison the Cure for Internalism?  
 
The review of the specialised literature in Chapter 1 cited numerous complaints of 
theoretical deficiency. As part and parcel of the so-called crisis of area studies, the 
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contribution of Middle East Studies, by admission of its practitioners, seems to halt at 
the region’s borders. Consequently, the studies of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms are 
stricken by national-myopia. For ‘particular histories of particular nationalisms,’ notes 
John Breuilly, ‘tend to become absorbed into their subject’ (1996b:138). Moreover, 
although these studies are not marred by essentialism and make use of recent critical 
and deconstructivist epistemologies, the single case study approach is the most popular 
choice. Narrative accounts of different nationalisms’ invention or imagination are 
ultimately caught up in the hermeneutic circle of nationalist thought (or discourse, to 
use the more fashionable term) and inadvertently end up registering the power of the 
nation (Breuilly 1996a:157). Paradoxically, the critical stamina of social constructivism 
falls short of overcoming national epistemological boundaries.  
 
But there may still be room for improvement. And one avenue towards that end is 
pointed out with noticeable frequency: comparison (Hroch 1998:78). Fred Halliday, 
who diagnosed a rift between general theories and individual case studies of 
nationalism, called for a halt to general theorising: ‘what we need instead are 
comparative, individual, histories that are both written in the light of these general 
theories and that, critically, test them against the historical record’ (1997:27). Another 
commentator suggests an almost identical treatment. Given the current saturation of the 
field of nationalism studies with abstract general theories at one end and concrete 
individual histories at the other, ‘the value of “theoretically informed” comparative case 
studies needs to be emphasized more than ever’ (Özkırımlı 2010:219). With an area 
studies focus, Moshe Behar reiterates the prescription: ‘the incorporation of the core 
comparative questions into the study of nationalism in the Middle East is a prerequisite 
for overcoming the relative idiosyncrasy typifying this domain’ (2005:587). 
 
In the instances just cited, authors provide little methodological guidance on how to 
compare and, as such, comparison seems to be ‘more widely admired than consciously 
practiced’ (Grew 1980:768).27 And when it is employed, as, for example, in the study of 
Turkish nationalism, it is at best ‘implicit and indirect’ (Zürcher 2014:592). Even then, 
extending the benefit of the doubt to comparative historical analysis may be of more 
                                                
27 Tellingly, two prolific historians of modern Iran and Turkey choose to downplay their 
methodological ambitions by attaching the qualifier, ‘Some Comparative Remarks,’ to the titles 
of their works (Atabaki 2007; Atabaki and Zürcher 2004:44–64). 
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value at this point than outright scepticism. What does, then, comparative historical 
analysis offer? How does it close the gap between history and theory? And how can it 
help overcome the limitations in the study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms?  
 
‘Truth on this side of the Pyrénées,’ said Blaise Pascal some centuries ago, is ‘error on 
the other side’ (Quoted in Dogan 2009:13).28 For its practitioners, the major virtue of 
comparative historical analysis is its ability to manage the diversity of social reality. 
Given that the social sciences have no theories with universal validity, the 
comparativists argue, the best way to comprehend such a diversity and idiosyncrasy of 
human societies, according to one sociologist, is the comparative method (Dogan 
2009:13). It is by way of comparison we can hope to reach new historical 
generalisations (Moore 1973:x). In this sense, comparative historical analysis is most 
beneficial, notes one historian, when it formulates ‘arguments at a middle range about 
differences and similarities among a range of cases that allow us to understand the 
general issue at hand better than had we limited our scope to one country only’ 
(Baldwin 2004:11). Usually, this goal is attained by pausing ‘along the path leading 
from one national history to abstract sociological generalizations’ and generating 
typologies (Baldwin 2004:8).  
 
The appeal of comparison is potently felt in the (sub-) discipline of historical sociology. 
If anything, historical sociology was born comparative, thanks more than anyone else to 
Max Weber and his work on world religions (Kalberg 1994; Onaka 2015).29 The 
German sociologist, who principally endowed historical sociology with its comparative 
birthmarks,30 rebuked a sceptic historian in 1914: ‘we are absolutely in accord that 
history should establish what is specific to, say, the medieval city; but this is possible 
only if we first find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic)’ (Quoted 
                                                
28 Mattei Dogan mistakenly attributes these words to Michel de Montaigne, instead of Blaise 
Pascal. The translator of Pascal’s work, Roger Ariew, notes that Pascal paraphrased 
Montaigne’s earlier point: ‘what truth is it that is bounded by these mountains, and that is 
falsehood in the world beyond them?’ (Pascal 2005:19) 
29 Emile Durkheim was equally adamant on the centrality of comparative method to sociology: 
‘comparative sociology is not a special branch of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it 
ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for facts’ (2013:109). 
30 As Peter Burke notes, ‘Weber spent much of his working life in the attempt to define the 
distinctive characteristics of Western civilization (notably what he called its institutionalized 
“rationality”), by means of systematic comparisons between Europe and Asia in the economic, 
political and religious spheres and even in that of music’ (1993:23). 
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in Roth 1976:307). Even when the hegemonic postwar American sociology ‘retreated 
into the present’ (Elias 1987) at the expense of historical inquiry, a meagre number of 
‘renegade’ historical sociologists like Barrington Moore and Reinhard Bendix struggled 
to keep the comparative fire going. It was the second-wave historical sociologists of 
1970s and 1980s (cf. Adams et al. 2005:15–30), including the sub-discipline’s 
household names like Immanuel Wallerstein, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly and S. N. 
Eisenstadt, who reintroduced historical analysis back into the mainstream of sociology. 
And it was ‘by stressing comparative method, they participate eagerly in the discipline's 
obsessive concern to justify itself as a science,’ because comparative method is ‘the 
standard alternative to mainstream statistical methods when the number of cases is 
insufficiently large’ (Sewell Jr. 1996:246).  
 
There are certain key features that define the methodological and epistemological 
aspirations of the comparativist agenda. At its core, contemporary comparative 
historical analysis is driven by a legacy of asking big questions. Having emerged at a 
time of epochal transformations of industrial capitalism, imperialist expansion and 
confrontation, state centralisation, nation formation and urbanisation, the classical social 
theories confronted questions of comprehensive structures and large-scale processes. 
This central occupation with ‘how…societies come to be recognisably modern’ (Adams 
et al. 2005:3)  fostered ‘an affinity between asking big questions and using comparative 
historical research methods’ that ‘has helped to sustain a single tradition from the 
beginning of modern social science analysis to this day’ (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003:7). This tradition, having lapsed into an institutional coma in the immediate 
decades of the postwar period, was revived in the last quarter of the twentieth century to 
pursue a research agenda with three distinctive features. First, the fundamental concern 
of comparative historical analysis is to identify and explain causal configurations that 
produce major outcomes of interest. Second, comparative historical analysis deploys an 
explicit focus on historical sequences and processes unfolding over time. Third, the 
analysis is carried out by systematic and contextualised comparisons of cases on the 
axes of similarity and difference (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:10–15).     
 
With such a venerable tradition to cite and so many accolades under its belt, 
comparative historical analysis, then, appears to be the best available cure for 
overcoming provincial empiricism and internalism that hinders the study of the 
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formative period of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. And this is not the end of it. If 
one chooses to deploy it, comparative analysis could potentially offer further benefits to 
the historiography of Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire in light of a highly 
authoritative counsel. Almost a century ago, the eminent historian Marc Bloch (1967)31 
made a distinction between universal comparison and historical comparison (cf. Hill 
and Hill 1980; cf. Sewell Jr. 1967; cf. Steinmetz 2014:416–17). In the former case, 
comparison involves societies ‘so widely separated in time and space that any analogies 
observed between them with respect to such and such phenomena can obviously not be 
explained either by mutual influence or by a common origin’ (1967:46). For Bloch this 
was not the right direction to take. The second option, historical comparison, involves 
neighbouring and contemporary societies that influence each other, are shaped by same 
broad causes and have common origins. For these reasons, historical comparison ‘may 
hope to reach conclusions of fact that are less hypothetical and much more precise 
[because] it is more capable of rigorous classification, and more critical about the 
objects it compares’ (1967:48; see also Dogan 2009:22).32 
 
For Bloch’s principles Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire are most suitable. The 
geographical contiguity of these countries has been a source of continual interaction 
(pacific or otherwise), exchange and influence over the centuries (Ateş 2013; 
Baghoolizadeh 2012; Elik 2011; Issawi 1970; Kunt 2011; Masters 1991; Shaw 1991; 
Yıldırım 2009). From a comparative perspective, Iran and Turkey show noteworthy 
similarities in ‘structural’ conditions they were exposed to and in their ‘domestic’ 
characteristics. Inheritors of long imperial heritages, they experienced geopolitical 
pressures from the industrial European empires and Russia at about the same time and 
devised similar reform efforts to cope with these pressures. Bending history ‘a little,’ 
the political high point of their reforms, the promulgation of a constitution, was nearly 
simultaneous, or at least part of a global revolutionary wave (Sohrabi 2011). With the 
majority of their populations Muslim, both countries were radically transformed by 
authoritarian modernisers in the twentieth century (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004), who 
wished to shake off their societies’ Islamic legacy (Hazır 2015:6). And these 
                                                
31 Originally published in French in 1928.  
32 In a similar vein, Aram Yengoyan observes that ‘traditionally, comparisons have invoked the 
idea that if what is being compared shares some common time and space, the findings will be 
more powerful’ (2006:9). 
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characteristics, among others, justify the reasonable volume of comparative analysis 
(Ahmad 2014; Akkoyunlu 2014; Arjmand 2008; Pfaff 1963; Shambayati 1994, 2004; 
Sohrabi 2011; Tezcür 2011; Vardağlı 2014). Yet, curious is the neglect of the 
comparative study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms (Keyman and Yılmaz 2006).  
 
Bloch’s call for paying attention to mutual influences between neighbouring societies 
poses a problem for the logic of comparative analysis since it privileges synchronic over 
the diachronic. The comparative method fixes its objects of inquiry and freezes them in 
experimental time (see, Adams et al. 2005:66).33 Fixing objects of inquiry does not, 
however, mean freezing them in the photographic moment. It entails identifying and 
isolating causal sequences within comparable scales in order to trace their presence or 
absence in cases subject to comparison (Hewitson 2014:164–68). But in its freezing of 
time, comparison neglects the interactive dimension of social reality and overlooks the 
fact that once a particular causal sequence unfolds it generates dynamics that impact on 
what appears to the comparativist scholar as comparable later sequences.34 What is lost 
in comparative method, notes Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, is the 
interactive dynamics that ‘when societies in contact are studied, the objects and 
practices are not only in a state of interrelationship but also modify one another 
reciprocally as a result of their relationship’ (2006:35; see also Delanty 2016:20). The 
net result of this is that comparative historical analysis fails ‘to transcend the boundaries 
of nationalist historiography’ (Tyrrell 1991:1033; see also Gould 2007:766).   
 
Comparative historical analysis is also prone to Eurocentrism, our second major 
problem. There is a tendency in comparative work to treat ‘the West as norm from 
which other cultures diverge’ (Burke 1993:26; for an alternative, see Holdrege 2010). 
The findings of such treatment then tend to be a list of presences and absences. An 
ominous legacy, first and foremost of Max Weber’s work, ‘we are able to see what is 
not there, in other words to understand the significance of a particular absence’ (Burke 
1993:23, see also 2016:87). Comparative historical sociology’s lore of absences in the 
                                                
33 As Kocka and Haupt (2009:14) put it, ‘comparison usually does not deal with the passage of 
time, but, rather, with similarities and differences.’ 
34 Some time ago Michael Burawoy (1989:781), drawing inspiration from Leon Trotsky (1969), 
spotted this problem of freezing history in Theda Skocpol’s highly influential, but equally 
challenged, comparative analysis of social revolutions (1979). This criticism is repeated by 
William Sewell (1996:257–58).  
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non-European world includes, among others, rationality, private property, individualism 
and, more recently, civil society (see, for example, Yapp 1992). In this way comparison 
establishes difference and ‘with every spectre of difference comes the possibility of 
hierarchy, of relations of domination and subordination’ (Mongia 2007:385). Conducted 
in this way, the tenor of historical inquiry becomes comparison to (rather than 
comparison of), which ‘sets up a hierarchy with the lead comparison as the normative 
entity against which something else will be compared’ (Levine 2014:340).  
 
3.3 Transnational History and Overcoming Internalism and 
Eurocentrism through Mobility  
 
The criticisms towards comparative historical inquiry have been primarily raised by a 
new group of historians who have been inspired by Akire Iriye’s call ‘to search for 
historical themes and conceptions that are meaningful across national boundaries’ 
(1989:2). The call itself and the responses it gathered corresponded to a particular 
historical conjuncture, ‘our’ recent age of globalisation, which threw the stability of the 
units of historical and sociological analysis into doubt. Much like the onslaught visited 
upon area studies (discussed in Chapter 1), comparative historical analysis came under 
increasing scrutiny. It appears that comparison is no longer the main methodological 
identity of historical sociology, leading some to nostalgically lament the passing of 
earlier, comparativist days (Arjomand 2011; see also the response by Mahoney 2011).  
Let us now look at first the new breed of historians who promises us greener pastures 
beyond the old and static world of internalism and comparison.          
 
In 2006, the American Historical Review, the flagship journal of the discipline, 
inaugurated a new feature. Since then the Annual AHR Conversation, as the feature is 
called, has been bringing several eminent historians into an online exchange of ideas on 
a significant issue in historiography. That the editorial board chose transnational history 
as ‘the important theme’ for the first conversation (Bayly et al. 2006) is a testament to 
the meteoric rise of this branch of history writing. Before the 1990s only a handful of 
historians plied their trade in transnational waters. But after the tsunami of globalisation 
purportedly flattened the boundaries of the modern nation-state and in parallel 
drastically undermined nation-centrism in social sciences and humanities, adjectives 
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such as transnational, global, connected or entangled have become academic household 
items (Iriye 2013:1–17). So much so that the editor of the first AHR Conversation felt 
the need to issue the warning that transnational history was ‘in danger of becoming 
merely a buzzword among historians’ with little agreement on its aims and method 
(Bayly et al. 2006:1441).    
 
My concern here is not to provide an extended review of this recent turn in 
historiography with its myriad perspectives, even less to arbitrate among them to 
announce whether world, global, transnational or any similar perspective in history has 
a better grasp of our brave and newly globalized past, than others. Internal differences 
are often tenuous (Iriye 2013:11) and they sometimes appear to be little more than 
practices of academic markings of territory. The question of method, or more pointedly 
the question of theory remains crucial however as it connects to the mainstream of this 
thesis: the relationship between history and theory in the study of (late) nationalism. As 
one of its more renowned practitioners notes, this kind of history ‘cannot be satisfied 
with mere description. Whether more explanatory or more interpretive in its general 
inclination, it always requires theoretical input – usually input it has not generated 
itself’ (Osterhammel 2016:25).  
 
While it may be cumbersome to catalogue all the internal differences among the variety 
of transnational histories, it is much easier to pin down the things they agree on. Two 
agendas seem to drive the coterie of transnational historians. First, transnational history 
seeks to challenge methodological nationalism. It wishes to overcome the dominance of 
the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis. It argues that histories of societies do not 
start and stop at the boundaries of states and are shaped by processes that cut across 
them. In this sense, it explores interconnections, movements and transfers across 
borders. Second, it challenges Eurocentrism of conventional historiography. It argues 
that Europe has no privileged status in world history nor are its achievement completely 
of its own making. These two are recurrent themes in almost all of the transnational 
history literature (Conrad 2016; Iriye 2013; Saunier 2013).   
 
To my knowledge, the most programmatic statement of the potential contribution of 
transnational history to the study of nationalism is an article by Dean Konstantaras. 
Taking his inspiration from one member of that historiographical family, histoire 
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croisée, Konstantaras identifies his empirical puzzle as ‘the spectacle of near 
contemporaneous [rise and spread of nationalist movements] in several parts of the 
world 35  that were nevertheless widely divergent in their political and economic 
configuration’ (2013:387). Compared to other forms of collective identification in 
human history, nationalism’s track record has been extraordinary. If we measure the 
temporal distance between the conventional French Revolutionary starting point and the 
end of the decolonisation period around the 1970s, this gives us less than 200 years, at 
the end of which the earth’s surface was exclusively populated by separate and 
sovereign nations. Given nationalism’s epidemic multiplication, the argument that all 
nationalisms are different and as such they should be analysed ‘in their own context,’ 
appealing as it sounds, is bound to reproduce not one, but many ‘internalisms.’ Thus, 
the argument that a nationalism can only be understood with reference to its own 
conditions of emergence rings rather hollow. 
  
Given this contemporaneity and interconnectedness, a relational historiography can add 
to the wealth of nationalism studies ‘by mining ideological appropriations and other 
forms of interaction for new layers of meaning or investigating the mutually constituted 
elements in various contemporary imaginings of identity and nationhood’ (Kostantaras 
2013:384). Thus the study of the rise and spread of nationalism from a relational history 
approach, notes Kostantaras, is ‘largely about culture.’ And he adds, in unexceptionable 
fashion, that culture ‘in principle and in any given context’ is ‘fundamentally relational 
and contingent upon a variety…of crossings’ (2013:385; see also Leerssen 2011).  
 
But how exactly does a transnational or a relational approach advance our 
understanding of the history of nationalisms? What sort of gap does it propose to close? 
Here the usual suspects are of two kinds: historians with a focus on single nations and 
social scientists who offer ‘structural’ explanations. The contemporaneity and 
interconnectedness of nationalisms is lost on historians who tend to focus on the 
particular, or, as Charles Tilly once put it, if they are insistent ‘on time and place as 
fundamental principles of variation’ (1991:87). And therein lies the problem. To the eye 
of the historian ‘each movement appears as the product of unique conditions and 
                                                
35 Kostantaras’s focus is on Europe and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolutions, but the 
premises of transnational history, which he subscribes to, should allow me to stretch his point to 
other regions and periods. What good is ‘the transnational’ otherwise!  
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contradictions.’ But if ‘the looking-glass is raised to a higher elevation, similar 
developments are found to be occurring in many other parts of [the world] under very 
different circumstances, at roughly the same time’ (Kostantaras 2013:387–88). The 
question is obvious as it is damning for internalist historians. Can we really assume that 
all nationalisms somehow emerged in different contexts in response to the same 
problems and deployed the same discourses?  What connects the dots? How can we 
even start to answer these questions if our histories of specific nationalisms remain 
overdetermined by ‘local’ factors? Historians or at least some of them can, of course, 
only be found wanting in their negligence of these questions, not in their attempts to 
answer them. The latter charge goes to the historically minded social scientists that 
study nationalism, also known as the modernist theorists of nationalism (Özkırımlı 
2010:81–141).  
 
Unlike historians, social scientists like their generalisations. And given the spatial and 
temporal multiplicity of the phenomenon of nationalism, they infer, so argues 
Kostantaras, ‘the existence of a necessary connection between certain general 
developments of the age and the formation of national sentiment’ (2013:388). In so 
many words, Kostantaras points out the problem of non-iteration of ‘original’ causal 
sequences in later instances of the same phenomena elsewhere – hence the problem of 
internalism. But this is only partly an accurate and a seriously incomplete assessment of 
theories of nationalism. All these theorists36 in question are perfectly aware of the 
diversity of nationalisms and they do try to account for it. The mistake is not with 
structuralism or functionalism as such. Nor is it right to find solace in the empirical 
diversity of nationalisms in order to argue that such is the reason for the failure of 
theorising, as Konstantaras implies. It is the way in which theory is constructed that is 
problematic. And this leads us one step closer to a discussion our cases and their 
relation to nationalism studies (cf. Marashi 2014).  
 
By exposing theoretical needs of transnational history, we can proceed onto their 
resolution by establishing links with historical sociology. Transnational history comes 
with a conceptual baggage. While its corrective aspirations towards overcoming the 
methodological nationalism should be acknowledged, it is not always theoretically 
                                                
36 Kostantaras qualifies his simplification in an endnote: ‘These arguments are largely directed 
toward the arguments of [Ernest] Gellner’ (2013:398 note 38).   
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equipped to overcome the much larger and persistent problem of internalism. This can 
be demonstrated on several counts.  
 
Firstly, transnational history suffers from what Jürgen Osterhammel calls ‘mobility 
bias.’ The price of upsetting the stability of units of analysis is an excessive emphasis 
on mobilities and flows, which costs transnational history ‘a sense of proportion by 
underestimating social structure and hierarchy’ (2016:38; see also Rockefeller 2011).  
The processual ontology that undergirds much of transnational history is troubled by 
‘the plain fact that much of the social world stays the same much of the time’ (Abbott 
1995:859). Those who took the joyride of globalisation in the 1990s, we should remind 
ourselves, later had difficulties to accept the resilience of the nation-state. In a powerful 
critique, Jan Rüger raises precisely this immensely important question: ‘Does not the 
focus on “in between” on “trans” and “cross” imply the existence of states as the 
powerful pillars between which all the exchange and transfer takes place?’ (2010:659). 
Indeed, Kostantaras acknowledges the weight of this problem and ponders on how to 
theoretically account for the fact of multiple political entities, but ultimately opts for the 
classical move of the historian and ‘set[s] these theoretical difficulties aside’ 
(2013:385). This escapism essentially confirms the theory deficit in transnational 
history identified by Jürgen Osterhammel above.  
 
Secondly, failure to answer Rüger’s ontological question smuggles in the indefensible 
assumption that the fact of humanity’s fragmentation into multiple political entities with 
uneven resources (to use the plainest ontological language possible) does not have any 
theoretical relevance. The net result of this is that transnational history does not 
acknowledge the historical and the theoretical import of ‘asymmetrical transfers’ 
(Werner and Zimmermann 2006:39) and risks slipping into a laudatory narrative of 
reciprocity among individuals and societies, essentially repeating the excesses of the 
globalisation rhetoric (de Vries 2013:39–42). Yet reciprocity is not symmetry. And the 
asymmetry is not solely about the transfers but more crucially about the historically 
located actors in uneven power relationships. One of the profoundest expressions of this 
unevenness has always been among multiple societies.  
 
Seen in this light, we cannot but point out that the emergence of late nationalisms was 
not simply an outcome of transnational interactions, but of ‘the structural similarity of 
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the task that fell upon one nationalist leadership after another in the long story of the 
emergence of the nation-states system’ (Desai 2009) under pressure from more 
developed and imperialist states. Not to mention that this ‘structural’ condition was not 
exclusive to the non-European world. And this is actually the opening gambit of 
Kostantaras. But he does not follow it through. Ultimately, without addressing the 
ontological fact of unevenness among multiple societies, which was not inaugurated by 
nationalism, recurrent emphases on the nation’s relational construction remain anodyne. 
Surely, the modern nations, as with all social and societal forms, are relational 
constructions. The question is what are those ‘things’ that relate to one another, if they 
are not nations? And what kind of causal determinations, if any, follow from their co-
existence that can help us to understand nationalisms?  
 
After all, while we can certainly dispute the existence of nations and nationalism before 
modernity, the same disputation does not extend to the fact of humanity’s existence in 
multiple societies with their states – the latter being the cluster of institutional and legal 
mechanisms through which the specialisation of internal roles, varying degrees of social 
coherence and conflict, and external differentiation and ‘diplomacy’ have been 
instituted, managed and enforced. The available historical record makes it plain that 
human social existence has always taken the form of multiple and politically 
differentiated societies since the Neolithic Revolution (cf. Rosenberg 2010). And it is 
this fact that has given licence to the institutionalisation of a tradition of thought and 
systematic research under the title of the discipline of International Relations (cf. 
Rosenberg 2016). 
 
Thirdly, this ontological problem helps us make sense of what might otherwise seem as 
a semantic quibble. The application of the transnational epithet to historical eras before 
modernity is found to be anachronistic. The fact that ‘before 1850, large parts of the 
globe were not dominated by nations so much as by empires, city-states, diasporas, etc.’ 
(Bayly in Bayly et al. 2006:1442; see also Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) restricts the 
utility of the term transnational. More importantly still, the unreflective extension of the 
term actually runs counter to its stated intention of challenging methodological 
nationalism. The indiscriminate use of the term paradoxically naturalises and 
dehistoricises the ‘national’ by leaving assumptions of space, state and subjectivity 





3.4 The Theory of Uneven and Combined Development  
 
From the preceding review, we can now proceed on to the substantive elements of a 
solution. First, our solution shall be such that ‘rather than starting from the internal 
structure of society, the foundations for its concept formation should incorporate inter-
societal conditions and cross-cutting processes of societalization’ (Tenbruck 1994:92). 
Translated into the terminology of historical sociology, we need a theoretical approach 
that does not treat the conditions that made the emergence of late nationalisms possible 
(i.e. social change) as internal to societies. But it also needs to overcome two other 
problems transpired from comparative historical analysis and transnational history. 
Thus, secondly, it should be able to integrate the interactive dimension of the 
constitution and transformation of societies which comparative historical analysis is 
unable to do. This shall make it possible to theoretically account for the multi-linear 
causalities which the traditions of historical sociology has failed to capture (cf. 
Magubane 2005). And finally, our solutions shall be such that it should not abstract 
these multilinear causalities from the transhistorical fact of humanity’s existence in 
multiple societies. And in light of the problems just discussed, recent commentaries 
broach the need to address the theoretical deficit in transnational history. And the way 
to do this, they propose, is to bring transnational history and historical sociology in a 
fruitful exchange (Anievas and Matin 2016c; Delanty 2016; Osterhammel 2016).  
 
 
The germ of such a solution, I argue, can be found in the work of the Russian 
revolutionary Leon Trotsky. He presented the most programmatic and condensed 
statement of his approach to history in his History of the Russian Revolution; a book he 
finished writing in 1930 when he was in exile on the island of Prinkipo, near Istanbul 
(2007:3–12). The immediate historical puzzle that provoked Trotsky’s mind was the 
October revolution. This was a proletarian revolution. But the historical wisdom of 
Marxism at the time, which was hardened into a dogma under the institutional roof of 
the Second International (1889–1916), held that societies must first have a bourgeois-
democratic revolution to achieve capitalist development. Only then, and on the 
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foundations of capitalist mode of production, could a militant industrial working class 
form and later overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie through a proletarian revolution. 
None of these prerequisites, not by any stretch of imagination, had matured in Russia – 
neither in 1905 nor in 1917. Yet a socialist revolution did take place. And Trotsky 
reasoned that something went seriously wrong. Not in history per se, certainly not in 
Russia, but in the ways in which the Second International Marxists (mis)understood 
Russian history or, even more fundamentally, history in general.  
 
The root of this misunderstanding was obvious to Trotsky. The dogmatists followed 
Marx to the letter: ‘The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the 
less developed, the image of its own future’ (1976:91). The implication of Marx’s 
statement is clear enough. There is one historical path towards capitalist development 
and the pioneer nation of industrialisation, England, laid it out for everyone else to 
follow37 – except for those that have no history (Benner 1995:159–86). Trotsky, 
however, offered a contrasting picture: ‘England in her day revealed the future of 
France, considerably less of Germany, but not in the least of Russia and not of India’ 
(2007:890). Clearly, he resisted an understanding of capitalism’s history (that is both its 
past and future) that envisioned internally unfolding multiplication of the same 
developmental trajectory within diverse and multiple societies differentiated by certain 
time lags. Nor, it must be noted, did he think that England, France, Germany, Russia, 
India or any other society for that matter followed separate path of its own. In Trotsky’s 
view, what we are accustomed to see as sui generis, the particularities of the national, 
were actually the products of the international interaction: ‘it is false that the specific 
features are “merely supplementary to the general features,” like warts on a face. In 
reality, the national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features 
of the world process’ (1969:147).   
                                                
37 This is not all there is to Marx’s writing, however. Theodor Shanin made a compelling case 
that late in his life Marx ‘had come…to accept the multiplicity of roads also within a world in 
which capitalism existed and became a dominant force’ after extensive contacts with Russian 
thinkers and revolutionaries (1983:29). The question of late Marx and the possibility of an 
alternative, Russian road to socialism through primitive commune (obschina) generated some 
heat (Desai 1986; Sayer 1987; Anderson 2010; Araujo 2017; Brown 2010). As things stand, the 
jury is still out on the question whether a strictly stagest and unilinear view of history can be 
attributable to Marx’s work in toto. I cannot venture into this issue here. Suffice it to say that I 
agree with Derek Sayer. While Marx’s doubts and reformulations were serious and 
characteristically far-sighted, the fact remains that he ‘never explicitly reworked his overall 
vision of history on the basis of these late insights’ and as such we shall refrain from making 
major claims on his behalf (Sayer 1990:22).     
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Seen in this light, the outbreak of the October revolution was not some kind of a 
deviation from the universal patterns but intrinsically connected to the developments of 
other societies:  
 
‘But do you really believe,’ the Stalins, Rykovs and all the other Molotovs 
objected dozens of times between 1905 and 1917, ‘that Russia is ripe for the 
socialist revolution?’ To that I always answered: No, I do not. But world 
economy as a whole, and European economy in the first place, is fully ripe for 
the socialist revolution. Whether the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia 
leads to socialism or not, and at what tempo and through what stages, will 
depend upon the fate of European and world capitalism (1969:129).  
 
This is all good and convincing. But is this all there is to it? It cannot be. Because I 
introduced Trotsky with a promise to present his approach to history in general, not just 
to the history of the dynamics of modern capitalist world, the October revolution or the 
significance of international interactions and combination. And I rounded off the 
argument by adding that the way Trotsky reasoned, the flaw in the historical vision of 
the Second International Marxists was not confined to their misunderstanding of the 
October revolution, but to history in general. Surely, then, I cannot get away with 
stretching historical arguments made in relation to a specific period – and a 
comparatively very short one in that – across the whole skin of human history – 
especially, not after criticising transnational history for committing a similar sin of 
conceptual stretching. Fortunately, Trotsky did indeed elaborate a conceptual system 
germane to the full expanse of the history of social world with which he resolves the 
puzzle of the October revolution. This conceptual system has four key components, all 
of which are alluded to above in relation to the historical dynamics of the revolution: 
unevenness, societal interactivity, combination and development. To those components 
our focus shall now turn.  
 
Unevenness refers to the fact that human beings have always lived in multiple societies 
with varying levels of development. This variety has been an outcome of dissimilar 
social and material conditions, which were, and remains to be in differing degrees, 
ecological, demographic, institutional, cultural and so forth. This fundamental condition 
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of human existence engenders temporally multi-linear patterns of development among 
multiple and diverse societies – that is both quantitatively (many) and qualitatively 
(different). This is, as Leon Trotsky put it, ‘the most general law of the historic process’ 
(2007:5).38 In other words, this is a transhistorical condition. And this transhistorical 
condition gives rise to a particular dimension of social reality ‘which arises specifically 
from the coexistence within it of more than one society’ (Rosenberg 2006:308). Let us 
refer this dimension of human existence, for want of a better term, the intersocietal.  
 
The second element, interactions among societies, contained in the kernel of the 
intersocietal, is absolutely essential to the conceptual system of the theory of uneven 
and combined development. Without conceptually integrating interactivity in the core of 
the theory, U&CD would only be describing ‘temporal coincidences’ of individual 
societies separated in space (Rosenberg 2006:317). If we do not posit interactivity as a 
causally consequential fact on the intersocietal, we would end up doing two things. 
First, we would have to derive the multiple instances of unevenness as the outcome of 
internal dynamics of particular societies. We already encountered examples of this in 
Chapter 1 with the nationalist historiography, which explain the modern form and 
existence of their nations by a mechanism of reverse teleology. This internalist 
historiography, which is not restricted to our cases, is based on establishing a linear 
narrative of the nation’s perennial past reaching providentially to its present form and its 
future. This type of internalism is also referred to as particularism or exceptionalism. 
Unevenness without interactivity could easily be subsumed within this type of 
historiography – quite conceivably, for example, by making references to one of the 
most imprecise and infinitely flexible concepts in our lexicon, culture (Yengoyan 
2006:5). Second, we can try to capture the diversity of human societal existence by 
means of comparison. But this only gets us, as I argued above, as far as ‘the abstracted 
space’ (Rosenberg 2006:319) and ‘the experimental time’ (Adams et al. 2005:66) of 
comparative method. In one of its historically specific forms, comparison serves as a 
means to exclude the later cases of a phenomenon (here, nationalism) from the remit of 
the theory, because the histories of later cases do not correspond to causal sequences 
derived from the internal dynamics of ‘original’ instances. As we have seen in Chapter 
                                                
38 It should be immediately noted that by ‘law’ Trotsky is ‘designating only a general 




2, the theories of nationalism, in different ways, commit this fallacy of masquerading 
theories based on internal, historical experience of Western European countries as 
universal theory. This form of internalism, otherwise known as Eurocentrism, is distinct 
from the internalism (particularism or exceptionalism) of the area studies. But they have 
been shaped by an institutionalised division of labour broadly shaped by the 
epistemological hierarchy of disciplines and area studies.     
 
But unevenness is not merely a descriptive feature of human history. It is not about 
cataloguing temporal coincidences of societal differences. Its political form, the 
intersocietal, has a causal significance. That is because societies do not exist in 
isolation. The opposite is historically valid.  
 
The internal structure of society is everywhere conditioned, determined or even 
brought into existence by external factors, so that each society is linked to 
others, interdependent with them or even shaped by processes of societalization 
that cut across them (Tenbruck 1994:80).  
 
‘Even the spatial isolation of less complex societies,’ Tenbruck reinforces his argument 
with a hard case, so to speak, ‘is not a geographical accident but the result of the 
avoidance of other peoples or the retreat into desired remoteness’ (1994:78). The 
intensity, frequency and content of these intersocietal determinations, of course, vary 
historically and can obviously hold a stronger dose of significance between societies in 
geographical proximity, as Marc Bloch reminded us. But the key point is that that 
variation is about the historical form of the intersocietal, not about the fact of it 
(Rosenberg in Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008:87).39  
 
We have now established that unevenness is a transhistorical condition and it gives rise 
to the intersocietal. Multiple societies have interacted with and influenced one another. 
                                                
39 Relatedly, with the decidedly modern concept of society I refer to all of the historically 
different forms of what Kamran Matin calls the ‘mutually recognized [socio-political] 
integrities’ (2013a:3). My usage is for practical purposes only. The alternative, referring to the 
variety of those socio-political integrities across history by their historically specific 
designators, would not only make a confusing reading, but would also defeat the theoretical 
purpose of the presentation. I also chose not to use scare quotes, because whatever its other 
drawbacks, the concept of society has a readily accessible cognitive familiarity to our modern 
minds – a quality, I think, is not available to any other concept.    
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No one of them, in whatever form and size, has existed outside this dimension. 
Following from this, our next step is a connecting one. It moves us from unevenness 
and interactivity to combined development. How did Trotsky ‘operationalise’ the 
transhistorical facts of unevenness and interactivity? What is their concrete causal 
purchase? Unevenness, for one, yielded him the differentiation between ‘advanced’ and 
‘backward’ societies – that is between Western Europe and Russia in History of the 
Russian Revolution. These are strictly relational categories. They do not refer to any 
inherent properties of societies. Echoing Marx’s famous discussion on commodity 
fetishism in the Volume I of Capital (1976:163–77), Colin Barker weighed in on the 
issue.  
 
Only from the angle of world economy, of the combined development of the 
different countries within it, do words like “advanced” and “archaic” have any 
meaning, as measures of coercive comparison within a larger system of 
competitive interactions. Nothing intrinsic makes a thing “backward”. We can 
turn a horse-drawn gun carriage every way up, subject it to all manner of 
chemical and other tests, and nothing “backward” will appear in its make-up. 
But set it against a motorised tank, and its backwardness soon appears 
(2006:78).   
 
From this developmental distinction between the advanced and backward societies, 
follows the competitive geopolitical pressures felt by the backward countries. Trotsky 
termed this causal mechanism as ‘the whip of external necessity,’ which forces 
backward states to borrow from advanced societies (2007:5). ‘Every developing nation, 
like every young craftsman, writer, or artist,’ he argued elsewhere, ‘begins by imitating: 
it is a form of schooling’ (1972:292). But, crucially, late developing countries do not 
and cannot temporally repeat the same trajectory of development. The fact that they can 
export the existing achievements of advanced societies grants them ‘the privilege of 
historical backwardness.’ This privilege  
 
permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any 
specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. Savages throw 
away their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without traveling the road 




Forced into this path, observed Trotsky, ‘Russia was compelled to build railroads 
[despite having almost no highways]. Without having gone through the European 
artisan and manufacturing stages, Russia passed directly to mechanised production’ 
(Quoted in Thatcher 1991:240). 
 
Left in this form, however, the general law of unevenness and its causal consequences 
can appear only semantically different from the unilinear understanding of history. 
After all borrowing from advanced societies, provided that it operates without 
hindrance, is bound to generate, logically at least, a tendency towards convergence 
among societies; and a super-charged one in that since backward societies can skip over 
stages.40 But this possibility of developmental repetition is excluded, because ‘the 
backward nation,’ Trotsky pointed out, ‘not infrequently debases the achievements 
borrowed from outside’ during the process of adaptation. He illustrates this by noting 
that Under Peter I, the introduction of European techniques and training in Russia had 
led to the strengthening of serfdom, rather than dissolving it to pave the way a more 
advanced form of labour. Furthermore, ‘European armament and European loans – both 
indubitable products of a higher culture – led to a strengthening of tsarism, which 
delayed in its turn the development of the country (Trotsky 2007:4–5). Both this 
scenario and the one in which countries like the United States and Germany had 
overtaken Britain industrially are just two contrasting instances on a spectrum of open-
ended possibilities resulting from backward societies trying to assimilate the 
achievements of the advanced ones with varying success. This is because ‘the 
possibility of skipping over intermediate steps is…by no means absolute. Its degree is 
determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the country’ 
(Trotsky 2007:4). 
 
The net result of these points is quite substantial indeed. Let me briefly restate, so we 
                                                
40 In Third International After Lenin, which he wrote in 1928, Trotsky indeed makes some such 
argument that capitalism, in contrast to preceding economic systems, ‘equalizes the economic 
and cultural levels of the most progressive and the most backward countries’ by virtue of its 
unprecedented expansionist dynamics (1957:19). But he immediately raises the dialectical 
qualification that capitalism itself actually rules this possibility out by its anarchistic methods of 
capitalism. Both of these tendencies (equalisation and unevenness), he rounds off the argument, 
were bolstered by imperialism (1957:20). In this instance, his discussion remained within the 
conceptual boundaries of the classical Marxist understanding of ‘uneven development,’ which is 
‘a generic property of capitalism and delinked from the intrinsic unevenness of historical 
development’ (Matin 2013a:13).   
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can take our next step. As a transhistorical fact, uneven development gives rise to the 
intersocietal. This dimension of human social existence contains the historically given 
property of interactivity. No society has truly existed outside interaction or outside the 
dimension of intersocietal. But this still retains a distinction between what is external to 
societies and what is inside them. Societies, after all, are not only constituted by their 
interaction with other societies, but also by their internal, reproductive41 dynamics 
(‘economic and cultural capacities of the country’). Even the causal dynamic of the 
whip of external necessity, on its own, may very well be prone to be construed as 
operative on the abstracted space of developmental comparison between the advanced 
and the backward society – however relationally we may conceive the distinction. But 
this is exactly where things get interesting. Because what Trotsky provides us with the 
causal consequences of the whip of external necessity and the privilege of 
backwardness is a conceptual bridge that integrates external and internal dimensions of 
societies.  
 
And the bridgehead we arrive is the third element of the theory: combined development.  
Trotsky defines combined development as the ‘drawing together of the different stages 
of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more 
contemporary forms’ (2007:5). Although almost all of what is available in Trotsky’s 
writings on the subject refers ‘specifically [to] the sociological [amalgam] of capitalist 
and non-capitalist forms which resulted from’ international capitalist pressures on late 
developing countries (Rosenberg 2006:319), he clearly intended the term to be 
applicable across human history: ‘the law of uneven development is supplemented 
throughout the whole course of history by the law of combined development’ (Trotsky 
1983:300; cf. Matin 2007). 
 
It was left to Justin Rosenberg, who intellectually spearheaded the recent neo-Trotskyist 
revival of interest in U&CD (Hobson 2011; Anievas and Matin 2016c), to extract, what 
he calls the three dimensions of combined development (see also Cooper 2015:486). 
For that task Rosenberg mined the longue durée of the Russian history – beginning with 
the early Russian state formation in the ninth century. The first dimension of the 
                                                
41 Reproduction, as I use it here, does not carry the negative connotations of stasis and decay 
that was dear to Orientalist historiography. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam points out, continuity and 
change are not necessarily antonyms (1997:759).   
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combined development is the most straightforward one. ‘The course of Russian 
history,’ Rosenberg points out, ‘was “combined” in the sense that at every point it was 
causally integrated with a wider social field of interacting patterns of development’ 
(2006:321).  The general implication of the argument is that every society’s external 
conditions of existence constantly impacts upon its internal development. This makes 
any society a dynamic component of the development of other societies. To clarify this 
seemingly sociologically elusive dimension of the social world, Rosenberg employs a 
quilt metaphor. The visual aspect of a quilt is a patchwork wherein each individual 
patch has a different colour. Moving from the source domain of the metaphor (the quilt) 
to the target domain (the intersocietal),42 Rosenberg likens patches to what he calls 
regional constellations of uneven development, within which a particular society exists. 
And ‘from each of these patches of the quilt (such as that of Russia and its neighbours) 
the outer members appear to interact directly on the margins of the other, adjacent 
constellations, stitching the patches together’ (2006:322).  
 
This act of stitching, so to speak, allows us to empirically register the impact of certain 
‘events’ arising in one constellation on another – events that ‘spill over’ from its 
original constellation. We can think of the emergence of a novel ideology (for example 
nationalism) in one regional constellation or the outbreak of a deadly epidemic. The 
consolidation of a new power centre that leads to forced migration, a technological 
breakthrough, social revolutions or a novel institutional configuration are examples of 
events that criss-crossed regional constellations. But this stitching is not an act of 
unadulterated and passive transmission. For unevenness does not only overdetermine 
what a society is, but also filters, refracts and reconfigures the substance and the 
consequences of interaction. Thus, ‘knock-on effects reverberate serially across two or 
more constellations, gathering force or dispersing, often changing their form as they go, 
and impacting indirectly on remote social settings whose members played no role in the 
genesis of the causal process’ (Rosenberg 2006:322).  
 
                                                
42 According to Neil Smith and Cindi Katz, ‘metaphor works by invoking one meaning system 
to explain or clarify another. The first meaning system is apparently concrete, well understood, 
unproblematic, and evokes the familiar; in linguistic theory it is known as the “source domain.” 
The second “target domain” is elusive, opaque, seemingly unfathomable, without meaning 




The second dimension of combined development was by way of interdependence, ‘not 
just of events but also of the structures of social, material and cultural life.’ The 
interdependence of these structures has reproduced Russian society ‘through 
institutionalized relationships which extended beyond Russia itself, integrating it into 
regional political orders, cultural systems and material divisions of labour’ (Rosenberg 
2006:324). And finally, as a cumulative and causative result of the previous two 
dimensions of combined development, at a ‘yet deeper dimension’ we can observe that 
‘Russian social formation was a hybrid, a changing amalgam of pre-existent “internal” 
structures of social life with “external” socio-political and cultural influences’ 
(Rosenberg 2006:325) The ultimate conclusion Rosenberg draws from this exposition is 
that combined development, as with unevenness, is not historically limited to the era of 
capitalist modernity: ‘there had…never existed a pre-combination Russia’ (2006:325).   
 
Now we must also bring our exposition of the theory of uneven and combined 
development to a conclusion. The final element, development, however, requires some 
attention, for it is overburdened with a highly questionable heritage. Its traditional 
association with unilinear stageism and progressive directionality impairs its utility as a 
historical and sociological notion. This progressive vision of history, conventionally 
imbedded in the notion of development, Robert Nisbet argued almost half a century ago, 
is underpinned by the biomorphic metaphor of ‘growth’ from the teachings of Ancient 
Greek philosophers onwards (1970). Moreover, the metaphor of growth ‘generates or 
underlines a vision of change as primarily immanent or endogenously determined’ 
(Martins 1974:274), which, in the nineteenth century, was elevated to a central role in 
historiography and social theory to make sense of recent European superiority over rest 
of the world. The ‘growth’ of European civilisation, or what we are today more 
accustomed to call modernity, is argued to be an endogenous dynamic and a 
culmination of the continent’s internal history, going through stages and accumulating 
force and sophistication since the time of the Athenian democracy. The shorthand for 
this vision of development is Eurocentrism (Matin 2013b:354). The dominant scale of 
this endogenous understanding of development, however, gradually shifted from the 
European civilisation to the Euro-American nation-state in the course of the twentieth 
century, as the latter increasingly came to been seen as ‘the terminal unit and boundary 
condition for the demarcation of problems and phenomena for social science’ and 
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history. This second form internalism, resourced from Eurocentrism, is what we today 
as methodological nationalism (Martins 1974:276).    
 
How do we, then, deal with such a loaded notion? To start with, in a very general sense, 
we can indeed attribute directional development to the entirety of human social history. 
Drawn on the broadest canvas, the contours of human history in its entirety reveal three 
kinds of societies: hunter-gatherer, agrarian and industrialising. And transformations 
from one mode of societal existence to the next were revolutionary in their implications 
for the relationship of humans to their natural environments, the organisation of social 
power and surplus extraction and the production and institutionalisation of knowledge. 
On this broadest scale, as Justin Rosenberg points out, there is no dispute among 
historians and as such there is ‘a real historical referent to the term “development”’ 
(2006:329–30). 
 
But this generality has always been suffused with unevenness and, its attendant 
consequence, combination that militate against any unilinear understanding of history. 
We have seen that by theoretically integrating combined development ‘as the concrete 
expression of unevenness’ that is operative as ‘a differentiated multiplicity’ (Matin 
2013a:15), U&CD radically refashions development, that big bad wolf of social theory, 
as ‘decidedly multilinear’ (Matin 2013a:16). For any generality or directionality we 
attribute to the ‘development’ of human history in its entirety, cannot be reflected on to, 
or derived from, ‘lower’ scales like civilisations or societies.  
 
As an integrated theory of external and internal dimensions of the society, U&CD 
shows us that what is traditionally theorised as a uniform and standalone society (or 
regional constellations or civilisations, for that matter) is actually the developmental 
outcome of historically uneven interactions, which combine with the internal, 
reproductive dynamics and structures of a society to generate a societal interface that is 
simultaneously more and less than the society itself. What seems as a particular society 
is a part and parcel of an intersocietal existence that cannot be captured simply by the 
historical experience of that society alone. Nor can it be checked against a prior notion 
of development abstracted from a particular historical geography and adorned with a 
self-fashioned claim to universality. Intersocietal co-existence is not a dimension that 
confronts societies externally. It is constitutive of societies. Thus development has, and 
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always had, an uneven, interactive and combined character. The consequence is that we 
have to ‘abandon at the deepest theoretical level any notion of the constitution of 
society as analytically prior to its interaction with other societies’ (Rosenberg 2006:325 
emphasis in original).  
 
This principle applies, as the recent research aptly demonstrates, to the so-called 
European miracle (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015; Hobson 2004) no less than to the 
parts of the world with ‘non-miraculous histories’! From these ontological premises, 
then, we can reach to a conception of the universal formulated by Kamran Matin: an 
‘operational causal context whose ontic fabric is heterogeneous and radically open to, in 
fact constantly shaped and reshaped by, difference, which generates emergent forms 
that overdetermine their own context of emergence’ (2013a:16).  
 
The core premises of U&CD allow us to solve three problems. First, they mark a break 
away from an internalist conception of the conditions of the emergence of late 
nationalisms. The internalist conception explains this phenomenon by reference to the 
‘local’ conditions of its emergence and reproduction or explains it away as a paradox 
for lack of congruence with European nationalisms’ conditions of emergence. In other 
words, it is ultimately a question of non-European modernity formed and constrained in 
an interactively uneven world and politically manifold responses generated by 
historically located agents responding to that unevenness.  The neglect of this 
dimension led internalist theories to relegate the international to an external and 
contingent factor. Thus, U&CD introduces an alternative theoretical solution to the 
study of the formative periods of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms.  
 
Secondly, they identify causal mechanisms which are not simply iterative, but 
temporally multi-linear and interactive. As such, the emergence of late nationalisms can 
be located within an interactive historical geography that recalibrates the unidirectional 
explanation that is grounded in the ‘from the West to the East’ diffusion. This 
recalibration engenders a re-thinking of nationalist agency in the Qajar and the Ottoman 
empires, by allowing the integration of multi-linear influences, or borrowings, in what 
we can call ‘the politics of combination’ by nationalists which is sensitive to the sources 
of political modernisation. Thus, rather than comparing the emergence and development 
of Iranian and Turkish nationalism with a European blueprint, thus expelling them 
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beyond the theoretical pale, combined development illustrates the amalgamated forms 
of social development that gave rise to them.  
 
Thirdly, a dynamic historiography becomes possible, which punctures the homogenous 
conception of Western pressure and Eastern response by the identification of multiple 
sources of influence and borrowing which historically transformed over the course of 
the nineteenth century from the initial acceptance of the universality of Western 
civilisation to a more balanced assessment. But also, this allows for the ‘causes’ of 
nationalism themselves to change over time.  
 
3.5 The Formations of Late Nationalisms in the Middle East and 
U&CD  
 
From the general law and the three components of the solutions just identified follows 
the specific methodology of U&CD. In order to present the components of 
methodology, this section works its way through the noteworthy works that made use of 
Trotsky’s original idea. To that end, two names stand out: George Novack and Ernest 
Mandel. Their works reviewed here with an eye on two important questions raised with 
regards to the recent revival of interest in the field of international relations and 
historical sociology. These questions are 
 
1. Temporal scope of the theory of uneven and combined development: Can the theory 
of uneven and combined development be applied across the history of human societies 
or is its explanatory reach confined to the capitalist era? In other words, is U&CD a 
transhistorical theory or not?  
 
2. The explanatory status of U&CD: Is it a general law that applies to inter-societal 
existence as a whole or a theory with more defined analytical value or a methodology 
with a specific purpose?     
 
A broad overview of the twentieth century literature (until its final decade) on Trotsky 
does not immediately yield much to work with in terms of U&CD. For, as Neil 
Davidson notes, the scholarly attention on the Russian revolutionary’s remained almost 
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exclusively focused on his notion of permanent revolution (2018:14). Michael Löwy’s 
The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development is possibly the best example of this 
focus. Demonstrating a commanding grasp of the revolutionary milieu within which 
Trotsky formulated his idea of permanent revolution, Löwy then extends his analysis to 
later cases of successful and failed revolutionary attempts across the world. The book 
provides highly informative and empirically rich studies of cases including, among 
others, revolutionary politics in China, Cuba, Mexico and Algeria. But not once Löwy 
actually attempts to discuss the theory of U&CD as laid out in The History of the 
Russian Revolution. His sole concentration remains, as the main title of his book makes 
amply clear, the politics of U&CD (1981).    
 
A similar approach is noticeable in Ernest Mandel’s work. Unlike Löwy, however, 
Mandel’s work is suffused with U&CD and as such it ‘occupied a special place’ in his 
thought (Linden 2007:145). This came in a textually subterranean form and Mandel 
never explicitly discussed the law U&CD at any length. As a perceptive reader put it, 
one can at best reveal the ‘traces’ of it in Mandel’s work (Stutje 2007:171). In that 
regard, in his most explicit engagement with Trotsky and his idea of uneven of 
combined development, the first chapter of his book Trotsky as Alternative, Mandel’s 
reading put accent on his notion of permanent revolution. Trotsky’s ‘contribution to the 
history of [the twentieth] century,’ he contended, ‘was a predominantly political one’ 
rather than sociological. But he added in the same breath that this political and 
‘eminently practical’ contribution to understanding of ‘class struggle on a global scale’ 
was ‘rooted in a magnificent theoretical achievement, the discovery of the law of 
uneven and combined development’ (1995:1).  
 
The theoretical roots of permanent revolution in uneven and combined development are 
left textually unearthed, but a closer reading immediately reveals Mandel’s 
commanding grasp of the relationship between the sociological theory of uneven and 
combined development and the politics of permanent revolution. For example, in a 
passage where he discusses the unevenness of capitalist development, Mandel draws a 
distinction between the working classes of advanced societies and that of backward 
ones. Unlike advanced capitalist societies where the conservatism of the labour 
movement leadership impedes radicalism, ‘the working class [of some less developed or 
transitional countries] can achieve a much higher level of class-consciousness, of unity 
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and militancy in the more developed countries.’ By gaining mastery over their political 
fate, the working classes can potentially conquer state power and ‘will begin the address 
the tasks of the socialist revolution.’ In other words, politics of permanent revolution, in 
objective terms, could involve skipping of stages, which is made possible by the ‘law of 
uneven and combined development’ (1995:3, see also Mandel 1975:22–23).43 
 
Mandel’s deployment of uneven and combined development with reference to working 
class politics in what he refers to as transitional countries contains a cue for our first 
question that has been raised in the context of the recent revival of U&CD in the 
discipline of international relations. As part of the debate around the ‘use and misuse’ of 
uneven and combined development in the recent literature, as two recent commentators 
put it (Allinson and Anievas 2009), the first main point of contention concerns U&CD’s 
temporal scope. There are two opposing views on this matter. IR scholars Justin 
Rosenberg and Kamran Matin has made the argument that inter-societal co-existence 
has been a constant feature of human life since at least the appearance of settled human 
communities following the Neolithic Revolution (Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2010) and 
this entailed unevenness and gave rise to its attendant consequence: combined 
development. George Novack, earlier, made an even more encompassing claim that the 
law of uneven and combined development is pertinent to not only inter-societal 
relations, but to the more fundamentally determinant levels of social and biological 
evolution (1980:116–20).   
 
In the opposing camp two connected arguments have been raised against the 
transhistorical reach of U&CD. In the first, Neil Davidson argues that ‘the detonation of 
the process of U&CD requires sudden, intensive industrialization and urbanization, 
regardless of whether the pre-existing agrarian economy was based on feudal or 
capitalist relations (2009:15). This view is seemingly shared by Ernest Mandel as well, 
                                                
43  Elsewhere, Mandel makes what could be read as a tacit reference to the combined 
development in terms of class politics. According to this, inter-societal difference (i.e. 
unevenness) generates different modalities of working class politics of skipping stages – in 
effect arguing against any linear conception of working class politics leading to a singular 
revolutionary resolution. ‘To conclude from the universal character of class contradictions to 
the necessary universal form of class struggle,’ he argues,’ is to presume immediate and total 
correspondence between objective socio-economic developments and human action, i.e. to 
eliminate from the picture the whole problem of national peculiarities, political forms, social 
relationship of forces, varieties of consciousness and role of organizations, in other words, 
Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and a lot of Marx and Engels too!’ (1970:22–23). 
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although he does not provide any extended discussion of it (1975:23). Echoing 
Davidson’s call to U&CD’s confinement to the capitalist era, Sam Ashman cautions 
that extending its historical reach would devoid Trotsky’s theory from explanatory 
power and turn it into a mere descriptive category (2009) – a view also shared by Benno 
Teschke (2014).  
 
The relationship between U&CD’s temporal scope and how this choice can determine 
its explanatory status relate to the second point of contention. Is U&CD a law, a theory 
or more restrictedly a methodology? Some saw the whole project of writing history on 
the intellectual foundations of this grandiose notion, for all its surface charm, 
methodologically imprecise. John Elster, for one, argued that U&CD ‘belongs to a class 
of Marxist notions whose suggestiveness is equaled only by their elusiveness’ 
(1986:56). Another critique addressing Novack’s work suggested that U&CD amounts 
to a ‘rather fragmentary and undeveloped conception’ (Romagnolo 1975:8). Given that 
Novack made arguably the most lavish claim with regards to the explanatory range of 
U&CD, it is no wonder that his work invited scrutiny. In one such instance, Cliff 
Slaughter raised a clearly defined problem. He argued if U&CD is to accorded with the 
status of a law then it must answer for the direction of combined development in 
specific settings: ‘Will the processes at work give rise to a dialectical leap forward in 
history, as in the October Revolution in Russia, or will they give rise to degenerative 
processes, as in the bureaucratic distortions of Stalin’s regime, or the destruction of the 
Tasmanian aborigines?’ (Quoted in Novack 1980:120). Novack’s answer was that 
U&CD cannot answer this question at the level of general premises, but only through 
the analysis of ‘the specific weight of all the factors in the given situation’ (1980:123).  
 
The recent neo-Trotskyist literature largely subscribes to a similar view and avoids 
referring to U&CD as a law. In a recent monograph Alexander Anievas and Kerem 
Nişancıoğlu also takes this cautious approach and suggests that uneven and combined 
development  
 
refers to and theorises concrete historical processes, be they epochal or 
conjunctural. In other words, we may speak of a theory (or theories) of uneven 
and combined development in this more historically delimited sense: that is, in 
terms corresponding to specific epochs or conjunctures characterised by 
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different modes of production that animate the broader dynamics of such 
historical temporalities (2015:58).  
 
This historically ‘adjusted’ understanding of U&CD, which this thesis also follows, 
guards against two problems that would follow from its restriction to capitalist era 
alone. Reducing U&CD to the capitalist era alone leads to a circular reasoning, a 
tautology, as the fact of U&CD as observed during the high-tide of capitalist 
industrialization explains the U&CD (Brophy 2018). Secondly, a ‘ultra-historicist’ 
reading of U&CD which retains ‘capitalism as its ‘core generator’ can only end like 
many theories before it – Marxist or otherwise: the trap of Eurocentrism. For once again 
we are back to a historical theory which at its core starts with the European origins of 
capitalism that spreads and transforms rest of the world (Hobson 2011).   
 
In so far as the methodology is concerned, the application of U&CD as a historically 
adjusted theory, then, requires several steps. The first is to identify the historically 
manifest effects of unevenness (the general law) between geopolitically superior and 
aggressive European powers on the one hand, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire on 
the other from late eighteenth century onwards. This date by no means indicates the 
genesis of their relationships. It marks the changing nature of that relationship, hence 
that of uneven development and its attendant consequences (Findley 1989:20; Lambton 
1957:12). For example, Ann Lambton argues (1957:12), if in a somewhat simplifying 
way, that the nature of the relationship changed from one of contact (with the West) to 
one of impact (of the West). Indeed, from the eighteenth century onwards the 
centralised monarchies of Europe started to exert immense pressures on the Ottoman 
Empire and later on Qajar Iran. This is by now an integral part of the histories of 
nationalism in the non-European world. But the methodological implications of this fact 
need to be spelt out.  
 
The nature of the imperatives felt by the backward entities of the Middle East can also 
help us to clarify the conditions that made formative conditions of nationalism possible. 
It does in other words can help us navigate through the misty seas of unsettled 
conceptual debates on nationalism. The form of the whip of external necessity shall act 
as our proverbial compass in this conceptual effort. The European pressures initially felt 
as militarily threatening the territorial existence of these land-based empires. This had 
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two implications. First, given that the reproduction of these imperial formations 
depended largely on agricultural surplus, hence the existence of taxable arable land, the 
geopolitical fortunes of these polities were inextricably tied to their ability to expand 
their domains by way of territorial aggrandizement. Second, this territorial dynamic of 
reproduction, an articulation of internal and external dimensions, is supported by an 
imperial self-understanding that upheld claims of civilisational superiority to the world 
around it. When the military balance tilted towards European powers, this dynamic of 
imperial reproduction and its vision felt threatened. It is no wonder then that early 
reformers of both polities, such as Selim III and the crown prince Abbas Mirza to cite 
two important examples, prioritised military reorganisation as the most pressing 
necessity. 
 
This imputed a central role to the imperial state to cope with the consequences of 
uneven development and, following from this, gave a markedly political bent to the 
early articulations of nationalism in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The 
imperatives of unevenness, in Mao Zedong’s efficient phrasing, put ‘politics in 
command’ (Quoted in Dore 1972:3). Now, identifying the driver of reform effort as 
primarily political compels me to clarify my understanding of nationalism. This 
requires a quick reference to Chapter 2 where I discussed theories of nationalism.  
 
There, I argued that John Breuilly is right to insist that nationalism is first and foremost 
about politics and modern politics is about the state. This way of approaching the 
subject, I added, clarifies the conceptual confusion – though certainly not overcomes it. 
Where Breuilly erred, by his own later admission, was his internalist understanding of 
politics overstretched beyond its conceptual means by a static comparative method. But 
what if we change the epistemological status of comparison and treat it as the frame of 
politics. In other words, what if make comparison ‘the substance of the inquiry rather 
than its framework’ (McMichael 1990:386).  
 
With this shift in focus, comparison can be seen as the grammar of the politics of late 
nationalism. We no longer treat comparison ‘as a methodological problem, but as a 
historical object’ (Stoler 2001:862). For late nationalism, before anything else, is about 
overcoming the backward conditions of one’s purported nation and relatedly about 
saving the state. It is an ideology of late development (Dore 1973:12; Matossian 1958) 
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that seeks to reimagine the political community and mobilise its resources in order to 
close the developmental gap with the industrialised and militarily superior European 
powers.44 Harry Harootunian presents this superimposing reality of geopolitics in 
superlative phrasing, ‘the peoples of the world outside of Euro-America have been 
forced to live lives comparatively by virtue of experiencing some form of colonization 
or subjection enforced by the spectre of imperialism’ (2005:26, emphasis in original). 
Crystallised within this geopolitical context, late nationalisms developed a 
fundamentally comparative vision of the world wherein the elites of the backward 
societies felt the independence of their nations and states under imminent threat, or, to 
be more historically accurate, they acknowledged the political necessity of the nation by 
comparison with the superior European world. This was the primary dimension of the 
politics of comparison. And nationalism as politics of comparison is our first 
intermediary concept that ‘bridges’ the theoretical principles of U&CD with empirical 
analysis.   
 
But can unevenness single-handedly provide us the key to the theorisation of late 
nationalism? It certainly cannot. Because we only partially left the abstracted space of 
comparison, we still need to move fully into ‘the real space of historical time [where] 
the spatio-temporal coexistence of societies…is the matrix of their concrete 
interrelation’ (Rosenberg 2006:319). Deriving the emergence of nationalism from 
uneven development between Europe and the Middle East is a necessary but also a 
partial move, because it remains operative on a singular axis of West-East 
differentiation. Primary as this may be, it is not the whole story. Because a 
historiography based on this geopolitical determination alone risks getting caught in the 
Eurocentric underpinnings of the ‘challenge and response’ argument (see, for example, 
Zürcher 2004:5–6), which reduces the political possibilities of Iranian and Turkish 
nationalisms exclusively to their relation to the European impact. This problem rears its 
head even in accounts that are critical of Eurocentrism. Because they retain in inverted 
form the restrictive and homogenising duality of the West and the East (cf. Lazarus 
2002). As I argued before, this problem limited the explanatory fortunes of Tom Nairn 
and Partha Chatterjee’s works.  
                                                
44 Ronald Dore captures this dynamic very well: ‘the political will to catch up, to raise the 
nation’s status in the international pecking order of nations, contributes a good deal of the 




The matrix of concrete interrelations of late developing societies under the full weight 
of European geopolitical pressures in the nineteenth century operated through layers of 
unevenness, which were not limited to the West-East axis alone. But also whatever 
interrelation and influence materialised among late developing societies could not 
ignore that overpowering fact of European pressures. They were indeed orientated 
towards addressing those pressures. Equally importantly, that overpowering axis did not 
remain unidirectional. I earlier raised an argument along these lines against Tom Nairn. 
It went something like this. Nairn is essentially right in criticising internalist 
explanations of nationalism and he is also right in associating the origins of late 
nationalism with the uneven development of capitalism across the world. But he was 
equally wrong to reduce the fact of unevenness to the singularity of the West-East axis, 
as late developing societies like Germany, Russia and Japan, to give influential 
examples, modified the structural coordinates of unevenness. What Nairn’s account 
failed to capture, due to his impressionistic use of U&CD, was a crucial argument of 
Trotsky. In The Third International After Lenin, Trotsky argued that there are different 
scales of unevenness for different parts of the world, which shapes and informs the 
strategic content and orientation of late development. ‘The unevenness of historical 
development,’ he memorably argued, ‘is in itself uneven’ (1957:15, emphases in 
original). 
 
From this important principle, we can derive our second intermediary concept: mediated 
modernisation. The ‘original’ European achievements in their variety of material, 
institutional or ideational forms did not always arrive or were imported into late 
developing world by way of unidirectional diffusion. Often they were mediated, 
refracted and transformed during their ‘journey,’ which modified the terms of their 
adoption in the late developing society that was at the end of the chain of mediation. 
Whether a late developing society was at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of 
these chains depended on its developmental distance from the advanced societies and its 
‘cultural and economic capacities.’ France, although a late developer vis-à-vis Britain, 
greatly benefited from its geographical and cultural proximity to the first industrial 
society. The Meiji Japan, although geographically distant, inherited considerable 




And the scales through which this mediation performed can be elucidated further by the 
dimensions of combined development identified by Rosenberg above. The first one 
(events) is utilised especially in Chapter 5 to trace the multilinear impact of the Russo-
Japanese War and the constitutional revolutions of the early twentieth century. The 
second one (structures) includes regional constellations referred above. Regions can be 
understood as a number of societies that cohere around a set of characteristics, which 
differentiates them form other constellations. But this understanding is radically 
different from the seemingly similar ‘units’ that framed the vocation of area studies. For 
regions in this sense cannot be reduced to its core attributes. Nor can the other structures 
Rosenberg refers to be spatially limited within the regional constellations. Among 
others, we can add, trans-imperial networks of trade, shifting geopolitical alliances and 
‘transnational’ movements (for example, pan-Islamism in the nineteenth century) were 
the kind of things that cut across both Russia and the regional constellations it was part 
of – challenging, reasserting or modifying the meanings of these latter two. These 
structures, as they are understood here, are akin to what Nile Green calls ‘arenas’ that 
are ‘dynamic and mutable spaces of interaction that enable patterns of dissemination, 
circulation, or competition among ideas no less than commodities’ (2014:558). At any 
moment in time, a regional constellation can be analytically broken down to a number 
of such structures or arenas, which reveals various layers of entanglements and 
interactions that are not limited within the boundaries of the region in question or within 
its constituent societies.   
   
This dimension of combination is presented in Chapter 4 with reference to the history 
and activities of the community of Qajar subjects in Istanbul, who acted as transmitters 
of European developments and Ottoman reform efforts. In Chapter 5 these structures, in 
the form of ‘transnational movements’ extend beyond and cut across Qajar Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire.   
 
Our final point relates to a geopolitically determined ‘particularity’ of Qajar Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire. As a host of scholars reminds us (Balaghi 2008:3; Boroujerdi 
1996:24; Gelvin 1999:77; Göçek 2013:74; Vejdani 2015:5), the Ottoman Empire and 
Qajar Iran were semi-colonial entities (Osterhammel 1986; Pizzo 2016) which made 
possible distinct modes of engagement with the geopolitical pressures of the European 
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powers and led to multi-directional and lateral appropriations among late developing 










































      
This chapter offers a first take on the history of Ottoman and Iranian modernisations 
and proto-nationalism that is not framed within the problematic strictures of internalism 
or causally underdeveloped notions of diffusion or modularity criticised in Chapter 2. 
To that end, it is useful to restate the relevant argument formulated in the Introduction 
of this thesis: the gulf between theories of nationalism and the histories of late 
nationalisms arises from the lack of theoretical attention given to the international 
conditions of emergence of nationalism. I argued therefore that nationalism as a 
response to ‘backwardness’ follows from intersocietal interaction, which is suffused 
with uneven developmental levels among socio-political units.    
 
In addition, I made a claim that semi-colonial conditions (Osterhammel 1986; Pizzo 
2016) of the Ottoman Empire and Iran allowed them some degree of freedom to 
reconfigure their institutions, pursue defensive modernisation projects and shift between 
geopolitical alliances. The historical condition of semicoloniality and the theoretical 
tools of uneven and combined development – particularly its emphasis on multilinearity 
of historical development – that were laid out in the previous chapter allow me to 
challenge three conventional premises of historiography of late modernisations and 
nationalisms.   
 
The first premise is that modernity was a fully formed European development that 
subsequently diffused outwards to the non-European world by following a unilinear 
trajectory. This diffusion was unilinear in the sense that modern Europe and the rest of 
the world were two ontologically separate entities. Much like a one-way circuitry, the 
former was the source and the latter was the recipient. Framed in this dyadic manner, no 
interaction or influence was conceived among non-European societies. Nationalism, a 
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product of modernity, was also something – once it was fully formed – that could only 
have flowed from Europe to the late developing world. This Eurocentric idea of a 
unilinear pattern of diffusion, to take the succinct point of one critique who documents 
the Moroccan efforts to modernise their military under Ottoman guidance, is ‘at least a 
very simplistic one’ (El Moudden 1994:243).  
 
The second premise complements the first. The change in the non-European world, to 
the extent it could take place, could only be triggered from outside – that is by way of 
European impact. Non-European societies lacked endogenous sources or catalysers of 
transformation and progress. Ergo, they had nothing to offer one another in that regard. 
Recent historiography on Iran and the Ottoman Empire has done much to challenge this 
view and provided ample evidence to challenge the Orientalist historiographies that 
associated the non-European world with innate stasis and an inexorable drift to decline 
in the face of growing European power (Emrence 2007; Martin 2005; Moazami 2013; 
Tezcan 2012). But occasionally this otherwise legitimate historiographical challenge 
has put undue emphasis on a kind of internalist explanation in the name of refuting the 
external (i.e. European) impact thesis. The pendulum swing of historiography has 
tended to the reproduce, rather than overcome, the problematic external-internal 
dichotomy (cf. Nişancıoğlu 2013:9–10).   
 
The third premise is already implicated within the two previous points but needs a 
clearer statement. The dichotomy of dynamism versus inertia has been presented with a 
certain periodisation. The most ubiquitous form of this periodisation is based on a both 
temporally and spatially clear-cut and simplistic distinction between modernity and pre-
modernity. Modernity emerges and matures in Europe, where time is progressive and 
linear. The non-European world, on the other hand, is mired in a state of stillness and 
non-development. Its time is cyclical and regressive. Non-European modernity could 
only start with European intervention and this has been generally taken quite literally in 
most traditional histories. It was the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon that chaperoned 
the Middle East into the modern age (cf. Ze’evi 2004). 
 
The historical account presented here aims to challenge these premises of conventional 
historiography in three steps. The first section focuses on the general law of unevenness 
of historical development and outlines the geopolitical environment within which 
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eighteenth century non-European states had to exercise their sovereignty. In terms of 
unevenness, the significance of this historical entry point is relatively straightforward 
and, as I try to document below, it marks a major shift of attitude among the ruling elite 
in the Ottoman Empire. From the eighteenth century onwards, the empire had to 
confront the challenges posed by European powers. Iran, partly owing to its relative 
geographical isolation and partly due to internal instability, was not yet fully implicated 
in or influenced by geopolitical changes in the eighteenth century. Save for the Russian 
Empire’s increasing interest in the Caucasus, Iran’s position as a buffer state between its 
neighbour to the north and the British Empire had to come about in the nineteenth 
century proper (Matthee 2012:115–16).   
 
This much is part of our conventional historical learning. What would be 
unconventional, and that is what I attempt below is that the response to the European 
challenge was not restricted to emulation of the European ways. Well before the so-
called dawn of modernity in the Middle East following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 
1798 and contemporaneous with similar transformations in Europe, the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran began to transform their external relations by way of bilateral inter-
dynastic agreements, which marked a ‘conceptual turning point’ in sovereignty and 
citizenship (Tucker 1996).  
 
With that in mind, I start with a mid-eighteenth century treaty between the Ottoman 
Empire and the Afsharid dynasty of Iran that set in motion developments that 
established notions of modern territoriality and imperial citizenship in the Islamic world 
that would end with codification of extraterritorial rights for Iranians in the Ottoman 
Empire towards the end of nineteenth century. This move enables a periodisation that 
departs from the conventional threshold of the nineteenth century as the inauguration of 
modernity in the Middle East by way of European intervention. The inter-dynastic 
conditions of emergence of modern peoplehood in the Middle East are not, I argue, 
subsequent to but coeval with changes in Europe. Secondly, looking at the relationship 
between two non-European states helps us to think within a ‘scale’ of transformation 
that adjusts, though not discards, the uneven power relationship between Europe and the 




I do not aim here only to recover some prior empirical facts about the concomitant 
Middle Eastern modernity. The point is more fundamental. It is to demonstrate that the 
intersocietal co-existence and interaction with transformative qualities were not 
subsequent to the extension of international society into the Islamic world. The Ottoman 
Empire and post-Safavid Persia, despite much turbulence the latter went through, were 
sovereign states. They were not only made into one following European impact. In that 
sense, this chapter follows from and contributes to the revival of interest in the history 
of eighteenth century Iran (Axworthy 2018a). Traditionally bracketed between the 
Safavid decline and the rise of Qajars, the ‘short’ eighteenth century has long been 
understood along the lines proposed by Roger Stevens, namely a ‘horrible’ period, that 
should be treated ‘with the greatest possible brevity’ (Stevens 1971:30). But recent 
work suggests far more dynamic history with attempts towards independent 
modernisation (cf. Axworthy 2018b).     
 
The second section looks at the consequences of this unevenness, especially the whip of 
external necessity and the privilege of backwardness. But it does this from a particular 
socio-spatial scale that is relatively underutilised in the so-called neo-Trotskyist 
literature. Rather than employing a sole focus on the state level strategies of 
backwardness that draws a relational distinction between industrialised European 
powers and late developing states of the non-European world, it identifies agents of 
transmission located in another late developing state. The Qajar subjects resident in the 
Ottoman Empire, in official and unofficial capacity, are the case in point here. Their 
experience in the modernising empire and convictions that the Ottomans could act as a 
model to reform the Qajar state and society adds a layer to our understanding of 
modernity which is largely overlooked in the accounts of ‘Iranian’ modernisation and 
remained limited to specific empirical studies (see, for example, Zarcone and Zarinebaf 
1993b). This investigation into this community of expatriate Qajar subjects serves as an 
instance of ‘mediated modernisation’ where a late developing society acts as model for 
another not only for how to modernise, but also how to modernise to cope with 
geopolitical pressures.    
 
The third section focuses on the actions of a single individual from that community who 
was well placed in assessing the promises and pitfalls of Ottoman reform efforts, and to 
draw lessons from this to inform his compatriots at home. The individual in questions is 
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Mirza Hoseyn Khan. As the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul between 1859 and 1870, his 
career was probably the most concrete instance of mediated modernisation vested with 
official capacity. The section demonstrates his close relationship with the key Tanzimat 
reformers and his later adoption of Ottoman development in Qajar Iran when he was 
given ministerial portfolios.     
 
Before moving on, one crucial qualification should be inserted here. My aim in raising 
these arguments, significant as they are, is not to downplay the power of European 
geopolitical pressures weighing down on the Qajar and Ottoman empires. There can be 
no denying of this momentous fact of history. As Albert Hourani cautioned, ‘a new sort 
of relationship’ was indeed ‘established in the nineteenth century between Europe and 
the Near East’ and ‘its effect was to initiate certain new movements.’ But he asked, 
characteristically inspiring much future research, ‘was this all that happened?’ 
(1961:36). This chapter argues that not only this was not the case, but also that 
understanding everything else that happened requires a mode of analysis that is not 
restricted to marshalling empirical evidence and historiographical interpretation based 
on internal (or native) resources of modernity in the imperial domains of the Qajars and 
the Ottomans. It is by way of inter-imperial relations of these late developing states, I 
argue, we can actually tap into very crucial developments and may begin to challenge 
the internal-external dichotomy perpetuated in historiography.      
 
4.2 From Kurdan to Erzurum: Modernising International Relations of 
the Middle East 
 
In this section I try to make a case that origins of modern peoplehood in Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire should be sought in eighteenth century international relations. It is here 
that one finds the proto-nationalist legal developments that differentiated Muslims on 
territorial lines within a wider religious community. The argument aligns with important 
points raised by Ayşe Zarakol in recent discussion with respect to the history of the 
concept of sovereignty. She makes the argument the ingrained notion that ‘the concept 
of sovereignty emerged (first and exclusively) in Europe’ is based on history written 
with reference to European materials only. Then she raises the provocative prospect of a 
different historiography: What if the concept of sovereignty developed in the East and 
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the West independently of each other? Should not this then ‘point to larger systemic 
causes our current theories are not well-equipped to deal with?’ (In Costa Lopez et al. 
2018:596). 
 
This section historically traces the development of ideas sovereignty in the international 
relations of the Islamic world in the eighteenth century and beyond to demonstrate, not 
the internal and native sources of modern nationhood, but its gestation through novel 
understanding of sovereignty in the Islamic world. In empirical terms our focus is on 
the Ottoman Empire’s relations with dynasties that have ruled over the Iranian plateau 
since the accession of the Safavids and with particular reference to the legal status of 
‘Iranians’ in the Ottoman realm.     
 
Despite constituting the largest number of ‘foreigners’ in the Ottoman domains 
throughout the imperial history, Iranians were not recognised as constituting a ‘nation’ 
like the resident European communities of the Empire. Before the nineteenth century, 
the Ottoman Empire treated Iranians in its domains as part of the wider Muslim world 
(dar-ul Islam). Iranian pilgrims visiting holy places or Iranian merchants trading in the 
Empire were not accorded with the legal and political rights of a foreign community, as 
it was the case with the Europeans living and trading in the imperial lands. The latter 
were subjects of the abode of war (dar-ul harb) (Masters 1991:3).  
 
Following the establishment of a centralised Safavid state on its eastern borders in 1501, 
the Ottomans had to confront a regional rival that presented a direct challenge to the 
Sunni orthodoxy, which constituted one of the pillars of their state. Especially during 
times of war, sectarian hatred became the main substance of Ottoman efforts to justify 
armed conflict. The Ottoman ulema were instrumental in this regard. They issued 
religious orders (fetva) that scorned the Shi’i Muslims as heretics. ‘The eternal reward 
for killing one Shi’i,’ Abbas Amanat quotes from a fetva by the mufti of Istanbul, ‘was 
equal to killing seventy Christian infidels’ (2017:55). 
 
The first peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids signed in 1555 
went to some lengths to urge Iranians to pay sufficient respects to the three caliphs that 
succeeded the prophet. This proved to be a repeating element in the future diplomatic 
texts as the Ottomans continued to see Shi’i Iranians as heretics. Yet this was not 
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recognition of difference in the legal sense, as it did not amount to granting official 
status to them. Despite the sectarian hatred directed against the Shi’is, the Ottomans 
remained ambiguous on this matter as the wording of the treaty ‘confirmed in a general 
sense the sultan’s status as protector of all Muslims’ (Tucker 1996:19). In times of 
peace, the Ottomans refrained from making policies based on the Shi’a/Sunni split in 
Islam; they consciously chose not to recognise that such a split existed. In that sense, 
the Ottomans did not differentiate between Muslims residing in, passing thorough or 
trading within their realm, even if their loyalty were to another dynasty. 
 
But this was only one side of the relationship. As Ernest Tucker points out, 
‘interdynastic relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids were [also] 
characterised by numerous congratulatory letters, embassies and gift exchanges, 
particularly upon the enthronement of the new monarchs’ (1996:19). But this modus 
vivendi between the Ottomans and the Safavids was thrown into turmoil when the 
latter’s rule collapsed in 1722 under the pressure of Afghan invasions. The Ottomans 
lost little time in seizing the power vacuum and turning it into an opportunity for 
territorial aggrandizement towards east, justified again on religious grounds. By now 
however there was a new player in the territorial game. As Maryam Ekhtiar notes, after 
at least three centuries of economic and diplomatic contact, the Russian state centralised 
and geopolitically confident under Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) started to take interest 
in Iran, most immediately in Caucasia (1996:58; Matthee 2012).   
  
Curiously enough, the Ottomans backed the claim of the Safavids over the Afghans and 
carried out some indecisive fighting which only extended the period of uncertainty in 
Iran. Not long before a Turkic tribal leader, Nader Qoli Beg, supporting the Safavid 
claimant Tahmasb II prevailed and was honoured as Tahmasb Qoli Khan. When a 
renewed Afghan threat distracted him into Khorasan, Tahmasb II, now emboldened, 
attacked the Ottomans and was soundly defeated. The punitive peace the victors 
imposed infuriated Nader and on that pretext he deposed Tahmasb and his son, Abbas 
III, became the new ruler. Nader lost no time to pursue the lost territory, during which 
his armies defeated the Ottomans twice. On the back of his recent military success, he 
was enthroned as Nader Shah (r. 1736-1747) of the Afsharid dynasty. The Safavid rule 




The ensuing negotiations and the peace treaty that followed it between the Ottomans 
and Nader Shah contained some unprecedented proposals from the latter. Nader Shah 
asked the Ottomans to accept him as the leader of a fifth Sunni school, Ja’fari – named 
after the sixth Shi’i Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq. The Ottoman delegation categorically 
refused this, as they did with the Afsharid request for a fifth pillar for this newfound 
sect at the Ka’ba, Islam’s most sacred mosque. These proposals were far too radical for 
the representatives of a state that fashioned itself as the upholder of Sunni orthodoxy. 
The Ottoman refusal did not sit well with Nader Shah, who resumed hostilities. For the 
last time, the Ottomans resorted to religious justification for fighting against Shi’i 
Iranians.  After some indecisive fighting, he dropped his proposal for a fifth school and 
the Treaty of Kurdan was signed in 1746.     
 
The Treaty turned out to be ‘a landmark piece of diplomacy’ (Salzmann 2004:73) as it 
laid down the groundwork for a territorial system of states. Of the clauses it contained, 
several need to be expounded here to make sense of their novelty. The Ottoman 
accession to ban the taking of Shi’i captives as slaves marks a reversal of attitude. In 
Islamic law for one to be lawfully taken as a slave, one has to be an infidel. With this 
agreement, the Ottomans accepted Shi’is into the dar al-Islam as fellow Muslims. This 
recognition was further compounded by accepting Shi’i pilgrims to have their own 
caravan leader (emirü’l-hacc) which allowed ‘a representative of the shah to exercise 
political authority in Ottoman territory’ (Tucker 1996:32) – a significant move towards 
extraterritoriality. On a similar note, the Treaty acknowledged the special needs of 
Iranians by granting them permission to visit Shi’i shrines in Ottoman Iraq. In overall, 
the Treaty of Kurdan, having employed the terminology of ‘two countries’ to signify 
their sovereign equality and instituting for the first time in Islamic world the exchange 
of permanent ambassadors, marked 
 
a conceptual turning point at which the Ottomans, by formally recognizing the 
legitimate status of Iranian Shi’is, began to move towards a definition of dar 
al-islam that embraced both the unity of the Islamic past and the pluralism of 
an emerging system of independent Muslim nations (Tucker 1996:17).  
 
Even the death of Nader Shah soon after the signing of the treaty did not reverse these 
steps, as his successors did not renege on its terms. For its part the Ottomans stuck with 
 
 130 
the treaty as well. When the next dynasty, the Zands, attained control of the Iranian 
plateau and occupied Basra in 1775, the Ottomans did not justify the war on religious 
grounds. ‘As an indication of the further secularization of Ottoman-Iranian relations’, 
notes Sabri Ateş, the fetva issued this time ‘differed from its predecessors by defining 
the enemy not as a Shi’i apostate, but rather as a rebel (baghi) against the sultan’ 
(2013:25). 
 
The path-dependent quality of the changes of the eighteenth century helps us see the 
Erzurum Treaties (1823 and 1847) as a culmination of earlier developments. Following 
a fresh round of hostilities between the Ottomans and the latest dynasty of Iran, the 
Qajars, these treaties mark, according to one commentator, the high point in the slow 
relegation of the ideal of umma to the realm of theology and its extraction from the 
international relations of these two states (Masters 1991:9). All sectarian diatribes, a 
common element of earlier treaties, were completely expunged from the language of 
diplomacy.  
 
Having removed sectarian divisions, the Ottomans followed the legal thread to its 
secular logical conclusion. They added Iran ‘to the list of countries for which the 
bureaucrats at the Porte maintained separate registers [Ecnebi Defterleri] of cases 
involving its citizens who needed state intervention’ (Masters 1991:11; Kern 2011:56–
57). This was an unequivocal statement on the part of the Ottoman state to recognise 
Iranians as a separate ‘nation’ or, less anachronistically, the subjects of a different 
sovereign. ‘For the first time in Middle Eastern politics, religious identity was a 
secondary means of classification’ (Baghoolizadeh 2012:2). Furthermore, I can agree 
with Baghoolizadeh that these developments ‘imposed vaguely-conceived imperial 
identities on Qajar and Ottoman subjects’ who are now ‘aligned with a crown and land, 
as opposed to a simple religious affiliation’ (2012:3). In addition to the vagueness of 
these identities, I would note the fact that this new-fangled identity was ‘imposed’ more 
on the Qajar subjects living in or travelling through the Ottoman realm, whose number 
would warrant, at this time, neither a full-blown national identity nor a coherent 
nationalist ideology. But the historical significance of these changes is beyond doubt.  
 
Following in the steps of the Treaty of Kurdan, Article 7 of the second Erzurum Treaty 
codified the role of Qajar representatives in the Ottoman Empire to look after the 





A Perso-Islamic term was employed for these officials, shahbandar, but that 
term was defined by the neologism of “consul” (konsolos), showing its 
conceptual origins in Western rather than Islamic diplomatic practice. The 
shahbandar was further affirmed to have the same rights (imtiyazat) as his 
European counterparts. Ottoman consuls abroad bore the same title. In this 
century of slow ideological modernization, a diplomat from a Muslim state 
could not yet have a European title even though he had similar rights and 
functions (Masters 1991:13–14).  
 
These developments had not yet amounted to full-blown extraterritorial authority to the 
Iranian representatives. That came with an agreement between two parties in 1875 that 
granted Iranian consuls exclusive authority over Qajar subjects (Nakash 1994:17–18) 
  
Several conclusions can be drawn from the legal and political developments in Iranian-
Ottoman relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  First, these novel 
legal and political steps were taken partly in response growing threats coming from 
European powers. The Ottoman Empire was in one sense adapting the legal framework 
of geopolitics relating to its Western borders to its relations with its Eastern neighbour. 
In that sense, it would be as wrong to detach these developments from the wider 
geopolitical environment in the name of making a case against Eurocentrism as to 
reduce every element of change to European impact. But we should also be mindful of 
the particular time the Treaty of Kurdan was signed. At that point, Ernest Tucker notes,   
 
the Ottomans were not facing grave military threats in Europe…Thus, the 
Ottoman-Iranian rapprochement of 1746 was not simply a temporary expedient 
driven by European pressures on the Ottomans; it can be seen rather as the 
logical outgrowth of a process of fundamental redefinition of relations between 
Iran and the Ottoman Empire begun in 1736 (1996:34). 
 
As such, increasing geopolitical pressures and the adaptation of imperial governance are 
not simply the isolated ends of a causal link, but coeval processes. Furthermore, 
transformation of international relations in the Islamic world was not simple 
substitution of one civilizational code (Islamic) with another (European). In the end one 
might rather see the process started with the Treaty of Kurdan as ‘a real departure from 
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traditional concepts of inter-Muslim relations’ (Tucker 1996:36, 2006:98–99) that 
accommodated the sovereign existence of two states within the wider Islamic 
community by strategically retaining the Ottoman claim as the leader of the Islamic 
world. One might see this as a judicious move for both sides as they acclimatised to the 
changing geopolitical conditions by adapting them to the uneven power relationship 
between them in terms of ‘international relations’ of the Islamic world.  
 
Thus, pushing the chronology of ‘Middle Eastern modernity’ back into the eighteenth 
century brings to the surface the existence of ‘international relations’ before European 
modernity come crushing in or international society expanded into the Middle East. The 
question of modern peoplehood, then, was not something forced upon the empires of 
the Islamic world. For international relations, or diplomacy, if we would like to expunge 
the anachronism, is not something originally invented in Europe. Diplomacy – ‘in the 
broadest sense of the negotiated management of inter-societal relations (Rosenberg 
2006:320) – is a generic property of the inter-societal co-existence of human 
collectivities.  
 
This extant dynamic, operative between the Ottoman Empire and the changing 
dynasties ruling over the Iranian plateau, began to transform partly by absorbing the 
changing principles of inter-state conduct in Europe and adapting them to inter-state 
relations in the Islamic world. This process had elements of what anthropologists and 
archaeologists would call diffusion and simultaneous invention. This process involved 
an element of diffusion because European developments are adopted, initially by the 
Ottoman Empire and later by its neighbouring dynasties by way of European mediation. 
It is also simultaneous inventions, because – and I am resorting to the language of 
archaeology here –  ‘where necessary parts [i.e. diplomacy] [were] already invented and 
there [was] strong interest to create a desired product [i.e. to make peace with a stronger 
neighbour]’ (Kehoe 2016:149).    
 
These developments also help us to challenge a conventional trope in Ottoman 
historiography. By now serious students of the Ottoman Empire have thoroughly 
questioned, if not totally abandoned the traditional imperial decline thesis, which 
depicted the old empire as devoid of administrative flexibility and economic dynamism 
(Aksan 2014; Aymes 2013; Mikhail and Philliou 2012). The eighteenth century was not 
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a period of unstoppable imperial decay and decline, but one of adaptation to the 
changing geopolitical environment following the formal closure of the frontier (Abou-
El-Haj 1969).  
 
Finally, the Qajar-Ottoman relations and novel steps they took towards what might be 
termed proto-national identity challenge another conventional idea in historiography, 
namely the supposed incompatibility between Islam and modern nationalism (see 
critiques in Bromley 1993:90–94; Gerber 2007:209–10). Different arguments are 
proposed to this end. For one, Islam, as opposed to Christianity, was a nomadic but not 
a territorial culture (Armstrong 1982). Another commentator, Adrian Hastings, asserted 
that the socio-cultural impact [of Islam] is to draw people into a single, far more 
universalist, community whose sole language of direct encouragement is Arabic’ 
(1997:159). Like Armstrong, Hastings also draws a contrast with Christianity, as if 
these are isolated cultures with no interaction or influence:45  
 
While the Islamic socio-political impact was thus in principle almost entirely 
anti-ethnic and anti-national, the Christian impact was more complex. Its 
willingness to translate brought with it, undoubtedly, a reduction in the number 
of ethnicities and vernaculars, but then a confirmation of the individual identity 
of those that remained: Christianity in fact helped turn ethnicities into nations 
(1997:179).  
But as I argue in this section, the legal and political changes in the international 
relations of the Islamic world in the eighteenth century gives indications of modern 
peoplehood. The Islamic world in this view does not have to wait for the Third Estate to 
storm the Bastille and then import a fully-formed ideology of nationalism from them, 
which did not in any case, according to sceptics, take root in the Islamic world.     
 
4.3 Istanbul: Qajar Reformists’ “Open Window Onto Europe”46  
 
In this section I present a case of late modernisation that does not subscribe to the 
traditional unilinear historiography. Chronologically we move into the nineteenth 
                                                
45 See the critique of this view by Richard W. Bulliet who made an important case for Islamo-
Christian civilization (2004) 
46 This phrase (‘une fenêtre ouverte sur l'Europe’) belongs to Zarcone and Zarinebaf (1993a:1). 
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century. It was during this troubled period that European geopolitical pressures came to 
be felt in full force. Even a cursory reading of the historical record leaves no doubt. The 
onset of the nineteenth century brought with it momentous geopolitical changes that 
engulfed Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. One scholar, who provides a perceptive 
analysis of the texts written by early Qajar intellectuals and diplomats, notes ‘the 
sudden sense of having fallen behind’ (Ekhtiar 1996:58). Similarly the Ottoman elite 
‘understood only too well that their world was exposed to mortal danger from within as 
from without’ (Deringil 2011:3).     
 
Having lost the military edge – an essential quality for the political reproduction of any 
land based empire – against their rivals, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire 
increasingly looked for methods and devices to cope with the imminent threat. Almost 
instinctively by the reform minded bureaucrat and intellectual alike, at least for those 
that did not attribute the visible powerlessness of their state solely to estrangement from 
the ‘old ways,’ it was recognised that the key to renewal and redemption was held by 
the hostile but superior European powers. This much of the historical script is by now 
familiar and I do not wish to repeat it here. The fact of European geopolitical pressures 
and the efforts of Ottoman and Qajar elites to cope with them constitute the master 
frame within which what I present should be understood. The twist to this otherwise 
well-known plot adds a third link to the chain, so to speak. Between Europe and Qajar 
Iran, one can picture the Ottoman Empire as a transmission belt and source for 
inspiration that for novel ideas, institutional configurations and, given the power 
disparity between these two late comers, a source of material wealth in the form of a 
commercial gateway to Europe.    
 
In this framing the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran are not strictly equivalent and 
separate units of analysis that can be compared in their attempts at reform or their 
relative backwardness vis-à-vis their European foes. There was indeed a clear power 
disparity between these two entities and differential rates of success in their attempts to 
reform. For that reason it is not surprising to find in the relevant literature comparative 
remarks, though almost always in passing, that note the relative weakness of 
modernization in Qajar Iran vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Egypt (Martin 2005:25). 
This is a striking and recurring, if only briefly stated, point that the Qajars failed to 
achieve a level of development/modernisation in comparison to the Ottoman Empire. 
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Sometimes an additional reference is also made to Egypt of the Muhammad Ali 
dynasty. Nikki Keddie states this plainly:  
 
Compared to countries nearer the Mediterranean and having a greater western 
trade and presence, notably Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Iran had only a 
few reform measures that lasted more than a decade, scant introduction of 
modern education, and, despite several army reforms, only one truly modern 
army unit (1999:15; see also Keddie and Amanat 1991:178 and 195). 
 
According to this line of reasoning, Iran lacked not only political institutions and will, 
but also necessary attributes like natural resources and population. Its relative isolation 
from European developments, geographical obstacles to trade, nomadic nature of the 
population and comparatively smaller proportion of non-Muslims to its overall 
population disadvantaged Iran vis-à-vis its co-religionist neighbour to the West (Pistor-
Hatam 1995:562–63).  
 
According to one historian, having a strong neighbour to the West was both a blessing 
and a curse:  
 
The major impediment [to reform in Iran] seems to have been geographical, 
namely the vast expanses of the Ottoman Empire which quite effectively 
shielded Iran from any blows that the European powers dealt the Ottoman 
Empire itself, their neighbour, but which at the same time equally isolated her 
from direct contact with the West (Karny 1973:12).  
 
Abbas Amanat recently made a similar point. Ottoman consolidation in Anatolia 
following their victory over the Safavids in Chaldiran (1514) blocked any direct access 
to Black Sea and Mediterranean trade routes and political interaction (2017:58). The 
rulers of Iran, from the Safavids onwards, had a higher mountain to climb (Keddie and 
Amanat 1991:177; Matthee 2010:255). 
 
But left in this way, these are plain comparative points with ostensibly quantitative 
valences – more attempt and success in one, less in the other. This comparativist 
gradation between the Ottoman Empire and Iran is not for everyone, however. In his 
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analysis of the historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, Ali Ansari picks 
this problem up in passing and turns it around to make sense of it: 
 
In broad terms, the Tobacco Revolt occurred at a similar time and ‘era’ as the 
granting of the Ottoman Constitution (1876) and the Urabi Revolt in Egypt 
(1881-1882), and if anything conveniently took place after these events, 
thereby reinforcing the didactic position that this was a regional process in 
which each state proceeded according to its relative proximity to Western ideas 
and influence. If this particular model did not work particularly well for 
the events of 1906, it was nonetheless possible and again extremely useful to 
emphasize its revolutionary nature by situating it within the context of the 
failed Russian revolution of 1905. Neither of these comparative approaches 
were necessarily wrong, and they did much to convey the importance of events 
in Iran to an otherwise disinterested British public, but one of the inadvertent 
consequences was to situate Iran chronologically and culturally as the poor 
neighbour to the Ottomans and subsequently the Turks (2012:41–42).  
 
Because his brief analysis falls short of a thorough engagement with comparativism, it 
ends up with, so I surmise from his wording, an empirical concession in the form of not 
‘necessarily wrong’ and a criticism of gradation between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar 
Iran.  
 
While certainly right on his normative objection, Ali Ansari does not see this as a matter 
of politics of comparison. Surely, normative criticism of this kind has a resonance 
beyond the study of late modernisations in the Middle East, as comparativism is often 
found guilty of introducing a hierarchy between units under comparison. And one of the 
most pervasive forms of such hierarchy has been the one established between the cases 
of Euro-American modernity and the rest of the world (Mongia 2007:385; Shih 2013).  
 
In this instance, Eurocentric hierarchy comes with an additional layer however. Not 
only Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire are subjected to hierarchical comparison with 
Europe, that very yardstick also serves to rank them. Such ranking, measured by the 
endogenous attainment of European modernity, arranges cases of late modernisation 
along a developmental arc (Pollock 2010:200). This reinforces the other enduring 
problem of comparative historical inquiry, namely internalism or methodological 
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nationalism (Martins 1974:273–80; Tenbruck 1994). For histories of late developing 
societies are measured and ranked individually (that is, ‘nationally’) and separately 
against the European norm. 
 
Shadowed by the cogent criticisms of normative Eurocentrism and methodological 
internalism is a third problem that has received relatively less attention – one that this 
chapter is chiefly concerned with. By limiting the histories of late modernisations to the 
singular axis of European impact and non-European response, comparativism effaces 
any ‘lateral’ connections among societies outside the European core (Holdrege 2010). 
Comparative relevance of the histories of non-European modernisations are rendered 
meaningful only to the extent they are thought to have succeeded or failed to achieve 
the hallmarks of European modernity, as in the comparativist gradation between Qajar 
Iran and the Ottoman Empire highlighted above.  
 
Such connections can be reinstated to their historical relevance by re-purposing 
comparison as a political vision and orientation or, as I stated earlier, by focusing on the 
politics of comparison. The contemporaries, in this sense, made this differential 
assessment of two late developing entities as well, which are generally overlooked in 
the literature. It was one of the earliest proponents of Iranian nationalism, Seyyed Hasan 
Taqizadeh, who noted the importance of Istanbul for reform movement in Iran. He 
stated with some literary flair that ‘the light… came from Istanbul to Iran, and 
especially Tabriz, and gradually influenced the awakening of minds and the political 
revolution’ (1960:459).  
 
Here I look into the views of Qajar residents in Istanbul in official or unofficial capacity 
that made such assessments and came to the conclusion that there may be much to be 
learned from Ottoman efforts at reform. Carter Findley draws the broader implications 
of the Ottoman priority in late development:    
 
The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century are…of pivotal importance not 
only for the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, but also 
for the entire history of the administrative tradition of the Islamic world. These 
reforms are also significant in a larger sense, as well. If we except Russia, 
whose traditional culture had much in common with that of the West, the 
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Ottomans come to the fore as the first modernizing society of the non-Western 
world and one of the few such societies to retain any degree of independence 
during the nineteenth century age of imperialism. In view of the Ottomans’ 
geographic position and the level of their interaction in all periods of their 
history with Europeans, theirs, too, is an exceptional situation. But their 
experiences during a century and a third of administrative reform must have 
implications for the study of the efforts of other peoples, the world over, who 
have launched comparable efforts only more recently-at times under even less 
promising circumstances, and often without any resource equal to the 
indigenous tradition that the Ottomans had behind them (1980:4).  
  
The Persian community (Pistor-Hatam 2007), which clustered mostly in major 
commercial cities and towns, came in three waves. The first wave of migration arrived 
in the wake of the devastating Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century. The second 
one formed mostly by the persecuted Sunnis following the Safavid enforcement of 
Shi’ism as the religion of the land in the sixteenth century. This wave also included 
those from Azerbaijan after its occupation by the Ottomans, who deported many skilled 
workers to Anatolia. The final wave, ‘the heyday of this community’ (Chelkowski 
2001:69), which is the subject of this section, arrived throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century with the increased commercial ties between the Ottoman Empire 
and Qajar Iran (Zarinebaf n.d.).  
 
And of this final wave I am more interested in the Qajar subjects resident in the imperial 
capital, Istanbul. Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahani, a traveller and a pilgrim on his 
way to Mecca, visited the city in 1885 and put the number of Iranians around 16.000, 
most of whom were merchants and traders (1990:143). Other major Ottoman cities 
hosted Iranian émigrés, if in comparatively much smaller numbers: 5.700 Iranians lived 
in Anatolia at the end of nineteenth century, 2.714 lived in Adana, 995 in Izmir, 850 in 
Aleppo, 721 in Erzurum and 448 in Van (Lawrence 2015:28). For most of the 
nineteenth century, Valide Han, located in the European part of the city, served as the 
main trading post and communal centre for the Qajar subjects in Istanbul. A city han 
was ‘the traditional Ottoman “office building” that provided, like an Arab caravanserai 
or the Italian fondachi, accommodation for travelling merchants at an affordable cost, 
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with the addition of workshops, offices, and storage space for craftsmen and tradesmen, 
usually specialising in a limited range of goods’ (Duranti 2012:233).  
 
Valide Han included a Shi’i mosque and hosted sacred Shi’i rituals of taziya and ashura 
(Glassen 1993). This evinces the increasing self-confidence and visibility of the Iranian 
community, released from the throes of religious persecution experienced by their 
‘compatriots’ who arrived with the earlier waves of migration (Kiren 2017). In 
Farahani’s account, the Iranians in Istanbul were enjoying the benefits of 
extraterritoriality, like other ‘foreigners’ towards the end of the century and their legal 
recourse was ‘entirely through the embassy. They were never under the jurisdiction of 
the administration of Istanbul’ (1990:143). 
 
The community was mostly comprised of merchants of Azerbaijani origin. This was 
facilitated by the increasing trade incentivised by the safeguards implemented by the 
Erzurum Treaties. During the nineteenth century the earlier geographical isolation of 
Iran’s fertile northern provinces was significantly overcome and a bustling trade route 
established from Tabriz to Istanbul by way of the port city of Trabzon on the coast of 
Black Sea (Issawi 1970; see also Sakamoto 1993). Through this trade route Iranians 
found a gateway into European trade. One contemporary Austrian observer, Rudolf 
Gödel, noted in 1849 that ‘the bulk of the trading business between Europe and Persia 
[was] concentrated in Constantinople and Tabriz’ which acted as the two poles of the 
commercial flow (Quoted in Chelkowski 2001:69; see also Issawi 1991:600–601).   
 
The political leanings of the Iranian merchants became increasingly critical of Qajar 
rule, as their privileges were continually damaged by the concessions granted to 
European capital and the reform efforts petered out at home. As Andrea Duranti notes, 
if with a slight overdose of historical linearity,  ‘the history of the Persian merchants 
strictly merged with that of the modernisation of Iran and the spread of western political 
ideologies that eventually determined the birth of the Iranian constitutional movement’ 
(2012:238). Their contribution as I try to show here was an instance of mediated 






4.4 Mirza Hoseyn Khan: The Reformist Ambassador in Istanbul  
 
This section further concretises the argument of the previous one by focusing on the 
actions of a single individual. Mirza Hoseyn Khan was the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul 
during the Ottman Empire’s momentous reform period known as the Tanzimat. During 
his service he enthusiastically, though not uncritically, reported these reforms and their 
benefits to his home country. In a sense, he was a conduit between an early late 
developing state and another such country, which he thought, was laggard in reform.    
 
Mirza Hoseyn Khan was not the first to recognise the Ottoman priority in late 
development. Possibly the earliest attempt in reform on European lines was put forth by 
Abbas Mirza (1789-1833), the governor of Azerbaijan and heir apparent to Fath Ali 
Shah (r. 1797-1834). And his efforts came in the face of patent military powerlessness. 
He took up his post in the north-western province in 1806 when the war was on-going 
with the Russian Empire, triggered by the latter’s annexation of Georgia in 1801, for 
long considered to be part of Iran. He was a determined, but also equally unfortunate 
visionary. Much like his successors in reform efforts to have felt that something has 
gone terribly wrong, when he uttered he following lines to the French envoy Jaubert:  
 
Stranger, do you see this army, this court and these instruments of power? Do 
not believe, however, that I am happy. Oh, but how can I be? It is like a 
troubled fleet in the sea that bangs itself against the immovable rocks; all the 
efforts of my courage have failed against the Russian armies. The people praise 
my achievements: I alone know my weakness. What should I do to gain the 
esteem of the Western warriors? What cities have I conquered? What revenge 
have I taken against those who have invaded our provinces? (Ekhtiar 1996:59) 
 
His mood was in many ways similar to his reforming counterparts in the Ottoman 
Empire, from where it seems he drew some of his inspiration for change. For 
immediately after assuming his post he moved onto to modernise his army with the help 
of his minister Qayem Maqam, remarkably when the war with the Russian Empire was 
underway. They established a new army corps equipped with European style uniforms 
and trained in European methods. Abbas Mirza’s army employed salaried officers 
trained by Russian deserters and later French and British military missions – the 
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employment of particular groups of experts was sensitive to the changing geopolitical 
dynamics in Europe, as by then Napoleon’s overtures into Iran after his failure in Egypt 
alerted the British Empire to the risk involved its prized possessions in Indian 
subcontinent. 
 
The naming and the method of justification for the new army, Nezam-i Jadid (New 
Order) seems to be directly influenced by similar efforts in the Ottoman Empire 
undertaken by the reformist Sultan Selim III (Cronin 2008:204). Although the veracity 
of this connection is disputed (Karny 1973:16), Hamid Algar opines that ‘possibly the 
Ottoman envoys who came to Tehran to suggest the formation of a common front 
against Russian expansionism were one channel whereby the Ottoman example was 
communicated’ (1980:77). But this was not just a straightforward imitation of the 
reform efforts of another Islamic dynasty. ‘The European model was perceived through 
the lens of Ottoman example’ (Algar 1973:103). 
 
But the early death of Abbas Mirza and the execution of Qayem Maqam next year with 
the succession of Mohammad Shah (r. 1834-1848) significantly slowed down reform 
efforts in Qajar Iran until Naser al-Din Shah (r. 1848-1896) assumed the throne. The 
young shah’s chief minister, Miza Taqi Khan (Amir Kabir), renewed reform efforts 
with an unprecedented zeal across the country, which unsettled vested interests. No 
more than three years later his downfall was brought about by court intrigue (Amanat 
2008:102–17). For about two decades Qajar modernisation went into a hiatus inside the 
country, except for sporadic and perfunctory efforts by Naser al-Din Shah that were 
doomed not least by the shah’s half-heartedness. But abroad, particularly in Istanbul, the 
reformist mind-set was kept aflame by the expatriate Qajar subjects. They found a 
government ally in their midst, when their new ambassador arrived in the Ottoman 
capital from his posts as consul in Bombay and Tbilisi. None other than Amir Kabir 
assigned him to Bombay in 1851 – a fact that gives us clues about his reformist 
leanings. And during his term in Tblisi, notes Azriel Karny, he first encountered 
Ottoman officials which led him to learn at first hand about the early reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire (1973:96). 
  
Mirza Hoseyn Khan was a man of humble origins, from Mazandaran in the Caspian 
region of Iran. It was his father, Mirza Nabi Khan, who was the first to take the 
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proverbial steps of the ladder up, thanks to the expanding bureaucracy in Qajar Iran. He 
made sure his sons were properly educated and galvanised family fortunes in the service 
of the state (Karny 1973:42–60). This education appears to have given him the political 
convictions of a European liberal. Although little is known about this period of his life, 
he was a student in Paris during the revolutionary days of 1848, the springtime of 
nations. His faith in progress was firm to the point of naïveté. He believed, notes Guity 
Nashat, that ‘change necessarily brought improvement’ (1982:35). And his years in 
Istanbul as the first resident Iranian ambassador (1859-1870) gave him more than 
enough chance to witness change first hand, as his mission coincided with the so-called 
second stage of Tanzimat reforms under the helm of Ali and Fuad Pashas. 
 
This second stage was opened by the Reform Edict of 1856, which reaffirmed the 
principles of the Imperial Edict of Reorganisation of 1839: the abolition of tax farming, 
the reform of conscription, and security for life, property and honour of all subjects of 
the sultan. Both edicts declared all subjects, regardless of their religious affiliation, 
equal before the law in line with the idea of Ottomanism.  A surge of legislation 
followed in the form of new land, penal and commercial codes. Despite a certain 
slowdown during the early years of the new Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), reform 
efforts gained further impetus under external pressure.  
 
Mirza Hoseyn Khan watched these developments closely and reported them to Tehran 
with a certain enthusiasm. He seems to have been particularly impressed by the Sultan’s 
trip to Europe in 1867 under the guidance of Fuad Pasha, first ever in Ottoman history 
during peacetime. Astutely, he noticed the increasing pace of reform following this visit 
and put his energies to convince Naser al-Din Shah to do the same (Karny 1973:196). 
The Shah, however, had a different idea in mind. He wanted to take his first ever trip 
abroad to Ottoman Iraq in 1870. Mirza Hoseyn Khan was initially opposed to the idea, 
because the Shah’s wish to take a pilgrimage to Shi’i shrines in Ottoman lands was 
obviously a delicate matter. Having failed to dissuade the Shah, the capable ambassador 
managed to secure the permission from the Ottoman authorities, possibly thanks to the 
fact that he was on good terms with the grand vizier Ali Pasha. Baghdad province at the 
time was under the governorship of Midhat Pasha, who already made a name for 
himself during his tenure in the Danube province (Koç 2004). The Ottoman governor 
was one of the ablest of the Tanzimat reformers, whose acquaintance Mirza Hoseyn 
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made with enthusiasm (Hazrati 2015). In this sense the Shah’s visit, Mirza Hoseyn 
would likely have thought, was a chance to familiarise him with the benefits of 
European reform carried by a fellow Muslim state (Keddie 1999:35).  
  
The comparison Mirza Hoseyn Khan made was in the first instance a geographical one. 
He believed that due to its geographical location, ‘Iran was not within the radius of 
European civilisation’ (Chelkowski 2001:71). For that reason it was in its benefit to 
receive the help of European powers, even it comes in the form of imposition. This was 
indeed the case for the Ottomans, who despite initially resisting these pressures for 
change coming from outside, eventually did the right thing by welcoming it. It is clear 
that Mirza Hoseyn Khan’s worldview was close to the Westernising bureaucrats of the 
Ottoman Empire (Karny 1973:172). 
 
He seems to be particularly impressed by the early constitutional movement in the 
Ottoman Empire. In 1867 Mustafa Fazil Pasha, who held several high-ranking positions 
in the Ottoman bureaucracy previously, sent a letter to the Sultan from Paris. He was 
associated with the oppositional Young Ottomans movement (Çiçek 2010:38–39). The 
content of his letter was highly critical of the Ottoman administration and advocated the 
promulgation of a constitution and a representative assembly to act as an advisory body 
to the Sultan. Soon the letter was translated in Turkish and was distributed in Istanbul. 
Mirza Hoseyn Khan lost no time to urge on the Iranian foreign minister the benefits that 
would accrue from translating this letter into Persian. On the same day, he wrote sent 
another letter to Naser al-Din Shah to praise the benefits of constitutionalism. In this 
letter, however, the limits of the ambassador’s progressive politics revealed themselves. 
His commendation of the Ottoman constitutional movement raised the issue of non-
Muslims. If Ottomans were a single kind, a constitution and representative politics 
would be of great value. But given that a significant portion of the Ottoman population 
were Christians who would have a say in the assembly through their representatives, a 
great risk was involved. According to Azriel Karny, Mirza Hoseyn Khan reasoned that 
‘since in more than one respect the Christians are more advanced than the Muslim 





Another comparison he drew between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran was with 
regards to the quality of newspapers. In a letter he wrote in 1865 to Mirza Yusuf Khan, 
then the Qajar consul-general in Tblisi, Mirza Hoseyn Khan expressed his views in no 
uncertain terms: 
 
For some time now, I have abandoned the habit of reading newspapers that 
reach us from [Tehran]. They are sent very rarely, and whenever they are sent, 
I pass them on directly to the Embassy without reading them as when I study 
and compare these to the newspapers and press in Istanbul, the result is nothing 
but displeasure […] I have repeatedly communicated to the state these 
newspaper’s results […] but have seen no good come of it. Therefore, all I can 
do is to abstain from reading any of these (Quoted in Lawrence 2015:45–46).   
 
Mirza Hoseyn Khan’s reports were not always received positively, however. His 
superior, the Foreign Minister Mirza Said Khan took exception to his ambassador’s 
negative comparison between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran and scolded him for 
continuously claiming that Iranian state failed to take the necessary steps towards 
progress and the implication that Iranian bureaucracy, including Mirza Said Khan, were 
composed of incompetent people, and not with visionary reformers (Karny 1973:181–
82). Given that the Iranian ambassador was not content with mere reporting of events 
but installed himself as ‘the unproclaimed apostle of change in Iran’ (Karny 1973:170), 
the Foreign Minister’s response conveys a sense of personal agitation. And he was not 
the only one in the Qajar bureaucracy to harbour ill feelings towards Mirza Hoseyn 
Khan. But he proved himself to be a gifted diplomat during his term in Istanbul and 
gained the Shah’s praise more than once. When he secured the latter’s visit to Ottoman 
Iraq, he was probably at the highest point of diplomatic achievements and in return the 
grateful Shah appointed him as the Minister of Justice. Once given this ministerial 
portfolio, Mirza Hoseyn lost no time to pursue his reform efforts. Seeing that justice 
system decentralised and lacked systematic written legislation (Farmayan 1968:131), he 
established Majles-e Ahkam-e 'Adliye (The Council of Judicial Regulations) on the 
Ottoman model of Majles-Vala-ye Ahkam-e Adliye (Supreme Council of Judicial 
Ordinances) (Karny 1973:236–37). Another one of his reforms was the re-institution of 




Overzealous in his enthusiasm for reform, Mirza Hoseyn soon extended his ministerial 
purview into military and foreign affairs. He was certainly emboldened by the Shah’s 
unwavering support. This was confirmed in November 1871 by his appointment as the 
chief minister (Sadr-e Azam) the highest possible rank in Qajar bureaucracy. Two things 
however brought his downfall. He convinced Shah to give a major concession to British 
banker Baron Julius de Reuter 
 
the exclusive right to finance a state bank, farm out the entire customs, exploit 
all minerals (with the exception of gold, silver, and precious stones), build 
railways and tramways for seventy years, and establish all future canals, 
irrigation works, roads, telegraph lines, and industrial factories [in return for 
£40,000 and 60 percent of the profits] (Abrahamian 1982:55). 
 
Mirza Hoseyn was deeply involved in the concession and Reuter bribed several officials 
to secure the concession. Although, Keddie and Amanat notes, ‘there is no evidence that 
Mirza Husain Khan took a bribe’ (Keddie and Amanat 1991:187). Regardless, whole 
thing was nothing short of scandalous. Even an arch-imperialist like Lord Curzon could 
not hide his amazement. The Reuter concession, he said, ‘is the most complete and 
extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign 
hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history’ 
(Curzon 1892:480). In the face of domestic outrage, the Russian objections and the 
British unwillingness to support Reuter, the Shah canceled concession.  
 
Not long after the dust settled on the Reuter concession, Mirza Hoseyn convinced Shah 
to take his first European trip. It is likely that Mirza Hoseyn presumably drawing 
inspiration from the earlier Ottoman example. While Shah’s visit was success, though a 
very expensive one, Mirza Hoseyn enemies prepared well while he was away and 
pressured the Shah to discharge him as soon as they returned to the Qajar domains, 
which he did.   
 
 4.5 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter attempted to do several things. First, rescaling non-European 
modernisation by introducing the Ottoman Empire as a mediating influence unsettles 
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Eurocentric historiography’s civilisational bifurcation. By this move we get to conceive 
unevenness of historical development not a dyadic contrast between an advanced West 
and backward East, but unevenness itself as uneven. This multilinear conception of 
unevenness and non-European responses to it change our understanding of Middle 
Eastern history from a singular European impact to one where differential strategies 
(Eastern connections) no longer receive only passing references. 
 
 Second, rearranging the historiography of the ‘modern’ Middle East by moving back 
into eighteenth century allows us to interpret legal and political developments that have 
‘indigenous’ origins and initiative, though not detached from the wider geopolitical 
master frame. A simple dichotomy between external and internal explanations of 
change should be avoided at all costs. International relations is not a realm of external 
or ‘structural’ determinants, but elemental to social change. This historiographical move 
aligns with the recent revival of interest in the eighteenth century Iran, which previously 
received the scantiest attention, an addendum of a few pages to the Safavid period 
(Morgan 2018). 
 
 In that vein, this chapter’s historiographical engagement with the eighteenth century 
international relations of the Islamic world follows from the main premises of U&CD – 
that the inter-societal co-existence is constitutive of societies’ historical development 
and transformation. And as such it is not an exclusive property of modern Europe, but 
of human social existence in general. By reaching at this deeper ontological level, this 
chapter aimed at avoiding the fruitless questioning of whether modernity is Western or 
can we locate native and internal resources of it. The very dynamics that led to the 
development of modern institutions, values and rules in different settings, their 
conceivable simultaneity or what Victor Lieberman shrewdly called ‘the strange 
parallels’ (1997), should neither be reduced to mere imitations of original European 
products or should invented in the past of the nation.    
 
 The fact that the modernisation of the Middle Eastern states and societies came 
undeniably under the influence of the geopolitical and geopolitical impositions of the 
European ‘surge ahead’ is no warrant to reduce history to this singular dichotomy. It is 
at this intermediate or mid-range level where U&CD’s attentiveness to unevenness of 
historical development proves to be vital. By utilising the concepts of politics of 
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comparison and mediated modernisation this chapter tried to argue that there is much 
more to the history of the Middle East (and to the history of the non-European world at 
large) than the timid historiography of mixing European developments with local 
cultural resources.  
 
 Finally, the emergence of nationalism proper in the early twentieth century Ottoman 
Empire and Qajar Iran was not a sudden introduction of an alien ideology that was 
bound to fail, as some commentators have thought (Kedourie 1992; Vatikiotis 1987), 
but had precursors in the transformations of sovereignty and citizenship from the 
eighteenth century onwards. The onset of the twentieth century was to mark the 
acceleration of processes culminating in the last quarter of the previous one. The age of 
steam and print, as a recent collection of essays nicely put it, would transform the 
Islamic world with increased mobility of peoples, ideas and technologies (Gelvin and 
Green 2014). Two landmark developments of this era were the phenomenal burst of an 
Asian power, Japan into global politics to inspire profoundly the late developing 
societies of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, and the global wave of constitutional 



















Chapter 5  
 





This chapter seeks to advance the mediated modernisation argument into the turn-of-
the-century emergence of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms – a period during which the 
first programmatic statements of these ideologies are formulated. Still not the pioneers 
of the mass phenomena they will become in the later decades of the century, nationalist 
intellectuals started to articulate a hitherto unknown conception of political community. 
The very conditions within which these political visions of the nation were devised 
form the substance of this chapter. And while presenting that substance, I seek to 
address two problems in the previous treatments of late developing nationalisms.  
 
The first one was already raised in Chapter 1. Critical histories of Middle Eastern 
nationalisms rightly challenge the putative antiquity of nations by exposing their 
modernity. This they do by demonstrating that nationalism is a European ideology of 
relatively recent invention and that nations are made by states and nationalism. 
Therefore, the European impact is empirically registered. But once this source does its 
job historically and acts as an ideological trigger, then the empirical analysis tends to 
turn inwards. What is introduced empirically (i.e. the intersocietal) is excluded 
theoretically, because the narrative structure retains the separation of external and 
internal that is connected with linear, not ontologically co-constitutive, causality. Rather 
paradoxically, social constructivists arguments that begins as a critical epistemological 
challenge to the nation, ends up tacitly assuming the national unit of analysis (Duara 
2002:27–29).  
 
This problem is recently taken up by the transnational histories of nationalism (Bayly 
2004:199–243; Kostantaras 2013; Thiesse 2005). Within this group of historians, 
Selçuk Esenbel proposes a way out of the internalist paradox that I just mentioned 
through what she calls ‘the history of the international relations of nationalism’ 
(2004:1143) or ‘the transnational history of nationalism’ (Esenbel 2006:40). Esenbel 
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raises the crucial point that the only international history of nationalism that is available 
to us almost exclusively focuses on the relationship between Western countries as 
initiators and colonies as followers. This is the second key defect of Eurocentrism – one 
that also harms its critiques (i.e. postcolonial theory) (2006:41). More often than not, 
non-Western nationalisms are subjected to a comparative test with earlier – that is 
almost always West European – nationalisms and found to be theoretically irregular or 
abnormal (Bonakdarian 2015:77) and the source of this abnormality is sought internally.  
 
Here we have once again the dual problems of internalism and Eurocentrism that seem 
to embody each other like matryoshka dolls (Anievas and Matin 2016b:4–6). 
Comparison with European models produces two types of responses/outcomes. First, it 
is often concluded that a specific late developing nationalism is not comparable, hence 
outside the purview of theory: return to step one above, provide an exceptionalist and 
internalist empirical narrative. Second, empirical complexity and multilinearity of 
development is truncated by making woolly claims that a specific late developing 
nationalism is a mixture of Western and Eastern elements – in other words, simplify the 
world historical proliferation of late modernisation to the singular axis of West and 
East.      
 
To overcome these problems, this chapter recalibrates the empirical focus of the 
analysis and brings to the forefront a hitherto downplayed aspect of late modernisation. 
That downplayed aspect is the significance of transimperial, ‘Eastern’ connections and 
influences among late developing societies that had formative influence on the 
development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Seeking these lateral connections is 
to make empirically good on the promise that the theory of uneven and combined 
development overcomes the limitations of unilinear historical explanation. A multilinear 
understanding of historical development removes the analytical restrictions that reduce 
the processes of political emulation as unidirectional phenomena running from the West 
to the East. Furthermore, by this move the analysis of late developing nationalism is 
released from the inchoate civilizational categories of East and West (Anievas and 
Matin 2016c:253).  
 
The key aim of the chapter is to show that what are treated as separate histories of the 
formative periods of nationalisms in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire can be more 
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illuminatingly seen as entangled processes (Randeria 2002; Schiel 2009) played out 
across several imperial realms. This principle is not restricted to the study of 
nationalism. As one scholar notes, ‘we would do well to think of emulation as a 
multidirectional process within a global marketplace of ideas and practices’ (Garon 
2017:69). Nationalism in the Middle East had such biographies of development, 
resourced from a Eurasian transimperial marketplace of ideas and practices.   
 
The historical account presented here aims to develop these premises in three sections. 
The first section, like in the previous chapter, focuses on the general law of unevenness 
of historical development and outlines the geopolitical environment within which turn-
of-the-century elites and intellectuals sought remedies for the backwardness of their 
states and societies. The analytical priority of this form of explanation (i.e. 
‘international’) follows from the central ‘causal’ claim of this thesis laid out in the 
Introduction that late developing nationalism is a means to ward off geopolitical 
pressures and achieve or bolster sovereign independence. For that reason, an internalist 
theory that excludes this dimension of social reality cannot account for late developing 
nationalisms. That is why the ‘peculiarity’ of a late developing nationalism should not 
be explained away with reference to its theoretical incompatibility, but should be 
construed instead as a dynamic outcome of uneven and combined development formed 
across an inter-imperial geography responding to geopolitical pressures.   
 
To understand the concrete content of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, it is essential to 
make a note of two key differences of this period from the previous decades of the 
nineteenth century. First, a sustained closure of the Eurocentric international order 
behind civilizational boundaries and the predatory New Imperialism of the period 
strained the worldviews of reformist intellectuals and elites in the Muslim world (and in 
wider Asia), and profoundly impaired their belief in and enthusiasm towards the 
universality of European enlightenment. Exclusion incited recourse to varieties of 
nativist political projects such as nationalism, pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism (Aydın 
2007b).  Second, the varying impact of other late modernising societies, especially the 
meteoric rise of Japan, rearranged the real and perceived reality of European pressures 
and emboldened the elites of both countries towards the attainability of political 
modernisation. Essentially, after a century of defeats and humiliation at the hands of 
superior European powers, the rise of an Asian power modified geopolitics, or at the 
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least it made such modification a possibility in the minds of other Asian elites otherwise 
agonising over the backwardness of their societies.  
 
The second section focuses on the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across 
the late developing world during early twentieth century. As a truly trans-imperial 
phenomenon, containing constitutionalisms in their respective singular national 
narratives can only be counterproductive. Recent historiography has shown the degree 
and frequency of interactions and influences between different ‘national’ revolutionary 
situations (Atabaki 2010; Hart 1987:187–234; Kurzman 2010; Osterhammel 2014:558–
71).  
 
The third section of the chapter traces a diverse group of intellectuals and Muslim 
reformists, whose identities cannot be confined to the analytical or substantive 
boundaries of the nation-state. It was actually out of their activities the modern nation-
states of Iran and Turkey constructed their political boundaries. Focusing on these 
peripatetic intellectuals and revolutionaries make possible to see societies as ‘mobile, 
spatially expansive, and interactive’ (Ho 2017:907) rather than endogenously 
developing.  
 
5.2 The Rise of Japan and the Divergent Temporalities of Unevenness 
 
This section picks up an earlier argument raised in Chapter 2. I argued that Nairn’s tidal 
waves imagery of nationalism’s spread, which he adapts from Gellner’s earlier work, is 
based on a mentally convenient but ultimately simplistic understanding of unevenness. 
Unevenness in human history is not also a cascade-like structure with several stages of 
waterfall corresponding to different levels of development among societies. Any such 
metaphor with neat spatial contours or singular temporal differentiation between the 
advanced West and the backward East is bound to be simplistic. While the most 
imposing and unavoidable vector of unevenness was indeed the European superiority in 
the nineteenth century, the efforts to cope with this fact, referred here generically as late 
development, cannot be reduced to this singular axis of the West and East distinction. 
Because successful cases of late development complicated that over-determining 
distinction and dislocated its singular dyadic temporal differentiation between the 
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advanced and the backward parts of the world. An instance of those successful cases is 
in point here: the Meiji Japan. If we were to use Nairn’s Gellnerian metaphor, by the 
end of nineteenth century, Japan created another wave, from the East, sweeping across 
the world – simultaneously challenging and seeking admission into the club of 
‘civilised’ nations. This could not but modify the strategic content and vision of late 
development and its ‘politics of comparison.’  
 
The significance of the rise of Japan is elaborated here on two registers. The first is how 
the Japanese model influenced and modified the categories within which, as well as 
against which, the politics of comparison in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire (and in 
the wider Asia) responded to its condition of backwardness vis-à-vis an increasingly 
aggressive and imperialistic European powers. The second is the momentous and global 
impact of the Japanese victory against the Russian Empire in 1905. The significance of 
this victory as an ‘event’ demonstrates the ‘knock-on’ effects that reverberated across 
regional constellations that we touched upon in the previous chapter (Type 1 combined 
development). It is important to note that the Japanese influence was not experienced 
uniformly among the late developing societies, due to their uneven access to then 
recently burgeoning global infrastructures of transportation and communications.     
 
When Japan declared war on the Russian Empire on February 10, 1904, neither side 
thought that their scramble for the outer perimeter of Asia – most of the fighting took 
place in Korea and Manchuria – would be the global sensation it turned out to be. For 
nineteenth months, ‘millions around the globe kept abreast of the news of the surprising 
victories of “little” Japan over the “mighty” Russian Empire’ (Kowner 2007:2). The 
result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 was of course the highest point of Japanese 
prestige across the colonial and semi-colonial world. First time in modern times, an 
Asian state prevailed over a European power. It was an unprecedented blow to the turn-
of-the-century racial classifications as the inferior ‘yellow’ race came out victorious 
against the ‘white’ for the first time in an all-out war.    
 
But the fascination with this previously little known society started some decades 
earlier. More precisely, what made Japan initially a case for wonderment was the rate of 
its development within a compressed time frame, from the inauguration of the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868 to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. In little over three decades, 
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an Asiatic state, placed in the lower rungs of pseudo-scientific racial-civilisational 
rankings of the age, managed to shake off the stymying weight of unequal treaties 
imposed on it, industrialised its economy at a considerable degree, made unequalled 
strides in public education and ascended to the league of great powers (Beasley 
1999:188–228).47  
  
Although the meaning of the Japanese success was eagerly received across the Islamic 
world and intellectuals from Cairo to Bukhara were mesmerised by the Japanese feat of 
reconciling modernity with tradition, the availability of information was contingent 
upon several factors. And this provides us with pointers towards forming our narrative 
here. In Iran for instance most of what is known about Japan had to be filtered through 
port cities like Bombay, Cairo and Istanbul with notable expatriate merchant 
communities (Green 2011; Luesink 1993; Zarinebaf 1993). Direct knowledge was scant 
as the accounts of two travellers to Japan, one by Ibrahim Sahhafbashi in 1897 (Sugita 
2007:18–27) and the other by Mahdi Qoli Hedayat in 1904 (Barzegar 1987) were not 
published until much later (1978 and 1945 respectively). Before 1905, Iranian 
knowledge on Japan, claims one researcher, amounted little more than ‘rumours’ 
(Rajabzadeh 1988:145).   
 
While Japan was a common source of attraction thanks to its aptitude to modernise 
without shedding its traditional identity and acted in that sense as ‘a metaphor for Asian 
modernity’ (Aydın 2007a:224), knowledge of its history and achievements were not 
evenly distributed but marked by ‘the asymmetries of information gathering’ and 
‘variable opportunities’ of access to social networks and new industrial transport and 
communication infrastructures (Green 2013:417). Even the information that was 
‘delivered first hand’ by the Japanese themselves was uneven. Between 1870 and 1900, 
the Meiji governments dispatched about nine hundred government agents abroad to 
discover the secrets of what Japanese called ‘bunmei kaika’ (civilization and 
enlightenment) (Pistor-Hatam 1996:120). Of these most went to Europe and the US. Of 
the remainder, some arrived in the Middle East, presumably to inquire into the ways 
                                                
47 Japan’s ‘skipping of stages’ was noted by its Asian admirers. The Qajar courtier Mahdi Qoli 
Hedayat, who visited Japan in late 1903 and witnessed the war preparations, noted the rate of 
progress by making a comparative reference to Japan’s earlier feebleness in the face of 
Commodore Perry’s ‘a few ships’ in 1853 and how it was ‘now beating drums of war against 
Russia’ (Cited in Rajabzadeh 1988:152). 
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they dealt with the European challenge and/or to establish trade relationships. In Iran, 
these relationships were not strongly built, for ‘Japan seems to have preferred to 
develop Ottoman contacts’ instead (Haag-Higuchi 1996:73; see also Bieganiec 
2007:445; Esenbel 2000; Worringer 2014:101–10). 48  The handful of Japanese 
representatives who arrived in the Qajar domains seemed to have returned with much 
enthusiasm for future contacts.49    
 
This unevenness of access found expression in the Iranian case with various 
mechanisms of mediation with the bulk of information about Japan reaching Iran via 
places with sizeable Iranian expatriate communities such as Bombay and Istanbul 
(Green 2013:432; Pistor-Hatam 1996). One important example of this is Akhtar, the 
Persian expatriate newspaper in Istanbul. Established by Muhammad Tahir Tabrizi, an 
Azeri merchant resident in Istanbul, Akhtar published its first issue on 13 January 1876 
(Lawrence 2015:33). Initially, the Azeri merchant secured the blessing and the financial 
support of Naser al-Din Shah thanks primarily to the persuasive efforts of Muhsin Khan 
al-Mulk, the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul between 1873 and 1891. When the financial 
support from the Shah ceased, the émigré newspaper secured help from the Sublime 
Porte, which sharpened its critical attitude towards the Qajars. While its politics became 
more independent, its source material remained largely dependent on its host country 
and its connections beyond. Akhtar sourced its information on Japan from various 
European newspapers and the Ottoman journal Vakit, though not always with accuracy 
or depth (Pistor-Hatam 1996:114–15).  
 
Yet, the hype around the Japanese victory in 1905 built up to such proportions that the 
newspapers carried daily reports of the war, making the Iranian public exceedingly 
familiar with their Asian brethren. Hadid thus reported in its January 15, 1905 issue: 
                                                
48 Yet, this difference should not be overstated. Although each side made numerous overtures 
towards one another for establishing full diplomatic ties, the relationship remained deadlocked 
on one thorny issue. Japan insisted on most favoured nation status, hence capitulations like 
those granted to the Western powers, which to both Abdülhamid II and the Unionist 
governments did not assent. Full diplomatic relations on equal footing were only established in 
1924 with the new Turkish Republic.   
49 The head of the very first Japanese mission, Yoshida Masaharu lamented the low number of 
committed reformers within the government. A further cause of disappointment was the 
insecure position of those who were genuinely seeking reform. Arrived in Tehran in the autumn 
of 1880, one of Masaharu’s first courtesy calls was to none other than Mirza Hoseyn Khan, then 
the foreign minister of Naser al-Din Shah. Next day the Shah discharged him.     
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‘People of Iran do not have access to many newspapers. Reading papers has not grown 
into a habit. Nevertheless, the Russo-Japanese War attracted the attention of some 
people who followed its news closely, and such names as Korea, Manchuria, 
Kuropatkin, and Oyama became their habitual phrases’ (Quoted in Rajabzadeh 
1988:88).  
 
Notwithstanding the asymmetrical distribution of and access to information about it, the 
global impact of the war was momentous. First of all, its crushing victory over the 
Russian Empire catapulted Japan, above and over the racial barrier, onto the pedestal of 
world power. This was a feat that could not have been overlooked. The arch-imperialist 
Lord Curzon put it in no uncertain terms before the House of Lords in 1911: ‘the 
reverberations of that victory have gone like a thunderclap through the whispering 
galleries of the East’ (Marks 2005:626). Of those reverberations in Asia, he must have 
dreaded most those felt in British India (Stolte and Fischer-Tiné 2012:69–71). Lenin’s 
take was no less grandiose. This was a permanent blow, he observed, inflicted ‘by a 
progressive Asia against a reactionary Europe’ (Dickinson 2005:524).  
 
The great Indian poet and educator, Rabindranath Tagore, overjoyed by the news of 
Japanese victory in the Battle of Tsushima, is said to have led his students in a victory 
march around his school in Santiniketan (Hay 1970:42). His compatriot Mohandas 
Gandhi, at the time practicing law in South Africa, sensed that ‘the people of the East 
seem to be waking up from their lethargy’ (Kowner 2007:2). A staff officer in training 
at the Ottoman Military College, Mustafa Kemal was closely following the war with 
fascination. The Japanese people were, he noted with all the romanticism he could 
muster, a ‘warrior nation’ (Gawrych 2013:14; Hanioğlu 2011:66).    
 
And the pride felt across the colonised and semi-colonised world was not restricted to 
literate classes. People from all walks of life were seized by the euphoria. ‘Returning by 
ship to China [from England] in late 1905, the Chinese nationalist Sun [Yat-Sen] was 
congratulated by Arab port workers at the Suez Canal who thought that he was 
Japanese’ (Mishra 2013:2; Jansen 2000:441). In Iran the celebrations irritated the 
Russian officials so much that the Qajars felt the need to send a mollifying mission to 
St. Petersburg (Matthee 2012:113; Clark 2002). Years after the war, one of its 
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celebrated commanders, General Nogi Maresuke, was given a hero’s welcome by the 
masses in Istanbul (Worringer 2014:105).50  
 
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of the varied and entangled global impact of the 
Japanese victory and its ‘synthetic and “combined” character’ (Rosenberg 2006:326) is 
a Persian book published in Calcutta: Huseyn Ali Shirazi’s Mikadonama (The Book of 
Mikado). Published in 1907, it contained 58 black and white illustrations of battle 
scenes depicting Japanese victory. These illustrations were adapted from their originals 
drawn by a Dutch artist. In Nile Green’s words:  
 
We are looking at a situation in which a Dutch artist from Amsterdam made 
illustrations of a war fought in the ports of the far side of Eurasia and sent these 
images for publication in a London newspaper, which itself circulated as far as 
Calcutta, where its illustrations were copied by a Bengali artist to be printed in 
a Persian book intended for export to Persia (2013:434).  
 
But in terms of the ideological formation of nationalism, Japan’s spectacular ascent onto 
great power status galvanised the self-definition of the Ottoman and Qajar elites as 
Asian. Needless to say, this was increasingly imposed by the racist imperialistic 
attitudes of Western powers that poured scorn on reform efforts in the non-European 
world and saw them as ‘unsuited for constitutional form of government’ (Kurzman 
2010:281). In a way, the Japanese model provided the much-needed boost to the self-
confidence of elites in the Islamic world, even if the only possible common 
denominator they could establish with Japan was the highly vague concept of Asia 
(Haag-Higuchi 1996) – itself a European construction no less (Mitani 2006; 
Subrahmanyam 2016). In that sense, the Young Turks accurately detected that Japan 
‘breathed new life into ancient nations of the world such as China and Iran’ (Sohrabi 
2002:60) as the latter drew – as the Ottomans would do as well – the crucial lesson that 
states that failed to establish constitutional rule were doomed.   
 
For Islamists the rise of Japan proffered ‘an alternative vision of modernity for solving 
the “Crisis of Islam” in the wake of the Western challenge’ (Esenbel 2006:38–39). But 
                                                
50 The Ottoman military plenipotentiary to the Russo-Japanese War, Pertev Bey (Demirhan), 
was attached to the Third Army under the command of Maresuke (Demirhan 1953:92).  
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for all its anti-Western symbolism, the Japanese accomplishments drove home one 
unmistakable fact. No matter how Asian was Japan, its achievements were, in one 
degree or another, due its successful adaptation to the West (cf. Westney 1987). The 
implications of this cut across the debates surrounding the globalisation of Western 
modernity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Was the example of 
Japanese modernisation appealing because it offered a peculiar and imitable Asian 
resolution to the question of modernisation or was it appealing because it offered 
mechanisms through which to import Western modernity? The difference between the 
two can be subtle but still profound.      
 
In any case, both in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire knowledge on Japan was, in 
different degrees, secondary to the image. Aided by its geographical remoteness and 
scarcity of reliable information, ‘the real value of a name like Japan in the debate lies in 
its rhetorical reduction to the dichotomous presentation of simple oppositions, 
combined with a set of key words’ (Haag-Higuchi 1996:77) such as progress and 
backwardness. Thus, whenever its name was raised, it was almost always for 
comparative purposes with intended didactic effect. The downside was that as an Asian 
success story, Japan served as an unwelcome reminder for the Ottoman and Qajar 
reformers of the backwardness of their lands. Mahdi Qoli Hidayat made this comparison 
with a very familiar trope in the Middle Eastern political literature at the time: Japan, 
unlike Iran, was not numbed by negligence (gaflet) (Quoted in Rajabzadeh 1988:154). 
 
And not everyone drew the same ‘lessons’ from the Japanese model. One implication of 
the increasing Japanese reputation across the Asian continent was that it posed a threat 
to the authority and reputation of the Caliph, the spiritual leader of all Muslims. The 
person who carried the mantle of that position, Sultan Abdülhamid II of the Ottoman 
Empire harboured ambivalent feelings towards Japan. Surely, he must have marvelled at 
the fact that the Russian defeat in 1905 allowed him much needed breathing space as 
much of the Tsarist forces had to be diverted to the eastern edge of the continent. Being 
not the most secure monarch in the world, as it happens, Abdülhamid had nurtured a 
keen oversensitivity towards detecting threats to his power. Given that there was ‘so 
much attention focusing on Japan as a leader of the East [this could] potentially 
elevat[e] the status of the Meiji Emperor beyond that of the Sultan in his role as Islamic 




Moreover, the atrocious record of Japanese imperialism across Asia in the following 
decades did much to reverse the earlier amazement. Asian memory replaced Tsushima 
with Nanking, Admiral Togo with Prince Asaka. Yet even then certain degree of its 
symbolism survived. Some later post-colonial leaders and intellectuals actively shored 
up the legacy of the Japanese victory in 1905 by weaving it into a narrative of ‘Eastern 
triumphs.’ This effectively rearranged or even displaced earlier, European points of 
historical reference for Asian nationalists in the twentieth century. Generations that 
came of age in the interwar period, seasoned in anti-colonial struggles, and who went on 
to become leading figures in their postcolonial nation-states, took less inspiration from 
the French Revolution or the varieties of republicanism in the Americas, but studied 
closely the culturally associable history of the Battle of Tsushima, the Indian National 
Congress or the Turkish Independence War (Esenbel 2006:45–46). In this vein, 
Pransejit Duara identifies the Japanese victory as the event that symbolises the 
beginning of decolonisation movement, which culminated in the Bandung Conference 
in 1955 (2004:2–3).  In any case, it would perhaps not be a speculation to argue that the 
animosity towards imperialist Japan wore thin as one moved westward across the Asian 
continent, towards those parts that did not experience the brunt of Japanese colonialism.    
 
To conclude, Japan’s attraction to the elites of backward and semi-colonial states of the 
Islamic world should be understood, in the last instance, at the intersection of 
geopolitics and internal structures of late developing societies. These can gleaned from 
two things the Meiji restoration of 1868 ultimately aimed at. The first was to overcome 
the backwardness of Japan vis-à-vis Western powers, increasingly felt since the arrival 
of Commodore Perry’s fleet in 1853. The Tokugawa shogunate, then ruling Japan, gave 
in to the military intimidation, and soon assented to the signing of unequal treaties with 
the United States in 1854 and 1858, which turned out to be only first two of a series 
similar treaties with other European powers. These treaties accorded trade privileges to 
the European merchants and gave legal immunities to European subjects resident in 
Japan. This was a condition both the Ottoman and Qajar elites also familiar with 
(Kayaoğlu 2010). Secondly, the Meiji drive for industrialisation, guided towards 
achieving military parity, retained the traditional outlook of political rule. The Japanese 
elite, who prevailed from the factional struggle during the final decades of the 
Tokugawa period, legitimised its radicalism by restoring the figure, though not the 
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power, of the emperor. In effect, the Meiji oligarchs successfully combined an 
industrialising economy and military organisation, which owed much to variety of 
European models with traditionalist political symbolism – combined development that 
very much resembled another successful case of late development: Germany united 
under the Prussian lead. It is then no coincidence that ‘the Meiji oligarchs…used the 
Second Reich as their model when they framed an authoritarian constitution and legal 
code for Japan’ (Anderson 1991:11). As such, Japanese combined development was 
geopolitically driven and its outcome offered a model that could be absorbed by the 
traditional-minded Ottoman and Qajar elites in the sense that in general they were not 
motivated by radical republican ideals. This point resonates specifically with the 
question of constitutionalism to which we turn in the next section. 
 
5.3 The Entangled Histories of Constitutional Revolutions  
 
What ‘spills over’ from the previous section is a point that is crucial. We should not, as 
Esenbel does, conflate the ‘international’ and the ‘transnational’ and certainly should 
not neglect the crucial fact that these transnational connections and influences cannot be 
detached from the absolutely crucial dynamics of geopolitics of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  It is equally imperative not to reduce the rise of Japan to a 
matter of high geopolitics and restrict it to a short chapter in the diplomatic history of 
long nineteenth century. For the consequences that followed from this geopolitical 
rearrangement had direct and multiple implications for the domestic politics of the 
ailing empires of the Middle East. Furthermore, the rise of Japan and its consequences 
tells us that the content of geopolitics is more far-reaching than conventional realist 
view of inter-state power struggle. Indeed, the methodological significance of Japan lies 
not only with its defiance of the West/East binary, but in its informative complication of 
the putative analytical clarity of the so-called levels of analysis (i.e. the individual, the 
state and the international). Because these hierarchically conceived analytical levels 
hide from the view the lateral connections and effects that cuts across and through the 
boundaries of units.    
 
One such complication introduced by the rise of Japan was its example serving as ‘a 
desirable progressive regime of constitutionalism in an Asian setting of modernity, 
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blurring he lines between the East and the West’ (Esenbel 2006:45). This more than 
implicated its influence on the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across the 
world in the first decade of the twentieth century, most directly on the Asian instances. 
This wave included the revolutions in the Tsarist Russia (1905), Qajar Iran (1906), the 
Ottoman Empire (1908), Portugal (1910), Mexico (1910-11) and China (1911-12). And 
despite still largely historicised in specific national or regional contexts, the 
extraordinary and multilinear spread of constitutional movements and written 
constitutions defies any attempt to trace the historical process of diffusion back to a 
singular point of origin. In this vein, the global spread of constitutions runs in the face 
of Eurocentric historiography: ‘while its early phase coincided with the quickening 
spread of a mineral-based industrial revolution, at no stage was this constitutional 
revolution [on the world scale] ever shaped exclusively or even overwhelmingly by 
developments in Europe’ (Colley 2016:161; see also Goderis and Versteeg 2014; Go 
2002). 
 
Another key characteristic of constitutionalism at the turn of the century was that it 
ignited revolutionary fervour in very diverse settings. This diversity alone justifies 
Nader Sohrabi’s point that ‘the ideology of constitutionalism could not have emanated 
from their social structures’ separately (1995:1384). This necessitates a historiography 
that brings forward the significance and density of the connections among the 
constitutionalist elements in the late developing world, who construed this legal 
achievement as one of the cornerstones of the advanced world including Japan. It was 
such an understating that gave urgency to the constitutionalist agitations. The urgency 
and speed of the diffusion of constitutionalist ideas is indeed attested by the expatriate 
Qajar community’s transmission of the short lived Ottoman constitution: ‘when on 23 
December 1876 the first Ottoman constitution was proclaimed, Akhtar’s readers had 
access to a Persian translation only six weeks later’ (Pistor-Hatam 1996:113). Unlike 
this expatriate newspaper, published in Istanbul between 1876 to 1896 (Lawrence 
2015), newspapers published in the Qajar Empire made no mention of the Ottoman 
constitution. For as Anja-Pistor Hatam notes, ‘apart from a handful of open-minded 
Persian liberals who wrote about the advantages of constitutional monarchy and even 
presented their aims to the shah, the question of working out a constitution did not occur 




Therefore, when we talk about constitutional movements in the Ottoman Empire and 
Qajar Iran, the political and geographical designators cannot be used as spatial 
categories of exclusion, as outer limits of separate and endogenously determined 
developments. For constitutionalist agitators shared much of the same urban settings 
and treaded much of the same routes of movement and exile (see, for example, 
Berberian 2012). One can easily identify the nodes of this geographic trail as Paris, 
Istanbul and Tabriz where the Young Turks and Iranian constitutionalists came in 
contact.  But the usage of the concept of a wave requires a clear delineation of when to 
start surfing it historically. Surely, the string of constitutional revolutions that stormed 
the world from Mexico City to Lisbon, from Beijing to St. Petersburg in the early 
twentieth century were not evenly relevant or newsworthy for the reformists in the 
Middle East. It was the Russian Revolution of 1905 that had the most direct influence. 
It is also important to justly delineate its influence. As Ivar Spector rightly cautions, 
because the Revolution of 1905 broke out concurrently with the Japanese victory over 
Russia, there is a tendency to diminish its importance and attribute ‘the subsequent 
national and constitutional upsurge in Asian countries from Turkey to China’ to the 
impact of the latter (1962:30). This is counterproductive for several reasons.   
 
First of all, there is a causal effect extending from the Japanese victory against the 
Tsarist regime at the eastern edge of the Asia to the success of the Russian 
constitutionalists at the western end of the continent. With a considerable portion of its 
military muscle dispatched to the Korean peninsula to fight a highly unpopular war, the 
Tsar’s government could not muster enough power to stem the rising tide of political 
agitation at home. If this was not the case, John Bushnell argues counterfactually, it was  
 
most likely [that] civil disorders would have been suppressed within a few 
months. There would almost certainly have been no general strike, quite 
certainly no October Manifesto, and so nothing like the near-death experience 
the regime endured after the publication of the October Manifesto. These later 
events would have been foreclosed because, with a million regulars in hand and 
prepositioned to suppress revolution, the regime would have dealt with 
disorders with greater dispatch in the early part of the year, and with no reason 




Second, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was symbolic for its achievements against 
autocratic rule, which the Ottoman and Qajar reformers saw as an obstacle to national 
progress and parity with the West. This of course made Russia’s humiliating defeat all 
the more amplified in the Middle East as for both the reformist Ottomans and the 
reformist Qajars the Tsarist empire constituted the most alarming threat (Sohrabi 
2002:53) and they were quick to highlight that the Japanese victory was a victory of 
constitutional rule. Indeed, ‘Japan’s constitution was the secret of its strength’ (Mishra 
2013:4). In a sense, they envisioned the double defeat of Tsarist authoritarianism as an 
outcome of constitutionalism both in Japan and in Russia.   
 
Thirdly, the chain reaction of the Japanese victory and the Russian Revolution was then 
refracted through the internal structures of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran.  For the 
semi-colonial monarchies of the Middle East could not genuinely find solace in the fact 
that a mortal enemy of theirs lost the war, for the political inference from the result was 
clear as day. Charles Eliot, the British diplomat, reported on the mood of Sultan-Caliph. 
 
When the Sultan's officers congratulated him on the defeat of his old enemy 
Russia, he replied that he did not by any means consider the result a matter of 
congratulation, because he and the Czar were the only autocratic monarchs in 
Europe, and the defeat of the Czar meant a blow to the principle of autocracy 
(Quoted in Deringil 2011:14) 
 
Within the regional constellation of Western Asia, the Revolution of 1905 was closely 
followed by and provided inspiration and political guidelines to the constitutional 
agitators in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire (Yaşar 2014). A member of the British 
legation in Tehran chronicled the influence:  
 
The Russian Revolution has had a most astounding effect here. Events in 
Russia have been watched with great attention, and a new spirit would seem to 
have come over the people. They are tired of their rulers, and, taking the 
example of Russia, have come to think that it is possible to have another and 




The Young Turks were to draw similar inspiration. ‘If we strive like Russians,’ they 
believed, ‘it won’t be long before we see even the Sultan’s aides-de-camp among our 
supporters’ (Quoted in Sohrabi 2002:59) 
 
It was not that the reformists learned about constitutions in 1905. After all, the Young 
Turks wanted the restoration of the 1876 constitution that was suspended by 
Abdülhamid II two years after its promulgation (Mardin 2000:74–78). Both the 
Ottoman and Qajar reformers had a good grasp of the benefits of constitutions and 
parliaments through Western sources (Sohrabi 1995). But it was the Revolution of 1905 
that ‘afforded a practical demonstration to them that a constitution could be won from 
an autocratic ruler in a country that was still agrarian rather than industrial, and where 
the masses were both heterogeneous in origin and largely illiterate’ (Spector 1962:32). 
As with Japan of the past, a similar index of commonality could be compiled with 
Russia: Asian, autocratic, agrarian and backward. Still, notwithstanding its enthralling 
appeal, Japan, compared to the Tsarist enemy, was inconveniently far and peculiar. 
Russia, for better or worse, was close and familiar.  
 
What of the influences running across the Ottoman and Qajar domains? Within the 
broader wave of constitutional revolutions we can also trace the cooperation between 
the Qajar and Ottoman constitutionalists and ‘the construction of shared constitutional 
narratives.’ It is imperative to see that for the Young Turks the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution was not some political confusion occurring in a neighbouring country. As 
Farzin Vejdani notes,  
 
the Iranian constitutional revolution expanded the horizon of possibilities for 
the Ottoman constitutionalists: just as the Japanese victory over the Russian 
Empire in 1905 had demonstrated how an Asian nation could defeat a 
European power, the Iranian revolution demonstrated how constitutionalism 
could take root in an Islamic nation, thus contributing to a hope among 
Ottoman constitutionalists that their country was next (2010:319). 
 
Quite crucially, then, from the Young Turk point of view, the Iranian revolution 
mediated constitutionalism by its associable Islamic quality. The Iranian Constitution 
did this by combining the model of the Belgian constitution with what was called the 
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Supplementary Fundamental Law. The articles of this law, appended to the draft 
constitution of 1906 a year later, made it clear that defining quality of the nation was its 
Shi’i character and provided the legal basis for the establishment of a council of clerics 
with veto power over the parliament (Afary 2015:53–54).  
 
As we have seen above, an earlier mediation was already provided by the Japanese 
example of combined development. What the co-religionist Iranians achieved was to 
refract it through an even more familiar lens of Islam. This was of course no novelty to 
the Young Turks, since they were successors to a native Ottoman tradition of 
constitutionalism. That earlier effort was spearheaded by the Young Ottoman 
intellectuals who ‘had indigenized Western constitutionalism by rediscovering the 
purportedly forgotten constitutional, parliamentarian lineage of Islamic politics, and by 
doing so “invented” an entire constitutional “tradition” for Islam’ (Sohrabi 2002:52). 
But this Islamic mediation had another quality to it. Something that the Young Turks 
did not inherit from the Young Ottomans in any programmatic sense or form, even if 
one of the central figures of this earlier movement, Namık Kemal, provided earlier 
indications of this by his novel use of the concept of vatan (homeland) (Lewis 
1991:530).   
 
The other important lesson the Young Turks drew from the Iranian Revolution (and the 
Russian Revolution of 1905) was, against their misgivings, that the masses were 
capable of political consciousness and action. That the wider revolutionary tide 
corresponded with the tax rebellions of 1906-1907 in Anatolia emboldened the Young 
Turks that a mass based uprising was possible. These developments galvanised Turkish 
nationalism within the Young Turk ranks, which ‘progressively defined [Anatolia] as 
the Turkish “heartland” (kalb-i vatan).’ They also helped redefine the Turks, who 
rebelled against the ‘tyranny’ of the Sultan, as ‘the only ethnic group whose loyalty to 
the integrity of the Ottoman state could not be questioned’ (Sohrabi 2002:62). It was at 
the intersection of external influences and internal developments we could trace the 
early crystallisation of nationalism among the constitutionalist elite.  
 
Thus, by the time of the constitutional revolutions, the language of nationalism did no 
longer sound unfamiliar, or, to put it differently, the ideas of Namık Kemal found 
concrete socio-political correspondence. Moreover, Iranian and Turkish nationalism 
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both had a distinct internationalist ring to them. When, in the aftermath of the Iranian 
constitutional revolution, Sultan Abdülhamid sent troops into Iranian province of 
Azerbaijan with the pretext of clarifying border issues, constitutionalists in either side 
of the border was quick enough to note that this was not a mere cartographic 
undertaking. In effect the Sultan, having sensed the shifting sands of politics, made an 
attempt to halt the potential spread of constitutionalism from Iran to his realm. The 
Young Turks assured their Iranian compatriots that this aggression was not endorsed by 
the Ottoman nation (millet), hence the Sultan and his government was not representing 
its will (Vejdani 2010:321).  
 
The crystallising nationalist vision and the messages of solidarity between Iranian and 
Turkish constitutionalists made constant references to the inevitability of constitutional 
rule and framed this solidarity in civilizational terms as the mark of anti-imperialist 
feeling. In a letter to their Iranian counterparts, the expatriate Young Turks Prince 
Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza Bey were confident of the future developments: ‘after the 
establishment of a constitutional administration in the Ottoman government, the two 
neighbouring countries can strengthen their friendship and render service to Eastern 
civilization’ (Vejdani 2010:322). Thus, these transimperial (‘transnational’) influences 
and connections remained within the orbit of the over-determining fact of geopolitics 
(‘international’) – that is, determinations that arise from uneven relationships among 
societies understood in this period largely in civilisational terms. The constitutionalists 
both in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire never lost sight of the singularly central goal 
of saving the state and elevating their nations to the rank of the ‘civilised.’    
 
5.4 Transimperial Origins of Nationalism  
 
This section addresses a problem identified in Chapter 1. I argued that critical literature 
on nationalism, which commendably exposes the fallacy of nationalist claims to 
antiquity and demonstrates its patent modernity, nevertheless commits an incapacitating 
epistemological error. Its internalism paradoxically retains theoretically what it seeks to 
question empirically: the national unit of analysis. One striking manifestation of this is 
to treat ‘external’ nationalists, the émigré intellectuals from Crimea, Azerbaijan and 
Central Asia, among others, as unproblematic contributors to the development of 
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nationalist ideology in the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran. But their ‘empirical value’ 
in historical analysis cannot be fully captured, if their intellectual trajectories are 
imagined as unidirectionally flowing into a specific nationalist movement – be that 
Iranian and Turkish. As our discussion of the constitutional revolutions above show, 
aligning the intellectual trajectories of these itinerant nationalists with later nation-
states, actually leads to a nationally framed historiography. Transnational history seeks 
to avoid precisely this.    
 
Let me illustrate the messiness of overlapping geographies of the empires in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with a very representative anecdote.  
 
In December 1908, telegraph reports of the opening of the Ottoman parliament 
in Istanbul reached Irkutsk, a town in eastern Siberia not far from the 
Mongolian and Chinese frontiers of the Russian empire. Commenting on the 
arrival of this news, the famous pan-Islamic thinker and activist Abdurreshid 
Ibrahim (1857-1944), who was traveling in the region, marveled at the 
outpouring of enthusiasm among the local Muslim inhabitants. They rejoiced, 
he recalled, at the restoration of the Ottoman constitution and gathered for 
prayers and speeches. Although these revelers were, like Ibrahim, subjects of 
the Russian tsar, they felt a close affinity with ‘all of their Ottoman Muslim 
brothers.’ They tried to reply with their own telegrams expressing solidarity 
with the Ottoman constitutionalists, only to be thwarted by the meddling of 
Russian officials. Still, Ibrahim lauded the emotional ties that linked these 
Siberian Muslims with their co-religionists in the Ottoman capital: ‘It was as if 
the wireless telegraph bound their hearts together’ (Crews 2014:35) 
 
As with the example of Abdürreşid İbrahim reporting on the impact of the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908, the internal crystallisation of nationalism should be seen at the 
criss-crossing of several distinct but interpenetrating movements and ideologies that cut 
across imperial boundaries. The Muslim literary renaissance that included but was not 
restricted to Jadidism in Central Asia (Khalid 1998), the social democratic and socialist 
trends that became formidable political forces in the oilfields of Russian Azerbaijan 
(Suny 1972), constitutional movements that cut across several imperial domains as 
documented in the previous section, pan-Islamists – like the Volga Tatar Abdürreşid 
İbrahim just mentioned – who would thread across vast swathes of the continent and 
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reach as far as Japan to build pan-Asianist connections (Esenbel 2004, 2017; Koyagi 
2014; Ryad 2014). Without their own nation-states, many nationalist movements 
became politically matured within and in interaction with movements with 
‘transnational’ aims and organisation. In many cases these movements were established 
by ‘diaspora actors forced to live in many countries and cities far from the homeland of 
the perceived territory of the nation’ (Esenbel 2004:1143–44).   
 
It is crucial to understand that when we talk about the transimperial origins of 
nationalism, we are talking truly about, for want of a better word, a ‘transnational’ 
political vision and action that responded to geopolitical unevenness. In this sense, for 
example, the politics of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire was intermixed with 
pan-Islamism and (pan)Turkic nationalism. The Young Turk journal, Türk, which 
represented the Turkish nationalist faction within the wider reformist movement, 
appealed to Muslims in the Tsarist empire to be pro-active and side with the forces of 
change in order not to be politically side-lined following the collapse of autocracy 
(Yaşar 2014:124).  
 
Additionally, the same period witnessed major population movements caused by wars 
and political changes. Thus, given the rate of increasing of voluntary and involuntary 
mobility in this period, the significance of migration cannot be overlooked in the 
formation of nationalism. As Radhika Mongia notes, ‘certain migrations, at particular 
moments, come suddenly to provoke the framing of identity in national and nationalist 
terms…or to produce unforeseen eruptions of fervent nationalist claims’ (2014:204). 
Russian colonialism had a direct influence on the historical sequence of the emergence 
of nationalism in Central Asia and Azerbaijan then Qajar Iran. According to Mangol 
Bayat the intellectual life of northern Azerbaijan, under the Russian rule, was a 
generation ahead of their Iranian brethren (1991:80).  
 
Perhaps no other ‘society’ represents the non-national sources of nationalism more than 
Azerbaijanis. Historically a diasporic people, much like their neighbouring Armenians, 
Azerbaijanis were active in all of the prominent events of the-turn-of-the-century. It was 
the Azerbaijani merchants and intellectuals in Istanbul as we saw in the previous 
chapter who acted as not only the enlightened messengers of modernity in their 
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oppositional newspaper like Akhtar, but also as financial sponsors of the 
constitutionalist cause in Iran (Zarinebaf 1993).51   
 
The same Azerbaijanis, though their ancestral land was divided by state borders not of 
their own, migrated for work to northern Azerbaijan in the Russian Empire as labourers 
in oilfields and established ‘a red corridor across the Russo-Persian frontier’ (Yolaçan 
2017:17) which relayed subversive ideas of socialism and constitutionalism first into 
Iranian Azerbaijan and then into Iran proper. Wealthy Azerbaijani families who 
traditionally sent their scions to the esteemed seminaries of Isfahan, Mashad, Qum or 
Najaf for religious training were noticing a disturbing trend. Now that Azerbaijan was 
split between two imperial realms, especially those young Azerbaijanis who ended up 
growing up in the Tsarist part of their country were showing a growing interest towards 
Western learning. This newfound fervour diverted their path, in the first instance, 
towards the schools in Tbilisi, the intellectual and political hub of the Russian 
Caucasus. In these schools, ‘the young Azerbaijanis, though small in numbers, would 
rub shoulders with a cosmopolitan crowd of Armenians, Georgians, and Russians, 
whose own intellectual networks extended to Europe via Istanbul and St. Petersburg’ 
(Yolaçan 2017:96).  
     
And that familiarity found expression via a very crucial ‘agent’ in the history of Iranian 
and Turkish nationalisms and reformisms: the Russian Muslims of Central Asia and 
Caucasia. This is another key element for appreciating the significance of the 
Revolution of 1905. The experience of the Revolution of 1905 was one of the 
transnational interfaces across which the intellectual and practical foundations of 
Iranian and Turkish nationalisms were conceived. ‘The Russian Revolution of 1905 was 
as much a revolution of non-Russians against Russification,’ noted Hugh-Seton Watson, 
‘as it was a revolution of workers, peasants and radical intellectuals against autocracy’ 
(1977:87). It was only ‘with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1905,’ notes 
Mangol Bayat, that ‘national consciousness emerged as a viable force in the nascent 
political life of the urban Moslem bourgeoisie [in Russia]’ (1991:78). And it was the 
                                                
51 Expressed in his characteristically over-combative idiom, Hamid Dabashi nevertheless makes 
a compelling point: ‘Those who have been pushing an entirely Eurocentric set of 
“modernization” theories that kept generations of American political scientists in business will 
find it a nightmare trying to account for Azerbaijan as the principal site of progressive ideas and 
liberating monuments in the region’ (2007:95).  
 
 169 
members of this bourgeoisie, politically seasoned in their reaction to pan-Slavism and 
influenced by various Muslim reformism movements, who came to form the intellectual 
backbone of Iranian and Turkish nationalism initially (Uzer 2016:3). Besides the better-
known cultural hubs of reform like Istanbul, Bombay and Cairo, it was in another 
‘trans-imperial space,’ in Iranian Azerbaijan new-fangled or reformed ideologies of 
Iranian nationalism, pan-Turkism, socialism and pan-Islamism breathed life into new 




The problem that inspired this chapter was introduced earlier in Chapter 1. It was that 
the general tendency among the historians of the Middle East remains a narrative 
history of nationalism drawn within the analytical boundaries of the nation-state. And 
for all their critical spirit, social constructivist analyses of nationalism continues to fall 
into the territorial trap (Agnew 1994). Later in Chapter 2 we saw that one eminent 
historian of nationalism, John Breuilly, pointed out this problem not only for the 
historical work on nationalism in general but for his earlier work as well. His proposed 
solution was to utilise the historiographical opening provided by the global or 
transnational history (2011). In our case, the paradoxical national framing of 
nationalism had led a treatment of the contribution of émigré intellectuals as an 
uncomplicated empirical matter. Neither the departure nor the arrival points of the 
migratory process is questioned. Nor is the fact of migration itself. It remained at best a 
noteworthy point to be raised that original nationalists were not actually nationals of the 
national community. My wording is intentionally circular here, so as to demonstrate 
circularity of the critical literature.  
 
Actually, the ‘travelling itinerary’ of ideas matters. Turkish and Iranian nationalisms 
were born out of transimperial processes of ideational cross-fertilisation and political 
action. And arranging historical material in this way supplies us with what Mustafa 
Tuna edifyingly phrased as ‘an informed recognition of the complexity of imperial 
situations’ (2015:2). It would be a great disservice to history to try to undo these 
entanglements and analytically force transimperial complexities into distinctly coloured 




This is the main reason why this chapter makes use of historical works with consciously 
transnational or transimperial focus – be that in the interactive paths of Japanese 
influence, the constitutional revolutions of the early twentieth century or pan-Islamic 
movements across Eurasia – is that they show us how influences among societies of the 
late developing world, previously conceived as bounded units, are consequential and 
non-negligible paths and channels of political action and inspiration. No longer we can 
write, for example, the histories of constitutional revolutions as separate instances of 
national modernisations, crucial, if not unavoidable, steps out of ailing pre-modern 
empires.   
 
In that sense, the promises of a cross-fertilisation between U&CD and transnational 
history, or more inclusively with historical sociology and transnational history, is one 
currently under discussion with calls from both sides for a more fruitful engagement 
(Delanty 2016; Zimmerman 2017). According to one practitioner of transnational 
history, historical sociology can provide the tools to address the analytical deficit and 
‘mobility bias’ in transnational history (Osterhammel 2016). The way in which this is 
attempted here, that is the way in which U&CD relates to transnational history can be 
explicated on one important count.  
 
That is the distinction that should be drawn, and which is often overlooked, between the 
international and the transnational. The former concept denotes the relationship between 
states and refers to the causal consequences of unevenness as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The transnational connections and circulations of actors and ideas were attentive to the 
power differentials that obtained at this domain. Transnational history can at times 
conflate these two domains, as in the case of Selcuk Esenbel above. But there are also 
instances where this distinction is put to a better use. For example, Cemil Aydın’s 
important work on anti-Westernism in Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
does a great job in relating the changing discourse and politics of trasnantional anti-
Westernist movements such as pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism to the changing 
geopolitical setting – especially with regards to policies of European powers towards 








The central problem this thesis tried to tackle was the problem of internalism that in its 
various forms has influenced the study of nationalism. In Chapter 1, I tried to 
demonstrate that nationalist historiographies commits to internalist fallacy by positing 
the perennial existence of the nation that does not require any historical explanation. 
The problem of internalism is also visible in critical histories of nationalism to the 
extent that they fall short of problematising inside/outside distinction. In Chapter 2, 
another variant of the same problem is discussed. But this time internal and endogenous 
development was that of Western Europe, from which the theories of nationalism draw 
their causal arguments. But the ‘causal relationship’ between modernity as the social 
and historical basis of the emergence of nationalism is ‘reversed’ in late developing 
world. From the start, late nationalisms have been burdened with the mission of 
modernising what they regarded as their nations reshuffling of the conditions of 
emergence and the consequences (or aspirations) of nationalism.    
 
Uneven and combined development, I argued, provides a solution to this disconnection 
between theory and history by theoretically integrating the inter-societal dimension of 
social existence as a constitutive dimension of the internal structures of societies. This 
theoretical opening allowed me to conceptualise late nationalism as politics of 
comparison, which made possible to subsume into that concept not only the geopolitical 
dimension of late nationalism, but also its strategic transimperial origins. With this 
move, the emergence of nationalism in the late development is no longer a sociological 
question without an answer, as Reşat Kasaba provocatively reasoned. ‘Of all the ways 
in which people in the Ottoman Empire could think of themselves,’ he noted, 
‘nationality would seem to make the least sense’ (2006:199). This could very well have 
been the case if the people of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran were not part of 
extensive relations and connections of an uneven world. Nationalism was not so much 
of a choice, but an apt way to respond to necessities of an uneven world. There is 
nothing inherently paradoxical about late nationalisms. It is their temporal belatedness 
and the historically uneven conditions within which they emerged and to which they 




There are further potentials in the use of U&CD. First, there is no real historical basis to 
treat the West as a uniform source of influence and pressure as it developed unevenly 
itself. This is evident, and can be exemplified historically, by the rise of Germany to a 
major power status. The German example became influential during the early decades 
of twentieth century in Qajar Iran and in the Ottoman Empire. It functioned not only as 
a geopolitical option to avert pressures from the British and Russian Empires by 
alliance politics, but also as a source of intellectual influence for modernisation, which 
was itself the result of uneven and combined development. The German contribution to 
mediated modernisation is often overlooked or submerged under the ‘higher story’ of 
geopolitics.  
 
The relatively understudied ‘field’ of South-South connections, or what I here called 
Eastern Connections, can generate novel insights in combined development and 
mediated modernisation. This aspect of modern history is still largely overshadowed by 
the centrality of the West, to some degree understandably so I argued more than once 
throughout the thesis. But mediations within the South (of European ‘imports’) can 
yield new perspectives. At a minimum, it can put some distance between the histories of 
late developing societies and overwrought formulations of West-East hybrids, synthesis 
or combinations. The strategic dimension of political comparison was far richer than 
simplistic toggling between universal and particular, the West and the East.      
 
Probably the single most important conclusion that should be drawn from the argument 
and solution presented here is that the problems of internalism and Eurocentrism are 
intimately related, but they still require distinct efforts. A sole assault on Eurocentrism, 
as it has been carried impressively by postcolonial theory, is not enough to expunge the 
problem of internalism. Without a simultaneous and integrated critique of internalism, 
we would always fall short of an alternative theorisation of the universal (Matin 2013b). 
 
In so far as the relationship of U&CD to the history of late developing societies is 
concerned, two concluding passages are in order. They shall clarify my engagement in 
this thesis with two types of history writing: comparative and transnational. As the 
guiding problematic of the thesis also necessitates this: what is the relationship between 





But it must be added that these criticisms are in no way intended to dismiss the 
cognitive significance of comparison for historical research. As another critic puts it, 
‘comparison is central, even indispensable, to any historical analysis’ (Mongia 
2007:385). But its long-term association with Eurocentrism taints its own history and 
normative problems this introduces into historical analysis cannot be swept under the 
rug. The way in which I tried to ‘redeem’ comparison was to move away from 
comparison based on bounded units to comparison as a subjective category of actors.  
 
What did this change in the status of comparison add to the study of late nationalism? 
Primarily, it releases the history of late nationalism from its dyadic analysis pegged to 
the West-East distinction. Politics of comparison and mediated modernisation, two mid-
range concepts employed here, make it possible to integrate diverse orientations and 
visions of nationalist movements and individuals into the kernel of the theory. The 
study of late nationalism is no more an effort to adjudicate between whether late 
nationalism is an imitation from a European original or a native disposition – and how 
they are ‘mixed.’ Even more, can we compare to what degree one late developing 
society succeed in its mastery over that mixing in comparison to others (see, for 
example, Keyman and Yılmaz 2006). When we change comparison as a Eurocentric 
measuring device to an actual category of practice, we see that late nationalism hah 
many and changing sources to aspire for. This variety is what is empirically provided to 
us by transnational history.  
 
The relationship between U&CD and transnational history, unlike the one with 
comparative history, is phrased in much more diplomatic and amicable terms here. This 
could not have been in any other way. For U&CD and transnational history shares much 
of the same sentiments towards internalism and Eurocentrism. Their corrective impulses 
clearly demonstrate similar orientations, if by different analytical routes to achieve 
them. But such is no barrier to their co-operation, as it was stated several times over 
throughout the thesis.  
  
It is, after all, through its use of the findings of transnational history, referred to mainly 
in Chapter 5, this thesis valorises that much overlooked argument of Leon Trotsky: ‘the 
unevenness is itself is uneven.’ By sharing the same suspicion towards Eurocentrism, 
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U&CD and transnational history elevates Eastern connections to their warranted 
historical standing. They align on the argument that there is a history of international 
relations of the non-European world (broadly understood) on its own terms, though not 
disconnected from developments in Europe.  
 
With a well-placed attention to transnational circulation of people and ideas, the study 
of late nationalism can be released from its national-boundedness – a paradoxical and 
quite possible unintended problem that besets even the critical accounts. But there are 
ample opportunities to push the horizons of cooperation between U&CD and 
transnational history further. To cite one example, except for the odd account, the 
historiography of the interwar period in Iran and Turkey is exclusively studies in hyper-
national terms. There is no denying that this period seems to be a hard case for 
transnational inquiry as it was indeed a time when newly forged nation-states became 
increasingly inward-looking, not least by the geopolitical conjuncture of the time. But 
this did not mean that national history was all there was to them (see, for example, 
Houston 2014).  
 
And one final point needs to be made. The thesis made occasional references to a 
seemingly elusive concept: semi-colonial. Due to its tangential nature to the overall 
argument, it is left underdeveloped. This reflects also the treatment of the concept in the 
historical literature on Ottoman Empire and Qajar Empire. The concept receives the 
occasional and fleeting references, but so far – and to my knowledge – it has not been 
discussed extensively. The only extended discussion remains to be the one offered by 
Jürgen Osterhammel more than thirty years ago for the Chinese context (1986). With its 
suggestive qualities and little ink spilt so far for its elucidation, the concept of the semi-
colonial suggests a potential avenue of research – especially in its usability as a 
comparative concept that can be applied to a handful of non-European societies that 
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